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ABSTRACT
A methodology to achieve the preliminary design of a surveillance,
data validation and control system (SDCS) for a power plant is
developed. This method is applied to the specific case of designing a
surveillance, data validation and control system for the N.S. Savannah
nuclear propulsion plant. The study has two major sections. The first
part develops the procedure for the preliminary design of the SDCS.
The second part has the design and analysis of the pressure and volume
control system for the N.S. Savannah pressurizer. This second part is
included as an example of the procedure to be followed beyond the
preliminary design stage.
The preliminary design stage starts with a study of the N.S.
Savannah nuclear propulsion plant to obtain the input-output
characteristics required for control. With this information, the SDCS
is sized and eight alternative architectures are developed.
The selection of the best alternative is made by means of a figure
of merit calculated as the Expected Monetary Value for each
architecture. The results of this study indicate that a distributed
architecture using star interconnection with serial communication is
the optimal alternative for the specific case of N.S. Savannah nuclear
propulsion plant.
The proposed design of the pressure and volume control system is
made on the basis of a Proportional-Integral-Derivative (PID)
controller, and motor operated valves. In order to test the transient
responses obtained with the control system, a quasi-steady state model
for the pressurizer is developed.
The pressurizer and the control system models are simulated in a
programmable calculator code. The results of the simulation indicate
that no integral action is required for the controller. Also the PID
controller is tuned with a strong derivative action. The response of
the system under transient conditions is predicted to be within the
quarter amplitude decay criterion.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. David D. Lanning
Title: Professor of Nuclear Engineering
Thesis Co-Supervisor: Dr. Paul J. Nicholson
Title: Visiting Scientist
Thesis Reader: Dr. Douglas A. Carmichael
Title: Professor of Ocean Engineering
-
.0 (D 0. (Dr3 CL (D
5ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to express my gratitude to my thesis advisors, Dr.
David D. Lanning, Dr. Paul J. Nicholson, and Dr. Douglas A. Carmichael
for their continued support and encouragement during the term of this
work. I would also like to thank the support given by the Chilean Navy
sponsoring this study. I would like to acknowledge the cooperation
provided by the Digital Equipment Corporation and in particular I
appreciate the assistance provided by Mr. Carl L. Noelcke, Mr. Timothy
Litt, and Mr. Richard A. Gaudette. I would like to thank Mrs. Alice J.
Sanderson and Mrs. Priscilla F. Kelly for production of the manuscript
and drawings.
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
Guillermo Baltra A. was born the 16th of January, 1951 in Santiago,
Chile. He completed grammar school studies at the Manuel Barros
Borgono School, and high school studies at Gabriela Mistral School.
Both institutions are in Santiago, Chile. From 1966 to 1970, the
author attended the Naval Academy where he graduated as a Navy officer
with the higher rank in his promotion. From 1974 to 1977 he attended
the Naval Polytechnic Academy where he graduated as a Naval Electrical
Engineer with the higher rank in his promotion. From 1978 to 1981 he
attended Massachusetts Institute of Technology, where his degree
program included both Nuclear Engineer and Master of Science in Naval
Architecture and Marine Engineering.
The author has previously published his Electrical Engineering
thesis entitled "Design and Construction of a Nuclear Reactor
Simulator" in 1977. He has worked in several Navy posts, including one
as manager of a major electrical project at the Naval Shipyards at
Talcahuano, Chile.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Introduction 17
1. Design Methodology 22
1.1 Introduction 22
1.2 Operational Requirements 22
1.3 System Characteri stics 24
1.3.1 Coordinated Control of the Load 25
1.3.2 Safety Control 25
1.3.3 Data Validation 26
1.3.4 Surveillance and Diagnosis 28
1.3.5 Operator Advice 29
1.3.6 Offline Data Supply 29
1.4 Preliminary Design 29
1.4.1 Expected Monetary Value 30
References 34
2. Preliminary Design 36
2.1 Introduction 36
2.2 Organization and Definition of the Functions 37
2.2.1 Control Function 38
2.2.2 Communication Function 40
2.3 Function Specifications 41
2.3.1 Basic Control Functions 41
2.3.2 Advanced Control Functions 62
2.4 Selection of Basic Alternatives 62
8TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
2.4.1 The Weighting Factors Method 65
2.4.2 Description of the Selected Architectures 67
2.5 Implementation of the Alternatives 75
2.5.1 Central Computer Architecture 78
2.5.2 Dual Central Computer Architecture 79
2.5.3 Star Architecture 82
2.5.4 Dual Star Architecture 88
2.5.5 Global Bus Architecture 99
2.5.6 Dual Global Bus Architecture 99
2.6 Fault Tree Formulation 112
2.6.1 Central Processor Architecture 118
2.6.2 Dual Central Processor Architecture 119
2.6.3 Dual Star Architecture 119
2.6.4 Global Bus Architecture 121
2.6.5 Global Bus Architecture 122
2.6.6 Dual Global Bus Architecture 122
2.7 Probabilities of Failure of Components and Software 122
2.7.1 Central Computer Architecture 124
2.7.2 Dual Central Computer Architecture 128
2.7.3 Star Architecture 129
2.7.4 Dual Star Architecture 134
2.7.5 Global Bus Architecture 138
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
2.7.6 Dual Global Bus Architecture 140
2.8 Cost of the Architectures 141
2.8.1 Central Computer Architecture Cost 143
2.8.2 Dual Central Computer Architecture Cost 144
2.8.3 Star Architecture Cost 145
2.8.4 Dual Star Architecture Cost 146
2.8.5 Global Bus Architecture Cost 147
2.8.6 Dual Global Bus Architecture Cost 147
2.9 Expected Monetary Value Analysis 147
2.9.1 Introduction 147
2.9.2 Decision Tree 148
2.9.3 Payoff Calculations 150
2.9.4 EMV Analysis 153
2.9.5 EMY Analysis with a Fault Tolerant Computer 156
2.10 Sensitivity Analysis 159
2.10.1 Introduction 159
2.10.2 Discussion of the Results 161
References 173
3. Model of N.S. Savannah Nuclear Reactor Pressurizer 175
3.1 Introduction 175
3.2 Mathematical Model for the Pressurizer 175
3.2.1 Steam Control Volume 176
3.2.2 Water Control Volume 180
10
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
3.3 State Equations for the Pressurizer 181
3.3.1 Insurge Condition 182
3.3.2 Outsurge Condition 183
3.3.3 Quasi-Steady State Condition 184
3.3.4 Analytic Formulation 190
3.4 Control System Model 195
3.4.1 Central System Description 195
3.4.2 Block Diagram Representation of the Central System 198
3.4.3 Transfer-Functions 199
References 227
4. Digital Simulation and Transient Analysis 229
4.1 Introduction 229
4.2 General Flow Fiagram 229
4.3 Detailed Analysis of the General Flow Chart 234
4.3.1 Initial Conditions 234
4.3.2. Let-down and Make-up Flows Calculations 234
4.3.3 Total Surge Flow Computation 239
4.3.4 Total Keat and Spray Flow Computation 239
4.3.5 Saturation Line Enthalpies Calculations 244
4.3.6 Condensed Water Flow Calculation 244
4.3.7 Flashing Flow Calculation 244
4.3.8 Specific Volume Calculation 244
4.3.9 Level Determination 246
11
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
4.3.10 Surge Enthalpy Calculation 246
4.3.11 Print Sequence 246
4.3.12 Pressure Integration 246
4.3.13 Water Enthalpy Integration 246
4.3.14 Steam Mass Integration 246
4.3.15 Water Mass~ Integration 248
4.3.16 Iteration 248
4.4 The Program 248
4.5 Control System Tuning 249
4.5.1 Simulation Input Data 249
4.5.2 Control System Tuning 251
4.5.3 Study Cases 253
References 264
5. Summary and Conclusions 265
5.1 Preliminary Design Conclusions 266
5.2 Pressure and Volume Control System Design Conclusions 267
5.3 General Recommendations 268
APPENDICES
A. N.S. Savannah Reactor Features 272
B. Software Parameters Forecasting 284
C. Configuring Sheet for Architectures 295
D. Fault Tree Analysis 335
12
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
E. Debugging Time Calculations 444
F. Sensitivity Analysis 447
G. State Equations for the Quasi-Steady State Condition 453,
H. Control System Simulation Program 458
I. Detailed Description of the N.S. Savannah Pressurizer Vessel 468
13
LIST OF FIGURES
Page
1.1.1 Design Process Flow Diagram 23
1.4.1 Generalized Decision Tree 32
2.4.1 Central Processor Architecture, Block Diagram 69
2.4.2 Dual Central Computer Architecture, Block Diagram 70
2.4.3 Global Data Bus Architecture, Block Diagram 71
2.4.4 Dual Global Data Bus Architecture, Partial Block Diagram 73
2.4.5 Star Architecture, Block Diagram 74
2.4.6 Dual Star Architecture, Parallel Transmission,
Partial Block Diagram 76
2.4.7 Dual Star Architecture, Serial Transmission, Parallel
Block Diagram 77
2.5.1 Central Computer Architecture, Detailed Design 80
2.5.2 Dual Computer Architecture, Detailed Design 83
2.5.3 Star Architecture, Parallel Transmission, Detailed Design 89
2.5.4 Star Architecture, Serial Transmission, Detailed Design 95
2.5.5 Dual Star Architecture, Parallel Transmission,
Detailed Design 100
2.5.6 Dual Star Architecture, Serial Transmission,
Detailed Design 104
2.5.7 Global Bus Architecture, Block Diagram 108
2.5.8 Dual Global Bus Architecture, Detailed Design 113
2.9.1 Decision Tree for Situation One 149
2.9.2 Deci sion Tree for Situation Two 151
14
LIST OF FIGURES
2.10.1 EMV Sensitivity to Cost Variations (Situation One)
2.10.2 EMV Sensitivity to Probability of a Control
Microprocessor Failure (Situation One)
2.10.3 EMV Sensitivity to Probability of a Diagnosis
Microprocessor Failure (Situation One)
2.10.4 EMV Sensitivity to Probability of a Diagnosis
Microprocessor Failure (Situation One)
2.10.5 EMV Sensitivity
(Situation One)
2.10.6 EMY Sensitivity
2.10.7 EMY Sensitivity
(Situation One)
2.10.8 EMV Sensitivity
(Situation One)
2.10.9 EMV Sensitivity
2.10.10 EMV Sensitivity
2.10.11 EMV Sensitivity
(Situation Two)
2.10.12 EMY Sensitivity
(Situation Two)
2.10.13 EMY Sensitivity
2.10.14 EMV Sensitivity
(Situation Two)
to Probability of a Software Failure
to
to
164
164Payoff of Success (Situation One)
Probability of Line Failure
165
to Time Between Maintenance Policy
to
to
to
Alternative Cost (Situation Two)
Operator Failure (Situation Two)
a Central Processor Failure
165
166
166
167
167
168
to a Diagnosis Microprocessor Failure
to
to
Line Failure (Situation Two)
Time Between Maintenance Policy
168
Page
162
162
163
163
15
LIST OF FIGURES
2.10.15
2.10.16
3.2.1 a
3.2.1 b
3.3.1
EMV Sensitivity to Software Failure (Situation Two)
EMV Sensitivity to Probability of Software Failure
Dual Star Serial Architecture (Situation One)
Steam Control Volume
Water Control Volume
Quasi-Steady State Model
3.4.1 Pressure and Volume Control System
3.4.2 Pressure and Volume Control System, Detailed
Block Diagram
3.4.3 Analog-Digital (A/D), Digital-Analog (D/A),
Transfer Function Model
3.4.4a Armature Controlled DC Motor
3.4.4b Armature Controlled DC Motor, Block Diagram
3.4.5 Hysteresis Cycles for the Heaters
4.2.1 General Flow Chart
4.3.1 Wlet and wmak Computations
4.3.2 QH and w sp Computations
4.3.3 Wf1 Computations
4.3.4 wsu (h su -hf) Computations
4.5.1 PID Controller Tuning
4.5.2 Pressurizer Pressure Behavior Under Transient Conditions
4.5.3 Pressurizer Level Behavior Under Transient Conditions
4.5.4 Pressurizer Pressure Behavior Under Transient Conditions
Page
169
170
177
177
186
196
200
207
211
211
221
231
237
240
245
247
252
256
257
258
16
LIST OF FIGURES
4.5.5
4.5.6
4.5.7
A.1
D.1
D.2
D.3
D.4
D.5
D.6
D.9
D.10
D. 11
D.13
D.14
D.15
D.16
I.1
Pressurizer Level Behavior Under Transient Conditions
Pressurizer Pressure Behavior Under Transient Conditions
Pressurizer Level Behavior Under Transient Conditions
N.S. Savannah Nuclear Propulsion Plant
Central Computer Architecture, Situation One
Central Computer Architecture, Situation Two
Dual Central Computer, Situation One
Dual Central Computer Architecture, Situation Two
Star Architecture, Parallel Transmission Alternative,
Situation One
Star Architecture, Parallel Transmission Alternative,
Situation Two
Dual Star Architecture, Parallel Transmission Alternativ
Situation One
Dual Star Architecture, Parallel Transmission Alternativ(
Situation Two
Dual Star Architecture, Serial Transmission Alternative,
Situation One
Global Bus Architecture, Situation One
Global Bus Architecture, Situation Two
Dual Global Bus Architecture, Situation One
Dual Global Bus Architecture, Situation Two
Pressurizer
Page
259
260
261
273
336
338
340
345
349
362
e,
e,
370
385
392
412
416
421
436
469
17
INTRODUCTION
In order to satisfy social needs, and with the assistance of
accelerated technological development, complex industrial processes
have been developed. Examples include the chemical industry, the
metallurgical industry and the electric power generation industry. All
of these industries are characterized by a coordinated operation among
several devices which are organized to perform a specific task.
Another feature of these processes is the high volume of data flowing
between the processes and their central control systems. Central
control systems are responsible for coordinating all the tasks and
guiding the complex toward the optimal point of its capabilities.
Traditionally it has been the human operator who bore most of the
control and coordination burden, but the volumes of information
together with the short time constants involved in complex industrial
processes, have threatened to overwhelm human reaction capabilities.
This is especially true in situations with sharp changes in process
parameters. Recent trends have been to utilize automatic controls
which can handle such situations, thus making the process operation
safer and more closely optimal.
The detailed analysis on industrial trends performed by Merrit
(Reference Int.1) makes clear that direct digital control (DDC) and
distributed digital control are the best automatic control system
design alternatives for the near future, to replace the present analog
control instruments that are now used in most process control systems.
The reasons for replacing the analogic control with digital control are
18
related to the following peculiar characteristics of digital control:
1. Digital control can handle a larger amount of information
simul taneously.
2. Digital control has the capability of making logical decision.
3. Digital control has the capability of storing and recalling
information.
4. Digital control algorithms can be easily updated by changing the
software.
5. Digital control hardware can be used in association with very
important- tasks of sensor validation, process surveillance, and
aiding the operator in critical situations.
These characteristics make digital control ideal for controlling
devices to be used in a nuclear power plant in which a high
availability plus an optimal fuel utilization, and overall, a high
level of safety, are required. What is desired then is to find the
appropriate digital architecture which performs these functions in the
best possible way.
This thesis seeks mainly to answer the question of finding the
digital architecture most appropriate for controlling the plant,
performing data validation, plant surveillance, and operator aid. The
plant chosen for the analysis (the N.S. Savannah nuclear propulsion
plant) is a marine propulsion plant: this plant has a
pneumatic-electrical control system (analog control system).
Alternatives for replacing the original control system with a digital'
control system with data validation and surveillance capabilities are
19
studied, and a method for selecting the best architecture to perform
these tasks is demonstrated.
The work has been divided into two major areas:
1. Design and selection of the optimal digital architecture.
2. Design of the automatic control system of one dedicated control
loop in the plant. The loop chosen is the pressure and volume
control at the pressurizer.
Because the scope of the work is broad, it was decided to develop a
general methodology which first leads to the design and then to the
selection of the optimal architecture. The design of the pressurizer
control loop is intended as an example which can be followed with
further work in other distributed control loops.
Although the design will be performed on a specific N.S. Savannah
case, the methodology developed is intended to be general and it can be
applied to other nuclear power control systems.
The sequence of the work performed in the first part of this study
is summarized as follows.
1. Eight feasible architectures are selected among several
alternatives, by using a weighting factor method. This step
narrows the number of possibilities to a manageable group of
alternatives.
2. Each one of the alternative designs is detailed to the component
level.
3. A figure of merit for selecting the optimal alternative is
developed. This figure of merit is a more elaborate method than
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the weighting factors and requires: knowledge of the probability
of failure for each alternative, their corresponding costs, and the
payoff (negative or positive) that the failure or success of the
architectures willinvolve.
4. In order to calculate the probability of failure for each
alternative, the corresponding fault trees are derived. The basic
event probabilities will be calculated on the basis of data
supplied by component vendors.
5. The figure of merit is calculated and the best architecture is
selected by analyzing the sensitivity of the figure of merit to
changes in its parameters.
The complete process of designing the eight alternatives and selecting
the optimal is explained in detail in Chapter 2. The methodology for
the design process and the background for implementing the figure of
merit are described in Chapter 1.
The second part of this work concerning with the design of the
pressure and volume control systern for the primary circuit of the 4.S.
Savannah nuclear reactor, follows these steps:
1. A statement of the methodology for designing the control system is
given. Because the transfer functions of the devices involved in
the control process are highly nonlinear, the common linear
approaches (Back, Nyquist, root locus) are discarded. Thus, the
only practical method available is to perform an analysis in the
time domain in order to find the appropriate control system.
2. The time domain approach requires the state equations governing the
21
whole system (plant and controller). Therefore the state equations
are developed. In order to simulate the pressurizer behavior a
two-control volume approach has been used.
3. The control system chosen is a common PID controller operating on
DC (direct current) actuators. The transfer functions for the
controller and actuators are also developed.
4. Using the state equations, a computer code which will simulate the
whole system behavior is then written.
5. The final step is to adjust the constants of the controller in the
computer code, to demonstrate that the response of the system is
acceptable for its future tasks.
The criterion for analyzing the acceptability of the control system
will be based on the overshoot (quarter-amplitude decay criterion) and
rise time of the response. (No unstable behavior will be accepted.)
The state equations and transfer functions are developed in Chapter
3. Chapter 4 is devoted to the design of the simulating code, and the
tuning process of the controller. Chapter 5 is the final section, and
contains the conclusions obtained from the work and some
recommendations for further work in this field.
REFERENCES
1. Large systems are in control. Richard Merrit. Instrument and
control systems. November 1978.
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CHAPTER 1
DESIGN METHODOLOGY
1.1 INTRODUCTION
The flow diagram (Figure 1.1.1) shows the stages that have been
followed in order to complete the new design for the control system of
the N.S. Savannah nuclear propulsion plant. The A and B feedbacks
(Fig. 1.1.1) point out the need of comparing the results obtained at
the end of each stage with the boundary conditions previously stated.
That is, if the system characteristics do not meet the operational
requirements, the specific set of characteristics should be modified
until the set meets the requirements.
The three last feedbacks are adjustments to the previous design.
For example, if at the end of the plant integration and validation
stage, the system does not work, the design process has to be fed back
to the preliminary design stage where the changes that the designer
deems appropriate should be made.
The scope of this work will cover up to the preliminary design
stage. The preliminary design stage is considered finished when the
optimal digital architecture is selected.
1.2 OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS
The operational requirements are implicit in the design objective.
The design objective is defined as follows: "To replace the automatic
control system of the N4.S. Savannah nuclear plant by a modern system
which offers better performance and safer operation than the original.
23
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B
PLANT INTEGRATION
& VALIDATION
Figure 1.12 Design Process Flow Diagram.
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The implementation of the new system has to be done with a minimum of
changes in the propulsion plant itself, and using the technology
available in the market." The performance of the control system can be
judged by the behavior of the plant during transients. The improvement
in safety during operation can be judged in terms of the features added
to the control system which help the operator's performance. (This is
a characteristic that the original design did not have.)
1.3 SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS
The characteristics that the system must have in order to meet the
stated objective are the following:
1. To supply, automatically, the necessary power to follow the load
demand.
2. To assist the operator continuously on the state of the plant,
supplying the necessary information with reliable values. This set
of critical parameters displayed to the operator is called the
safety state vector (Ref. 1.5).
3. To perform surveillance on-line over the plant, in order to make
early detection of malfunctions.
4. To advise the operator, in case of accidents or malfunctions, on
probable courses of action to follow.
5. To supply offline data related to the plant, as required by the
plant management staff.
Each one of these characteristics requires a separate explanation.
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1.3.1 COORDINATED CONTROL OF THE LOAD
Basically, this characteristic is similar to that of the original
system. Appendix A has a brief description of the N.S. Savannah
nuclear plant that is helpful in the following description. A detailed
description of the plant is given in References 1.1 and 1.2.
The ship propulsive plant can be seen as a system of variable load,
which must adapt to the different speeds ordered from the bridge. This
situation is especially critical when the ship arrives or leaves ports,
and when the ship is crossing channels. The variable load has to be
matched by the power supply system (the reactor).
Seven loops of dedicated automatic control make up the whole
coordinated control system.
- Pressure and volume control in the pressurizer
Level control in the steam generators
- Steam pressure and flow control in the secondary circuit
- Load following and temperature control in the primary circuit
- Propeller speed control (optional, only when manoeuvring)
- Pressure and temperature control in the buffer seals system
- Temperature and flow control of the primary purification system
1.3.2 SAFETY CONTROL
Safety control is another characteristic retained from the original
system. The distinguishing characteristic of the safety control is its
absolute independence from the diagnostic and coordinated control
system. This type of control will not be examined in this study.
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1 .3.3 DATA VALIDATION
Validation of the information coming from the sensors is a new
operation required by the control system. Fundamentally, data
validation means to eliminate the failure uncertainty related with the
information given by the instruments. This uncertainty is caused by
sensor failures, sensor aging or large random noise added to the
readings.
One method used to validate instrument readings is to take 3
signals coming from 3 different sensors (same parameter). The readings
are averaged; if one sensor deviates by a specific amount from the
average, it is considered to have failed, and the readings coming from
that sensor are neglected. The validation process follows with the
remaining sensors. The obtained averages are smoothed by means of a
fitting algorithm (for example, the least squares method) applied to a
group of previous readings, e.g., the ten readings immediately before
the current reading. In this way it becomes a smoother signal showing
clearly its trend. Finally, the signal is input to a mathematical
filter (for example the Kalman- filter) with the aim of obtaining a
signal which is the best estimation of the variable that can be
obtained. Another consequence of using a mathematical filter is that
some variables which are not directly measureable can also be estimated.
The information validated in this way can follow four different
paths:
1. It can be displayed directly to the operator
2. It can be used as an input to the automatic control algorithms
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3. It can be used as an input to the diagnosis algorithms
4. It can be stored offline for further analysis
In the new control system design the data coming from the following
subsystems will be validated.
1. Nuclear parameters of the reactor
2. Control rods
3. Primary circuit with its pumps
4. Steam generators
5. Main feed pumps
6. Condensate pumps
7. High and low pressure heaters
8. Main condenser
9. Deaerating tank
10. Main turbines
11. Buffer seals system
12. High pressure steam circuit
13. Primary purification system
14. Electrical generation system.
Only the validated data which are meaningful to the operator will
be displayed on a top level display. (Other information can be
obtained on demand.) This preselective process is intended to relieve
the operator from considering unimportant signals and to show him the
significant variables which will help him in making decisions. The
preselected set of variables is called the safety vector of the plant
(Ref. 1. 5) .
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1.3.4 SURVEILLANCE AND DIAGNOSIS
This is one particularly interesting feature added to the control
system. This characteristic is defined as the ability to detect a
malfunction and to diagnose its cause.
There are several techniques which aim to achieve these
capabilities. To detect malfunctions, the following techniques are
-available (Refs. 1.6, 1.7, 1.8, 1.9):
- Spectral densities method
- Reactivity balances method
- Coherence function method
- Linear discriminating function
- Multivariable analysis
To diagnose the detected errors the following techniques are
available (Refs. 1.10, 1.5):
- Linear regression analysis
- Pattern recognition
- Thermodynamic bal ances
- Cause-consequence analysis.
In order to estimate the implicit variables (variables which are not
directly measureable), the control algorithm will have a model of the
process which is controlled. The reactivity balances and thermodynamic
balances method also use a model of plant to perform their diagnosis
functions. This makes the two latter techniques suitable to be
employed together with the filtering technique by shearing the common
model of the plant.
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1.3.5 OPERATOR ADVICE
Once the malfunction or accident is detected and diagnosed, the
system must advise the operator on the proper course of action to cope
with the emergency. To do so a predicting algorithm has to be added,
which functions foreseeing the behavior of the variables if the
situation continues as at the actual moment. There are also several
techniques devoted to this advising function. Some of them are (Refs.
1 .3, 1.11):
- Fault treee analysis
- Cause consequence charts.
1.3.6 OFFLINE DATA SUPPLY
This feature is intended to be a help to the reactor plant
managers. All relevant data will be stored offline to be available for
consulting.
1.4 PRELIMINARY DESIGN
The goal of the preliminary design stage is to produce several
alternatives satisfying the operational requirements and system
characteristics. After that the most suitable alternative will be
selected by means of a figure of merit. This figure of merit has to
reflect the design policy governing the work.
Once the minimum acceptable requirements of safety and performance
are satisfied, the process of selecting the best alternative has to be
ruled by a figure of merit which penalizes high cost and low
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availability. Cost is defined as the total cost of the system
calculated at its Net Present Value (NPV). By availability is meant
the percentage of operating time compared with its useful life,
measured over the life cycle of the control and surveillance system.
The whole problem shows the characteristics of a decision analysis
case. The decision maker has several alternatives to decide, each
alternative has its own cost. Moreover, the success or the failure of
each alternative involves a certain amount of benefits or losses.
Finally each alternative has a particular probability of being
successful during its time between repairs.
Therefore a figure of merit obtained by applying decision analysis
theory is appropriate to this case.
1.4.1 EXPECTED MONETARY VALUE
The Expected Monetary Value (EMY) is a technique used to assess the
decision process among several feasible alternatives. Each one of the
alternatives satisfies the basic requirements, but they have different
costs and different benefits. These benefits are also tied to
different probabilities of achieving them.
The EMV of one alternative with several outcomes is obtained by
multiplying each possible cash outcome by its probability of occurrence
and summing these products over all possible outcomes. The decision
analysis theory states that a decision maker will be indifferent
between two alternatives with the same EMY and he will prefer the
alternative with the higher EMY (Ref. 1.4).
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Thus the EMV has the appropriate characteristics to be used as a
figure of merit for this study.
The first step to achieve the figure of merit (EMV) is to develop a
decision tree which is a graphic display of the alternatives faced by
the decision maker. The alternatives that can be controlled by the
decision maker are represented by a square, or if they are ruled by
chance, and they appear as circles.
Figure 1.4.1 shows a decision tree for a simple but general case. A
manager placed at S faces N alternatives e0, el. ... eN and each one of
them has a set of further decisions to be taken by the person, for
example, at the point A0 are a01, a01,...a0N al ternatives to choose. The
same rules for the A. nodes. The subset of alternatives a i, a 1,a
which is a general branch of the decision tree, has a related cost and
a related payoff. The payoffs are tied with a finite probability of
success of the alternative, in other words, the alternative has a
finite probability of obtaining a positive revenue (success) measured
in money, and a finite probability of getting a negative revenue also
measured in money, or a less desirable revenue than the first one
(failure).
The following nomenclature will be used.
POS(a.) = Payoff of success in alternative a..
POF(aj) = Payoff of failure in alternative a
PF(a.) = Probability of failure in alternative a
PS(a. ) = Probability of success in alternativea
Fran the theory of decision analysis the EMY of eg branch is
wA
Figure 1.4.1 Generalized Decision Tree,
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EMV = POS(aij) x PS(a..) + POF(a..) x PF(a..) - C(
i
To make the decision the manager has to choose the higher EMVi,
in other words:
selected alternative = max [EMVY] (1.4.2)
The main obstacle to following this procedure is the process of
obtaining the probability data. Most architectures have no probability
data available because they are not even implemented. To solve this
problem, the designed architectures are detailed to a level of standard
market components, and those devices do have probability data supplied
by the vendors. To reach the probability of failure of the whole
system, the fault tree analysis theory is required.
The component costs come from direct questioning of suppliers.
The cost of the software and its probability of failure are special
issues which require careful study. These considerations are developed
later in the work.
Once the EMV analysis is finished, the best architecture is that
with the higher EMV; a consistency check with experience and common
sense should, of course, also be performed. The next step is to
perform a sensitivity study to detect critical points in the design and
correct them. Also the sensitivity analysis gives a good insight of
the variables' impact; finally most of the conclusions and
recommendations come from this sensitivity study.
With all the mentioned steps completed, the preliminary design is
achieved.
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The next chapter is devoted to the goal of designing the feasible
architectures competing as alternatives in the special case of the N.S.
Savannah propulsion plant.
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CHAPTER 2
PRELIMINARY DESIGN
2.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter develops the expected money value (EMV) technique
already explained in Chapter 1. The specific case under design is the
N.S. Savannah nuclear propulsion plant (Ref. 2.9); the information
concerning that system is unclassified and is accessible in the open
literature.
The aim of this thesis is not to seek an actual replacement of the
N.S. Savannah nuclear plant control system. Rather, that plant is used
as a basis for a general design procedure, permitting the development of
comparisons between current designs and proposed alternatives.
Comparative figures are to be developed based on those parameters which
are not common for every design alternative. With this constraint the
given costs are not the final costs, but are the costs of every distinct
parameter which is not common with the other alternatives.
Installation, operation, and maintenance costs are assumed to be similar
for every alternative. These costs and those for other external factors
such as power sources are not included.
The design analysis procedure starts in Section 2.2 with the
description of functions required for the surveillance, diagnostic, and
control system (SDCS). The next step is given in Section 2.3 where the
specific tasks required of each block of the SDCS are explained in
detail. The data given in this section form the basis for sizing the
possible architectures.
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Because the range of possible alternatives to be used in the design
is wide, Section 2.4 develops a method to narrow down the spectrum of
architectures, ending up with eight feasible alternatives. Section 2.5
explains in detail how these eight different architectures are designed,
and what their components are.
Once the hardware modules are specified, the next step is to develop
the fault trees appropriate for each alternative; that procedure is
given in Section 2.6. In Section 2.7 event probabilities are applied to
the fault trees already developed. Costs for each alternative are
determined in Section 2.8 and expected money value (EMY) analysis is
performed in Section 2.9. Finally, this analysis identifies the
architecture with the best figure of merit (ENV), thereby identifying
the preferred SDCS preliminary design. This selection is analyzed
further in Section 2.10 where sensitivity analyses are performed. The
assumptions and uncertainties involved in the design process are tested
to determine if they could seriously affect the final decision.
2.2 ORGANIZATION AND DEFINITION OF THE FUNCTIONS
The proposed list of the control system functions is independent of
the chosen digital architecture, in other words, all candidate design
alternatives must follow a common functional organization. In Reference
2.1 Trchka and Ash propose the following task division for a control
system.
a. Control functions
- basic control
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- advanced control
b. Communications functions
- tactical communications
- strategic communications.
This task division implies a hierarchical order within it. The
following subsections broaden the concept more.
2.2.1 CONTROL FUNCTION
Control functions are related to process variables and the actions
needed to keep them at specific levels. These functions are divided
into two groups:
- Basic functions or level one functions are those involved in
regulating simple variables such as temperature, pressure, etc.
- Advanced functions (also called supervisory or level two
functions) are related to variables which require the
calculation of special complex algorithms not used in a routine
fashion in the control of basic variables.
2.2.1.1 BASIC CONTROL FUNCTIONS
The seven basic control functions required by the N.S. Savannah
propulsion plant are (Ref. 2.9):
- water level control at both steam generators
- pressure and volume control at the pressurizer
- temperature control at the primary system tied to a load
following capability
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- speed control at the propeller shaft (optional)
- temperature and pressure control in the buffer seals system
- temperature and flow control in the primary purification system
- pressure control in the secondary system.
The original system does not have data validation functions, but the new
design will be required to have them. Thus the following subsystems may
require validation:
- nuclear parameters
- control rods
- primary circuit
- pressurizer
- steam generators
- feed water system
- secondary steam system
main condenser
- turbines
- buffer seals system
- primary purification system
- electrical generation and distribution.
2.2.1.2 ADVANCED CONTROL FUNCTIONS
The following functions performed by the system are considered to be
advanced:
- acquisition and display of safety parameter display (SPDS)
(validated plus estimated measurements)
- detection and diagnosis of malfunctions
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- forecasting the behavior of the variables and advising the
operator
- communication control
- continuous checking of hardware failures
Most of these functions are identified as required for on-line plant
disturbance analysis (Ref. 2.11) as well as for direct-digital control
2.2.2 COMMUNICATION FUNCTIONS
The communication functions are divided into two groups: tactical
and strategic.
2.2.2.1 TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS
This kind of communication is a short-term value communication, such
as the representation at the display of current values of the process
variables. Tactical communications occur on-line in the following links:
- sensor-processor communications
- processor-actuator communications
- processor-processor communications
- operator-processor communications.
2.2.2.2 STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS
The strategic information has a long-term value and is used in
planning new goals for the plant or planning changes in operations.
Strategic communications are typically employed offline since they imply
background analysis of data previous recorded and observed on line.
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They consist only of:
- processor-operator communications.
2.3 FUNCTIONS SPECIFICATIONS
The control functions listed in Section 2.2 are distinguished in
such a way that their performance can be sustained with reasonable
independence. Accordingly each can be considered as a unit or block of
processing power with its own inputs and outputs. The remainder of this
section is devoted to the specification of the inputs and outputs
a'ppropriate for each block based on information given in Ref. 2.9. Also
the number of channels required for each type of signal is enclosed by
parentheses. This information is used later when sizing the
architectures. Table B.3 (Appendix B) has- a summary of all the
parameters shown in this section.
2.3.1 BASIC CONTROL FUNCTONS
2.3.1.1 WATER LEVEL CONTROL OF STEAM GENERATORS
The inputs are
-reference level signal (1)
-actual level signal (2)
-feed water flow signal (2)
-steam flow signal (2).
The outputs are:
-position signal to the feed water valve (2)
-hardware failure signal (1).
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2.3.1.2 PRESSURE AND VOLUME CONTROL IN THE PRESSURIZER
When the system is in the automatic mode, the inputs are
-reference level signal (1)
-reference pressure signal (1)
-actual level signal (1
-actual pressure signal (1)
-overpressure reference signal (1).
The outputs are:
-position signal to spray valves (1)
-position signal to make-up valve (1)
-position signal to let-down valve (1)
-control signal to heaters (5)
-control signal to relief valve (1)
When the system is in the manual mode, the input signals are:
-position signal from make-up valve (1)
-position signal from let-down valve (1)
-position signal from spray valves (1).
The output signals are:
-position signal to make-up valve (1)
-position signal to let-down valve (1)
-position signal to spray valve (1).
In both modes, the inputs are:
-signal for changing spray valve (1)
-signal for transferring auto-manual spray valve (1)
-signal transferring auto-manual spray valve (1)
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-signal transferring auto-manual let-down valve
-control signal to close overpressure valve.
The outputs are:
-status mode signal for make-up valve (1)
-status mode signal for sprays (1)
-status mode signal for let-down valve (1)
-cut the heaters down signal due to low water level (1)
-hardware failure alarm signal (1)
2.3.1.3 LOAD FOLLOWING AND PRIMARY TEMPERATURE CONTROL
When the system is in the automatic mode the inputs are:
-stemn flow signal from secondary system (1)
-temperature signal from cold leg (1)
-temperature signal from hot leg (1)
-neutron flux level signal (1)
-reference temperature signal (1).
The outputs are:
-position signal to the control rod in service (1)
-position signal from control rods (5)
-position signal from groups of control rods (21)
The output signals are:
-position signals to control rods (21)
-position signal to groups of control rods (5)
In both modes the inputs are:
-command signal to auto-manual (1)
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-signal to start fast insertion (1)
-signal to stop fast insertion (1)
The outputs are:
-status mode signal (1)
-signal to start fast insertion (1)
-signal to stop fast insertion (1)
-hardware failure alarm signal (1)
2.3.1.4 STEAM PRESSURE CONTROL OF SECONDARY SYSTEM
The input signals are:
-reference pressure signal (1)
-actual pressure signal (1)
-main condenser back pressure signal (1)
-command signal to fast closing valves (2).
The outputs are:
-control signal to bypass val ve to the main condenser (1)
-command signals to fast closing valves (2)
-hardware failure signal (1)
2.3.1.5 SPEED CONTROL OF THE PROPELLER SHAFT
When the system is in the automatic mode, the input is:
-reference speed signal (1).
The outputs are:
-position signal to throttle valve (1)
If the systemi is in manual mode the inputs are:
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-command signal to ahead throttle valve (1)
-command signal to astern throttle valve (1)
-command signal to guardian throttle valve (1)
The outputs are:
-command signal to ahead throttle valve (1)
-command signal to astern throttle valve (1)
-command signal to guardian throttle valve (1)
In both modes the inputs are:
-command signal to quick-closing valves (2)
-command signal auto-manual (1)
-shaft speed signal (1).
The outputs are:
-status mode signal (1)
-valve closing signal due to overspeed (2)
-valve closing signals by operator command (2)
-hardware failure signal (1).
2.3.1.6 TEMPERATURE AND FLOW CONTROL OF THE PRIMARY PURIFICATION SYSTEM
When the system is in the automatic mode, the inputs are:
-total flow signal (1)
-reference total flow signal (1)
-temperature signal (1)
-reference temperature signal (1).
The outputs are:
-position signal to flow control valves (2)
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-position signal to cooling flow control valve (1).
If the system is in the manual mode the inputs are:
-position signal to flow control valves (3)
-position signal to cooling flow control valve (1).
In both modes the input signals are:
-command signal auto-manual for flow control (1)
-command signal auto-manual for temperature signal (1)
-open-close signal to 18 circuit valves (18).
The output signals are:
-status mode flow control valves (1)
-status mode cooling flow control valve (1)
-command signals to the 18 valves (18)
-hardware failure signal (1).
2.3.1.7 PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE CONTROL IN THE BUFFER SEALS SYSTEM
The inputs when the system is in the automatic mode are:
-pressure signal from the reactor (1)
-buffer seal water pressure signal (1)
-reference signal for differential pressure (1)
-reference temperature signal for desurger's tanks (1)
-temperature signals from desurger's tanks (3)
-buffer seal water temperature (1)
-discharge pressure signal from booster pumps (1)
-reference pressure signal for discharge pressure of booster pumps (1)
The output signals are:
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-position signal to bypass valve controlling differential pressure (1)
-command signals to booster pumps (3)
-command signals to desurger heaters (3)
-position signal to valve controlling the cooling flow (1
-command signal to emergency booster (1).
If the system is operating under manual mode, the inputs are:
-position signal to bypass valve (1)
-position signal to valve controlling the cooling flow (1).
The output signals are:
-position signal to bypass valve (1)
-position signal to cooling flow control valve (1)
-command signals to charging pumps (3).
In both modes the inputs are:
-command signal auto-manual for
-command signal auto-manual for
The outputs are:
-status signal manual-auto mode
-status signal manual-auto mode
-hardware failure -signal.
differential pressure control (1)
temperature control (1).
in controlling differential pressure (1)
in controlling water temperature (1)
2.3.1 .8 VALIDATION OF NUCLEAR PARAMETERS
The inputs to this block are:
-log count rate from start-up channels (3)
-log count rate from intermediate range channels (3)
-neutron flux level from power range channels (3).
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The outputs of this block are:
-period signal (1)
-count rate signal (1)
-neutron flux level signal (1)
-hardware failure signal (1).
2.3.1.9 DATA VALIDATION OF PRIMARY SYSTEM
This block does not include the primary pumps. Its inputs are:
-starboard reactor outlet temperature (3)
-port reactor outlet tenperature (3)
-discharge temperature port steam generator (3)
-discharge temperature starboard steam generator (3)
-reactor outlet pressure (port) (3)
-primary flow port circuit (3)
-primary flow starboard circuit (3)
-cooling flow to primary pumps (12)
-status signals cooling water valves (12)
-status signals fran main isolation valves (12).
The outputs from the block are:
-primary pressure port circuit (1)
-primary temperatures reactors outlets (2)
-primary tenperature at the suction of primary pumps (2)
-average temperature for each circuit (2)
-total average temperature (1)
-temperature differential at each circuit (2)
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-status signals for main isolation valves (4)
-low temperature alarm signals primary circuits (2)
-high temperature alarm signal at the reactor outlet (1)
-low primary flow alarm signals (2)
-high pressure alarm signal (1)
-low reactor pressure alarm signal (1)
-hardware failure alarm signal (1).
2.3.1.10 DATA VALIDATION OF CONTROL RODS 1-10 AND GROUPS 1-3
The overwhelming amount of data related to this function make it
advisable to divide the block into two parts. This block includes the
data coming from control rods 1-10 and the group 1-3. The inputs to
this block are
-position signals from the control rods (30)
-position signal from the groups (9)
-status signal of the control carrier clutches (30)
-status signal of the control rod motors (30)
-status signal of the control rod groups (9)
-temperature signals from the control rod motors (30)
The output signals are:
-position signal of the control rods (10)
-position signals of the groups (3)
-status signals of the carriers (10)
-status signals of the control rod motors (10)
-high temperature in control rod motors alarm signal (1)
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-status signal of the control rod groups (3)
-hardware failure signal (1).
2.3.1.11 DATA VALIDATION OF CONTROL RODS 11-21 AND GROUPS 4-5
The input signals are:
-position signals from control rods (33)
-position signals from the groups (6)
-status signals of the control rod carrier clutches (33)
-status signals from control rod motors (33)
-status signals fram control rod groups (6).
The output signals are:
-position signals fran control rods (ll
-position signals of control rod groups (2)
-status signals of the control rod carrier clutches (11)
-status signals from control rod motors (1l)
-high temperature at control rod motor alarm signals (11)
-status of control rod groups (2)
-hardware failure signal (1).
2.3.1.12 VALIDATION FOR PRESSURIZER DATA
The input parameters are:
-water level (3)
-pressurizer pressure (3)
-pressurizer temperature (3)
-surge line temperature (3)
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-status signal of each heater bank (15)
-status signal of each spray valve (6)
-status signal 'of each relief valve (6).
The outputs are:
-water level signal (1)
-pressure signal (1)
-temperature signal (1)
-surge line temperature signal (1)
-status signal for each heater bank (5)
-status signal for each spray valve (2)
-status signal of each relief valve (2)
-high temperature alarm signal (1)
-high water level alarm signal (1)
-low water level alarm signal (1)
-high pressure alarm signal (1)
-low pressure alarm signal (1)
-hardware failure signal (1).
2.3.1.13 DATA VALIDATION OF BUFFER SEALS SYSTEM
Because of the high number of signals involved, the validation task
is split into two blocks. Buffer seal flows are discussed in Section
2.3.1.21.
The inputs are:
-surge tank level signal (3)
-surge tank pressure signal (3)
-surge tank temperature signal (3)
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-discharge pressure from booster pumps (3)
-pressure signal from charging pumps discharge (3)
-temperature signals from desurger tanks (18)
-status signals of booster pumps (6)
-status signal of charge pumps (9)
-status signals of desurger tanks' heaters (18)
-status signal of bypass valves (6)
-status signal of cooling flow control valve (3)
-status signal of surge tank drain valve (3).
The output signals are:
-surge tank level signal (1)
-surge tank temperature signal (1)
-surge tank pressure signal (1)
-discharge pressure signal of charge pumps (1)
-temperature signals from desurger tanks (6)
-status signal of booster pumps (2)
-status signal of charge pumps (3)
-status signals of desurger tanks' heater (6)
-status signals of bypass valves (2)
-status signal of cooling flow control valve (1)
-status signal of cooling flow control valve (1)
-high surge tank temperature alarm signal (1)
-high surge tank level alarm signal (1)
-low surge tank level alarm signal (1)
-high surge tank pressure alarm signal (1)
-low discharge pressure of booster pumps alarm signal (1)
-low differential pressure alarm signal (1)
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-high cooler's discharge temperature alarm signal (1)
-hardware failure alarm signal (1).
2.3.1.14 DATA VALIDATION OF STEAM GENERATORS
The input signals are:
-water level for each steam generator (6)
-pressure signal for each steam generator (6)
-steam flow signal for each steam generator (6)
-feed water flow for each steam generator (6).
The outputs are:
-water level for each steam generator (2)
-pressure of each steam generator (2)
-steam flow of each steam generator (2)
-feed water flow for each steam generator (2)
-high water level alarm for each steam generator (2)
-low water level alarm for each steam generator (2)
-high pressure alarm for each steam generator (2)
-high steam flow alarm for each steam generator (2)
-hardware failure alarm (1).
2.3.1.15 DATA VALIDATION OF THE FEED WATER SYSTEM
The inputs are:
-main condenser vacuum (3)
-main condenser temperature (3)
-discharge pressure of condensate pumps (3)
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-discharge temperature of ejector condenser (3)
-discharge temperature from low-pressure heater drain pump (3)
-steam pressure at deaerating tank (3)
-temperature at discharge of deaerating tank (3)
-main feed pump discharge pressure (3)
-high pressure
-status signal
-status signal
-status signal
-status signal
-status signal
-status signal
-status signal
-status signal
-status signal
-status signal
heater discharge temperature (3)
of main circulating pump (3)
of sea water intake valve (3)
of scoop valve (3)
of circulation water discharge valve (3)
of condensate pumps (6)
of drain pumps (6)
of the main feed pumps (6)
of the emergency feed pumps (3)
of the main feed valves (6)
of the auxiliary feed valves (6)
-position signal of main feed valves (6)
-position signal of the auxiliary feed valves (6)
-status signal of isolation valves (6)
-oil pressure signal from main feed pump 1 (3)
-oil pressure signal fran main feed pump 2 (3).
The output signals are:
-main condenser vacuum ()
-main condenser temperature (1)
condensate pumps discharge pressure (1)
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-main ejector condenser discharge temperature (1)
-drain pump discharge pressure (1)
-deaerating tank level (1)
-deaerating tank discharge temperature (1)
-main feed pump's discharge temperature (1)
-high pressure heater discharge pressure (1)
-high pressure
-status signal
-status signal
-status signal
-status signal
-status signal
-status signal
-status signal
-status signal
-status signal
heater discharge temperature (1)
for main circulating pump (1)
for water intake valve (1)
of circulation water discharge valve (1)
of condensate pumps (2)
of drain pumps (2)
of main feed pumps (2)
of main feed valves (2)
of auxiliary feed valves (2)
of isolation valves (2)
-position signal for main feed valves (2)
-position signal for auxiliary feed valves (2)
-low deaerating tank level alarm signal (1)
-low oil pressure main feed pump 1 alarm signal (1)
-low oil pressure main feed pump 2 alarm signal (1)
-hardware failure signal (1).
2.3.1.16 DATA VALIDATION OF TURBINES
The inputs are:
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-steam pressure to the seals (3)
-steam pressure to ahead nozzle of high-pressure turbine (3)
-steam pressure to low-pressure turbine (3)
-steam pressure to astern nozzle of low-pressure turbine (3)
-position signal of ahead throttle valve (3)
-position signal of astern throttle valve (3)
-status signal of guardian throttle valve (31
-status signal of a~lead throttle valve (3)
-status signal of astern throttle valve (3)
-speed signal of propeller shaft (3)
-oil pressure signal from high-pressure turbine (3)
-oil pressure signal from low-pressure turbine (3)
-lubricating oil pressure signal from lubricating system (3)
-oil temperature signal at lubricating oil tank (3).
The outputs are:
-steam pressure to turbine seals (1)
-steam pressure to high-pressure turbine nozzles (1)
-steam pressure to low pressure turbine (1)
-steam pressure to high-pressure turbine astern nozzles (1)
-position signal of ahead throttle valve (1)
-position signal of astern throttle valve (1)
-status signal to guardian throttle valve (1)
-status signal of ahead throttle valve (1)
-status signal of astern throttle valve (1)
-propeller shaft speed signal (1)
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-status signal for main lubricating pump MLP 1 (1)
-status signal for MLP 2 (1)
-lubrication system oil pressure (1)
-oil pressure to high pressure turbine (HPT) (1)
-oil pressure to low pressure turbine (LPT) (1)
-oil temperature at lubrication system (1)
-oil level at lubrication tank alarm signal (1
-low oil pressure HPT alarm signal (1)
-low oil pressure LPT alarm signal (1
-high oil temperature oil system alarm signal (1)
-hardware failure signal (1)
2.3.1.17 VALIDATION OF HIGH PRESSURE STEAM SYSTEM
The inputs are:
-total steam flow signal (3)
-total steam pressure signal (3)
-main condenser back pressure signal (3)
-status signal of quick closing valves (6).
The output signals are:
-total steam flow signal (1)
-total steam pressure signal (1)
-main condenser back pressure signal (1)
-status signal of quick closing valves (2)
-high steam flow alarm signal (1)
-low steam flow alarm signal (1)
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-high steam pressure alarm signal (1)
-low steam pressure alarm signal (1)
-high main condenser back pressure alarm signal (1
-hardware failure signal (1)
2.3.1.18 VALIDATION OF PRIMARY PURIFICATION SYSTEM
The inputs are:
-purification flow signal (3)
-purification pressure signal (3)
-purification temperature signal (3)
-water conductivity at cooler's discharge (3)
-PH signal (3)
-differential pressure at the filters (3)
-conductivity signal at the surge tank inlet (3)
-status signals for 22 valves (66).
The outputs are:
-purification flow (1)
-purification pressure (1)
-purification temperature (1)
-conductivity at discharge of let-down coolers (1)
-PH signal (1)
-differential pressure at the filters (1)
-conduciti vity at the surge tank inlet (1)
-status signal for 22 valves (22)
-high purification flow alarm signal (1)
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-low purification flow alarm signal (1)
-high purification temperature alarm signal (1)
-high differential pressure at filters alarm signal (1)
-hardware failure signal (1).
2.3.1.19 DATA VALIDATION OF ELECTRICAL GENERATION SYSTEM
The inputs are:
-electric load signals from generators (12)
-voltage signals from generators (12)
-DC voltage signal (3)
-voltage signal for lighting (3)
-emergency power voltage signal (3)
-shore power voltage signal (3)
-shore power load signal (3)
-status signal for 24 breakers (72)
-status signal of AC/DC groups (12)
-status signal of DC/AC groups (12)
-status signal of emergency diesel generator (3)
-voltage signal from main bus (6)
-oil pressure at turbo generator no. 1 (3)
-oil pressure at turbo generator no. 2 (3)
-oil pressure at diesel generator no. 1 (3)
-oil pressure at diesel generator no. 2 (3)
-back pressure signal from turbo generator no. 1 (3)
-back pressure at turbo generator no. 2 (3)
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-cooling water temperature at diesel generator no. 1 (3)
-cooling water temperature at diesel generator no. 2 (3)
-starting air pressure for diesel generators (3).
The outputs are:
-electric load for turbo generators nos. 1 and 2 and diesel
generators nos. 1. and 2 (4)
-generator voltage (4)
-DC voltage (1)
-lighting voltage (1)
-emergency power voltage (1)
-shore power voltage (1)
-shore power load (1)
-status signal from 24 breakers (24)
-status signal of AC/DC groups (4)
-status signal of DC/AC groups (4)
-status signal of emergency diesel generator (1)
-main bus voltage (2)
-low oil pressure at turbo generators nos. 1 and 2 and diesel
generators nos. 1 and 2 alarm signals (4)
-high temperature diesel generators nos. 1 and 2 alarm signal (2)
-high cooling water temperature at diesel generators nos. 1 and 2
alarm signal (2)
-low starting air alarm signal (1)
-hardware failure alarm signal (1)
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2.3.1.20 DATA VALIDATION FROM PRIMARY PUMPS
The inputs are:
-primary pumps cooling flow signal (12)
-primary coolings water temperature (12)
-status signal of primary pump (12)
-electric load of primary pumps motors (12).
The outputs are:
-primary pump cavity temperature (4)
-electric load of primary pump's motors (4)
-status signal of primary pumps (4)
-abnormal load primary pump's motors alarm signal (4)
-cooling water flow to primary pumps (4)
-primary pump's cooling water temperatures (4)
-hardware failure signal (1).
2.3.1.21 DATA VALIDATION OF BUFFER SEAL'S FLOW-PARAMETERS
The inputs are:
-total input flow signal (3)
-seals flows signals (63)
-total output flow signal (3).
The output signals are:
-total input flow (1)
-seals flows signals (21)
-total output flow signal (1)
-high output flow alarm signal (1)
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-hardware failure alarm signal (1).
It should be noted that almost every signal given by the
conventional system has been triplicated in the new design. The reason
for this redundancy is to provide the validation algorithm with three
independent measurements. A real implementation may not contain this
level of redundancy, but the digital design has to be sized to allow
that possibility.
2.3.2 ADVANCED CONTROL FUNCTIONS
The advanced control functions block requires the data previously
validated as input. The outputs from this block are the following
variables:
-safety state vector
-communications control signals
-polling signals for detecting hardware malfunctions.
The validated signal traffic is given by the output of the
validation blocks (28). The signal traffic involved in the
communication process is assumed to be one signal for each block
(validation, control, and peripherals) (49). The same assumption is
made with the polling signals (49).
The number of variables included in the safety state vector is a
matter still under study, but an approximate number is 30 (Ref. 2.2)
2.4 SELECTION OF BASIC ALTERNATIVES
Basically four types of control systems are available:
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-analog control
-supervisory control
-direct digital control
-distributed digital control.
These approaches are analyzed in detail in Ref. 2.3. The referenced
paper proved that direct digital control and distributed digital control
have shown a positive trend in applications, while analog or supervisory
control is declining. Moreover, considering the requirements of data
validation, plant surveillance, and operator advisory inputs required of
the system, a designer has no choice but to discard the first two
alternatives.
Narrowing down the spectrum of choices to direct digital control and
distributed digital control still leaves several alternatives for
further consideration. For example, direct digital control has two
possible applications
1) the use of one central computer performing all functions;
2) the use of two processes working in parallel. One computer is in
service connected to the plant and receiving and sending signals; the
other is in warm stand-by only receiving signals fran the plant. If the
computer on service fails, a switch changes the plant from the output of
the failed device to the output of the back-up computer (Ref. 2.6).
Both alternatives are analyzed in greater detail in subsequent sections.
Distributed systemis are analyzed in Ref. 2.4, where their main
advantages and defects are identified. From Ref. 2.4 five distributed
architectures can be used in this process. They are:
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-loop architecture
-interconnection architecture
-mul tiprocessor architecture
-global bus architecture
-star architecture.
Even these five alternatives are too numerous to be compared in detail;
a further selection procedure is needed to narrow the choices. To this
end, the following definitions are used by Thurber and Masson in
Reference 2.4:
-Cost modularity (CM): is the incremental cost of adding a
processing element (PE). In some systems this could be free (zero
cost); in others it could require that n-i paths be added to accept the
nth PE.
-Placement modularity (PM): is the degree to which the function on
location of an element is restricted. In some systems, a path, switch,
or PE can be easily added to improve performance. In others, for
example, STAR (see Section 2.5.3), the central computer is not amenable
to placement modularity. In this case, addition of another computer
sharing the processing task would change the architecture to another
category.
-Connection flexibility (CF): primarily important in
message-switched systems. This is a measure of the alternative cost
associated with adding a PE. When a processor is added, whether extra
long-distance connection paths or extra local paths have to be added is
one measure of the connection flexibility. This issue is similar to the
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modularity trade-offs associated with path-oriented systems.
-Fault tolerance (FT): is the measure of the effect of a fault in a
system. In system configurations, this manifests itself in terms of how
the system is reconfigured by architectural changes, performance
modifications, or both. Systems with decentralized control are
considered most amenable to fault-tolerant design because of their
flexibility to share the same function by processors placed at different
physical locations.
-Local complexity (LC): deals with a measurement of the amount and
complexity of decisions necessary to route information (send a message)
within a system.
-Bottleneck (B): deals with resource performance limitations
created by saturation or congestion of a system facility such as a data
link due to system resource demand.
-Development and application: deals with the degree of theoretical
and practical development shown by the architecture. The trend in
actual applications is also included in this idea. The concepts defined
above will be the basis of choosing two alternatives among the five
mentioned. These two will be developed in detail. To decide which
alternatives to choose, a weighting factor method is used together with
the quantification of each alternative's properties.
2.4.1 THE WEIGHTING FACTORS METHOD
This method is based on quantifying a set of properties for each
alternative. After quantification, the desirability of each property is
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assigned a weighting factor. The desirability is given by the
operational requirements asked of the design. This part of of the
decision process is under designer control because he has to quantify
the weighting factors by considering the importance of each property in-
relation with operational requirements.
The process starts when the quality of the properties (definitions)
themselves are quantified, that is, the analysis of each architecture in
relation to the applicability of every property. This process is
explained in Ref. 2.4; here the given qualities are translated by the
following scale:
extremely good 9.0
very good 8.0
good 7.0
moderate 5.0
bad, poor 3.0
very bad 1.0
The weighting factors have to reflect the importance of each
property in light of the operational requirements. For example, fault
tolerance is considered to be the most important and receives a
weighting factor of 10. On the other hand, bottleneck and local
complexity are the least important and they receive a 1.0. The list of
weighting factors is:
Fault Tolerance (FT) 10.0
Cost Modularity (CM) 8.0
Connection Flexibility (OF) 8.0
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Development and Application (DA) 8.0
Placement Modularity (PM) 5.0
Local Complexity (LC) 1.0
Bottleneck (B) 1.0
The figure of merit is reached by multiplying each property by the
weighting factor and making the summation of these products for every
alternative. The final results are shown in Table 2.1.
TABLE 2.1
WEIGHTING FACTOR METHOD
(Ref. 2.4)
Architectures
Loop
Interconnection
Multi processor
Global bus
Star
Weighting factor
CM
9
1
5
8
8
8
Properties
DM
9
9
9
8
8
5
CF
1
1
1
1
1
8
FT
3
8
5
8
3
10
LC
9
9
1
8
5
1
DA
7
7
8
9
9
8
Figure of
of Merit
221
214
209
275
222
From Table 2.1, the two best architectures are Global bus and Star.
Therefore, these, together with the central computer ones, will be used
in the next stage of the design process.
2.4.2 DESCRIPTION OF THE SELECTED ARCHITECTURES
2.4.2.1 CENTRAL COMPUTER
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The central computer architecture concentrates all the processing
intelligence and the communications control in one processor. The
processor receives all the data, processes them, and sends the
information to the connected elements. Devices connected with the
central computer include man-machine interfaces (MMI), plant actuators,
or data storing devices. Every signal produced by the plant sensors is
wired individually to the interfaces placed in the central computer.
The computer/plant interface is usually a I/0 hardware device designed
to translate real time signals coming from the plant into digital
language intelligible to the computer. The process is also performed in
the opposite way. Figure 2.4.1 shows a scheme of this architecture.
A typical option in this kind of architecture is to add another
computer with its own MMI and I/0 interfaces, working in parallel no
stand-by. This feature is one way of improving the fault tolerance of
the architecture. Figure 2.4.2 presents a scheme of such architecture.
2.4.2.2 GLOBAL BUS ARCHITECTURE
This global bus configuration is show in Figure 2.4.3. As seen on
the figure, the processing intelligence is now distributed along several
microprocessors located close to the loop they are controlling or
watching. A central computer is also needed to coordinate the actions
of the distributed microprocessors and to perform general tasks not
performed by the dedicated microprocessors. A distinctive feature of
this distributed process is the common communication bus used by all the
processors. Any processor can communicate with another by means of the
Diagnosis Line
Plant Sensors Plant Actuators
Lo
Central processor architecture, block diagram.
Central Processor
Control Line
Figure 2.4.1
Interprocessors link
Diagnosis
line 1
Figure 2 .I.2 Dual central computer architecLure, block diagram.
line 2
-1-
Figure 2.41.3 Global data bus architecture, block diagrail.
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common bus. The global bus architecture uses a direct transfer
strategy; thus there is no switch device acting as a bridge routing the
data through it. The communication path is shared, and access to the
bus is regulated by the central computer. The communications through
the bus are typically made in a serial protocol. The bus can be
duplicated to improve the fault tolerance or to achieve higher data
traffic.
On the microprocessor side, they are duplicated to improved fault
tolerance, control microprocessors have a switch to change the control
load from the microprocessor on service to the hot stand-by unit, if the
former fails. The latter feature is taken from the dual central
computer architecture.
The global bus architecture also has a dual option, shown in Figure
2.4.4. This architecture is the result of adding a complete central
computer plus a new bus to the single global bus. Switching from one
computer to another is implemented by software.
2.4.2.3 STAR ARCHITECTURE
Star architecture also has the processing power distributed along
the plant. This architecture uses an indirect transfer strategy (data
crosses through an intelligent processor). The information is routed by
the central computer and the communication path is dedicated for each
microprocessor (Figure 2.4.5). A distinct feature of this architecture.
is that validation microprocessors communicate directly with control
microprocessors and with the central computer. The communications
protocol can be serial or parallel depending on the required volume and
Interprocessor link
rdary Secondary
age 1 storage 2
Figure
2.4.4
Dual global data bus architecture, partial block diagram.
(A)
Central
il ni computer
Star architectire, block diaqram,Fiu re 2.4.5
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speed of the information.
Also the Star architecture has dual options consisting of adding a
complete central computer as a hot standby and connecting it to every
microprocessor. When dual Star architecture is considered, the
comunication protocol chosen defines a change in the hardware Figure
2.4.6) shows a dual Star architecture using parallel communications.
This specific option requires a hardware switch to change from one
computer to the other. On the other hand, a dual Star architecture
using serial communications (Figure 2.4.7) does not require the switch.
2.5 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ALTERNATIVES
The standard procedure to choose appropriate hardware is to examine
the whole computer market and make the selection on purely technical
grounds. This procedure proves to be difficult to perform because most
vendors are not unwilling to supply confidential reliability data about
their products. In addition, choosing one vendor for all the devices
assumes component compatibility and simplifies the problem. Therefore
it was decided to use one component manufacturer as the component
supplier for the purpose of this design study. This decision by no
means implies that only one supplier would be used in the case of an
actual implementation; the purpose of this work is to find the best
architecture and not to make a final installation. The actual devices
used for doing that is a matter for further study. Moreover, in order
to protect the propietary reference condition of the data supplied by
the manufacturer, only generic names will be related with the
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reliability data.
The procedure followed in choosing the proper components is first,
to calculate the memory capacity and data rate requirements, and with
that information, to choose the appropriate devices. Finally, the
configuration sheets are filled out for every architecture.
To estimate the memory capacity requirements is particularly
troublesome, since the actual software has not yet been developed.
Therefore, in order to estimate the memory required, a general theory
developed by Maurice H. Halstead (Ref. B.1) is used. This is a general
theory, and the actual application could differ from the outcome given
by the theory, but nevertheless it is the best tool dvailable to
quantify the size of a software not yet developed. The reader is
referred to Appendix B to see how the theory is applied to our
particular case.
The following subsections analyze particular architectures.
2.5.1 CENTRAL COMPUTER ARCHITECTURE
The design of this architecture is based on the experiece acquired
by using central computers in process control (Reference 2.5). The
actual design has the reductions appropriated for the size and lower
complexity of the N.S. Savannah nuclear plant.
Peripheral devices are:
1 disk system (non-volatile memory)
1 tape system (back-up memory)
3 consoles (CRT plus keyboards)
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1 line printer
1 card reader.
To calculate the total amount of memory required, it will be assumed
that it is equal to the summation of all individual memory
requirements. From Table B.2 this amount is 1482.54 (kby). Also only
the advanced control algorithm needs to store data in non-volatile
systems. From past experience it has been noted that only 15 percent of
total memory is held in solid state memories, the remaining goes on
disks. From the above considerations, the SDCS algorithm requirement is
approximately 175 kby. plus 317 kby. for control and validation, or 492
kby total solid state memory and approximately 989 kby in volatile
systems. (The values are rounded.)
A system from DEC which meets the above requirements is a PDP 11/70
system. With this model and using an updating time of 2 seconds, each
signal will share an average of 735 instructions. Figure 2.5.1 shows
the details of the design and calculations appear in the corresponding
design sheet in Appendix C.
2.5.2 DUAL CENTRAL COMPUTER ARCHITECTURE
This kind of architecture is intended to improve the fault tolerance
of central computer architecture. The back-up computer is designed
exactly in the same way as the single central computer. The
architecture is based on a reliable switch system, which selects the
outputs coming from both computers. The selection process is a
combination of the switch hardware and a special software implemented in
31
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1. MMI
2. Secondary storage
3. Processor
4. VS1l-AP (3)(monitors and keyboards)
5. CR-li (1) (card reader system)
6. LPl1-VA (1) (printer system)
7. TS03-NA (1) (magnetic tape system)
8. RL1l-AK (1) (disk system)
9. 11/70 NK (CPU and memory)
10. 19" color monitor
11. CR04-A card reader
12. LPO5-VA printer
13. TS03-SA magnetic tape drive
14. RL01-AK disk drive
15. MK1l-CA (1) memory
16. PDP 11/70 (1) CPU
17. VS11-AA
VRV02
18. Documation M200 controller
19. LP1l controller
20. TSO3 master
21. RLll controller
22. Unibus
23. LPAll-K (9)
A/D controller
24. LPA11-K (27)
D/A controller
25. A0ll-K (18) (A/D interface)
AMll-K (18) (multiplier)
26. AA1-K (27) (D/A interface)
27. Control line
28. Diagnosis line
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both processors. An inter-computer link is provided to facilitate the
decision process.
The dual computer feature is widely used in control applications,
especially in nuclear power plants (References 2.5, 2.6). The switch
has been designed to be one for each- analog output (after the D/A
devices). The switches are simply analog multipliers whose driving
signal comes from the computers in service. With this design, a partial
failure will make shift only the switches involved in that failure, thus
both computers will be working on-line, sharing the processing task.
Although this situation could happen with some frequency, the current
assumption will be to consider a total shift when a failure occurs.
The final architecture is shown in Figure 2.5.2; the design sheets
appear in Appendix C.
2.5.3 STAR ARCHITECTURE
As explained previously, Star architecture is a distributed
architecture. The basic control functions and the data validation
processes are distributed in dedicated microprocessors installed near
the plant. The advanced control function remains in a central
minicomputer installed in the control room. This minicomputer requires
less memory than the previous control computers because of its
process-sharing feature.
To improve the fault tolerance of the architecture, the dedicated
microprocessors are designed to be redundant. Control microprocessors
follow the same pattern of dual central computers by using a switch to
2
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1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
MMI 1
Secondary storage 1
Processor 1
VS1l-AP (3) (monitors and keyboards)
CR-1l (1) (
LPIl-VA (1) (printer system)
TS03-MA (1) (magnetic tape system)
RLl1-AK (1) (disk system)
11/70 NK (memory and CPU)
19" color monitor
CR04-A
LP05-VA printer
TS03-SA tape drive
RL01-AK disk drive
MK11-CA (1) memory
PDP 11/70 (1) CPU
VS11-AA, VRV02-BA
Controller documation M200
LP11 controller
TS03 master
RLl1 controller
UNIBUS
LPAl1-K (27) (D/A controller)
LPAll-K (9) (A/D controller)
AAll-K (27) D/A (interface)
ADlI-K (18) A/D (interface)
AMl1-K (18) multiplexer
Switch control signal
Signals from processor 2
MPC8S
Diagnosis line
Control line
I--c7
12 11 10
5
16 15 14
18
8
Figure (continued) Details on D/A and A/D interfaces.
2.5.2 See legend on nextqpage,
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1. LPAl1-K (A/D controller)
2. AAll-K (D/A interface)
3. MPC8S (Motorola, analog multiplexer)
4. MPC8S
5. MPC8S
6. MPCBS
7. Signals from the other processor
8. Central lines (4)
9. LA1l-K
10. AMl1-K (multiflexer
11. ADl1-K (A/D interface)
12. AD1l-K
13. AMll-K
14. 48 lines
15. 16 lines
16. 16 lines
17. 48 lines
18. Diagnosis line
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shift the duty.
The validation microprocessors send their outputs to the respective
control microprocessors and to the central minicomputer. The control
microprocessors are also connected to the central minicomputer.
The central minicomputer has the same peripherals as the central
computer architecture because requirements are independent of the chosen
architecture.
The memory requirements for the minicomputer given in Table B.2 are
exactly equal to the memory requirements for the advance control (AC)
algorithm. The division between volatile and non-voltaile memory
follows the same policy as central computers (15 percent for solid state
memory). Thus
volatile memory = 175 kby
non-voltaile memory = 989 kby
total memory = 1164 kby.
A PDP 11/60 system is the best equipment choice for these requirements.
From Table B.2 it is clear that every algorithm requires different
amounts of memory and possibly different kinds of processors.
In order to achieve a standardization the microprocessors will be
divided in two groups, the control microprocessors and the validation
microprocessors. The former will be implemented by using LSI-ll/02 CPU,
and the latter by using LSI-ll/23 CPU. Furthermore, the microprocessors
are implemented with full memory capacity.
Control microprocessor 16 kby
diagnostic microprocessor 64 kby.
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It should be noted that microprocessor C3 (Table B.1) is slightly over
the maximum capacity. The above standardization will not be done in
practice, because in the case of an actual implementation only the real
amount of memory required is installed. This approximation facilitates
further calculations but introduces a factor against the distributed
architectures by raising the total cost and the probability of failure.
The effects of the approximations and assumptions will be discussed in
the section dedicated to sensitivity analysis.
It should be noted that the choice of LSI-11 technology implies 16
bit word format. This means more powerful instructions and lower
processing time.
Two alternatives of communications can be designed for a Star
architecture, parallel communications, and serial communications. Each
choice means different interfacing devices, but the essential elements
remain the same. Figure 2.5.3 shows the detailed design for the
parallel communications alternative and Figure 2.5.4 shows the serial
one. Appendix C has the work sheets for both alternatives.
2.5.4 DUAL STAR ARCHITECTURE
In the Dual Star architecture, a complete minicomputer plus its
peripherals is added to the single Star design in order to improve the
fault tolerance of the architecture.
Unlike the actual computer architecture where the outputs to plants
are switched, in the Dual Star architecture the control microprocessors
are switched. This switch can be made by a hardware switch as in the
3 .
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Figure 2.5.3 Star architecture, parallel transmission,
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1. MMI
2. Secondary storage
3. Processor
4. VS11-AP (3) (monitors and keyboards)
5. CR-1l (1) (card reader system)
6. LPIl-VA (1) (printer system)
7. TSO3-MA (1) (magnetic tape system)
8. RL1l-AK (1) (disk system)
9. 11/60 EA (1) (CPU and memory)
10. 19" color monitor
11. CR04-A card reader
12. LP05-VA printer
13. TS03-SA tape drive
14. RL01-AK disk drive
15. MS1l-KE (3) memories
16. KDl1-K CPU
17. VS1l-AA, VRV02-BA
18. Controller documation M200
19. LPl1 controller
20. TSO3 master
21. RLll controller
22. UNIBUS
23. DR1l-B, M7230 (parallel interface)
24. DR11-B, M7230
25. DRll-B, M7230
26. DRll-B, M7230
27. Control room
28. Machinery room
1*
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Figure 2.5.3 (co lgendtinued)
*See legend an next page.
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1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
Control room
Machinery room
pPD' (stand-by diagnosis microprocessor)
vPC' (stand-by control microprocessor)
vPC (control microprocessor on service)
JPD (diagnosis microprocessor on service)
H9270 (2) (power supply)
H9270 (3)
H9270 (3)
H9270 (2)
DRV11-B, M5927 (parallel interface)
MSV11-DD (memory)
KDFll-AC (CPU) 37.
DRVl-B, M5927 38.
MSVl1-DB (memory) 39.
KDIl-HA (CPU) 40.
DRVIl-B, M5927 41.
MSVll-DB 42.
KDll-HA 43.
DRVi-B, M5927
MSV1i-DD 44.
KDF1l-AC 45.
KDFl1-HD (CPU and memory) 46.
KDIl-FHB (CPU and memory)
KDll-HB
KDF11-HD
Q-BUS
Q-BUS
Q-BUS
Q-BUS
ADVll-A (5) (A/D interface)
OR/il-B (parallel interface)
ORli-B
DRVil-B
DRV1l-B
AA/li-A (4) (D/A interface)
AAVl1-A (4)
DRVl-B
DRV1l-B
DRVli-B
DRVil-B
ADVI1-A (5)
MPC8S (Motorola analog
multiplexer)
Switch
Sensors
Actuators
(continued) Detailed design of D/A interface.
*See legend on next page.
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1. AAV1l-A (D/A interface)
2. MPC8S (Motorola analog multiplexer)
3. MPC8S
4. MPC8S
5. MPC8S
6. From yPC
7. From pPC'
39 -~~ 2 1*8 7 6 ,5 4
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Figure 2.5.4 Star architecture, serial transmission alternative,
detailed design.
*See legend on next page.
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1. MMI
2. Secondary storage
3. Processor
4. VSIlI-AP (3) (monitor and keyboard system)
5. CR-li (1) (card reader system)
6. LPI-VA (1) (printer system)
7. TS03-MA (1) (magnetic tape system)
8. RLl1-AK (1) (disk system)
9. 11/60 EA (1) (CPU and memory)
10. 19" color monitor
11. CR04-A card reader
12. LP05-VA printer
13. TS03-SA tape drive
14. RLOl-AK disk drive
15. MSll-KE (3) memory
16. KD11-K CPU
17. VS11-AA, VRV02-BA
18. Controller documation M-200
19. LPI1 controller
20. TS03 master
21. RLl1 controller
22. UNIBUS
23. DZ11-C (6) (serial interface)
24. Control room
25. Machinery room
15 4 3 2
9 8 7
9q 28 27
41
Figure 2.5.4 (contienued).
*See legend on next page,
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1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
Control room
Machinery room
wPD' (stand-by diagnosis microprocessor)
yPC' (stand-by control microprocessor)
wPC (control microprocessor on service)
pPD (diagnosis microprocessor on service)
H9270 (2) (power supply)
H9270 (3)
H9270 (3)
H9270 (2)
DLV-1l (serial interface)
KDFll-HD (CPU and memory)
KD1-HB (CPU and memory)
KD11-HB 37.
KDF11-HD 38.
MSVll-DD (memory) 39.
KDFII-AC (CPU) 40.
DLV-11 41.
MSV1l-DB (memory) 42.
KD1l-HA (CPU) 43.
DLV-li
MSV11-DB 44.
KD1l-HA 45.
DLV-li 46.
MSVil1-DD
KDF1i-AC
Q-BUS
Q-BUS
Q-BUS
Q-BUS
ADV11-A (5) (A/D interface)
DRVil-B (parallel interface)
DRV1l-B
DRVil-B
DRV11-B
ANAi-A (4) (D/A interface)
AAV1l-A (4)
DRV11-B
DRV1l-B
DRV1l-B
DRV11-B
ADVli-A (5)
MPC8S (Motorola analog
mul tip 1 exer)
Switch
Sensor
Actuators
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case of the parallel transmission alternative, or a pure software switch
as in the case of the serial transmission alternative.
The validation microprocessors are connected directly with both
minicomputers, without any need for switches. All the dedicated
microprocessors are redundant, as was the case in the single
architecture. Figure 2.5.5 shows the design for the Dual Star parallel
transmission alternative. Figure 2.5.6 shows the design for the Dual
Star serial transmission alternative. The worksheets for both are in
the Appendix C.
2.5.5 GLOBAL BUS ARCHITECTURE
The global bus architecture differs from Star architecture in the
communications process. The Star architecture has a dedicated link with
each one of the distributed microprocessors. The global bus
architecture has only one link shared by every microprocessor in the
design. Apart from that, the basic design is the same: the same
minicomputer, the same peripherals, the same microprocessors. Only the
interfacing elements are different.
This architecture does not require a special link to communicate
validation microprocessors with the control microprocessors. The
communication is achieved by the common bus. Typically this
architecture uses serial communications and the talking through the bus
is regulated by the central minicomputer. The detailed design of the
architecture is shown in Figure 2.5.7. The worksheets are in Appendix C.
2.5.6 DUAL GLOBAL BUS ARCHITECTURE
Following the same pattern of other dual designs, the dual global
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Figure 2.5.5 Dual star architecture, parallel transmission,
detailed design,
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1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
Control room
Machinery room
vPD' (stand-by diagnosis microprocessor)
iPC' (standpby control microprocessor)
vPC (control microprocessor on service)
pPD (diagnosis microprocessor on service)
H9270 (2). (power supply)
H9270 (2)
H9270 (2)
H9270 (3)
DRV11-B, M5927 (parallel interface)
DRV11-B , M5927
KDFll-HD
MSV11-DD (memory) 37.
KDF11-AC (CPU) 38.
DRV11-B, M5927
MSV1l-DB (memory) 39.
KDll-HB (CPU and memory) 40.
KDll-HA (CPU) 41.
DRV11-B, M5927 42.
KD11-HB 43.
MSV11-DB 44.
KDll-HA (CPU) 45.
DRV11-B, M5927
DRV1l-B, M5927 46.
KDF1l-HD 47.
MSV1l-DD 48.
KDF1i-AC
Q-BUS
Q-BUS
Q-BUS
Q-BUS
ADV11-A (5) (A/D interface)
DRV1l-B (parallel interface)
DRVll-B
DRV11-B
DRVII-B
AAVl-A (4) (D/A
interface)
AAVl1-A (4)
DRV11-B
DRVil-B
DRV11-B
DRVIl-B
ADV11-A (5)
MPC8S (Motorola analog
mul tip1 exer)
Switch
Sensors
Actuators
*0
Figure 2.5.5 (t(continued).
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1. MMI
2. Secondary Storage
3. Processor
4. VSll-AP (3) (monitors and keyboards)
5. CR-Il (1) (card reader system)
6. LPl1-VA (1) (printer system)
7. TS03-MA (1) (magnetic tape system)
8. RLl1-AK (1) (disk system)
9. 11/60 EA (1) (CPU and memory)
10. 19" color monitor
11. CR04-A card reader
12. LP05-VA printer
13. TS03-SA tape drive
14. RL01-AK disk drive
15. MSll-KE memory
16. KDl1-K CPU
17. VSll-AA, VRV02-BA
18. Controller documation M200
19. LP1l controller
20. TSO3 master
21. RL-l1 controller
22. UNIBUS 1
23. DTO7 (switch)
24. DRil-B, M7230 (parallel interface)
25. DR1l-B, M7230
26. UNIBUS 0
27. DRil-B, M7230
28. DRl1-8, M7230
29. Switch 0
30. Machinery room
31. Control room
32. To UNIBUS 2
3. 16 15
2
8 7 16 5 4
4 13 12 11 10
21 20119 18 17
22
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24
25
Figure 2,5.6 Dual star architecture serial transiiiission, detailed design.
*See legend on next page,. 0
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1. MMI 1
2. Secondary storage 1
3. Processor 1
4. VSl1-AP (3) (monitors and keyboards)
5. CR-l1 (1) (card reader system)
6. LPllI -VA (1) (printer system)
7. TS03-MA (1) (magnetic tape system)
8. RL11-AK (1) (disk system)
9. 11/60 EA (1) (CPU and memory)
10. 19" color monitor
11. CR04-A card reader
12. LP05-VA printer
13. TS03-SA tape drive
14. RL01-AK disk drive
15. MSll-KE memory
16. KD11-K CPU
17. VS11-AA, VRV02-BA
18. Control documation M200
19. LPl1 controller
20. TS03 master
21. RL-1l controller
22. UNIBUS 1
23. DZ11-C (serial interface)
24. Control room
25. Machinery room
26 To UNIBUS 2
Figure 2.5.6
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(continued)
*See legend on nextLpage.
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1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
Control room
Machinery room
iPD' (stand-by diagnosis microprocessor)
4PC' (stand-by control microprocessor)
uPC (control microprocessor on service)
uPD (diagnosis microprocessor on service)
H9270 (3) (power supply)
H9270 (2)
H9270 (2) 37.
H9270 (3) 38.
KDF11-HD (CPU and memory) 39.
KDF11-HB (CPU and memory) 40.
KDF11-HB 41.
KDF1l-HD 42.
DLV-11 (serial interface) 43.
DLV-11 44.
MSVl1-DD (memory) 45.
KDF1l-AC (CPU) 46.
DLV-11 47.
DLV-li
MSV11-DB (memory) 48.
KD11-HA (CPU) 49.
D.V-1l 50.
DLV-li
MSV11-DB
KDil-HA
DLV-l1
DLV-li
MSV1l-DD
KDF1l-AC
Q-BUS
Q-BUJS
Q-BUJS
Q-BUS
ADVil-A (5) (A/D interface)
DRVil-B (parallel interface)
DRV1l-B
DRVll-B
DRV1l-B
AAVll-A (5) (D/A interface)
AAVIl-A (4)
DRV1 1-B
DRVl 1-B
DRV1l-B
DRVl 1-B
ADV1l-A (5)
MPC8S (Motorola analog
multiplexer)
Switch
Sensors
Actuators
9*I
16 15
- I
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21
8 7 6 5 4
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C00
22
25
Global bus architecture, block diagram.
*See legend on next page,
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Figure 2.5.7
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1. MMI
2. Secondary storage
3. Processor
4-. VS11-AP (3) (monitors and keyboards)
5. CR-li (1) (card reader system)
6. LP1l-VA (1) (printer system)
7. TSO3-MA (1) (magnetic tape system)
8. RL11-AK (1) (disk system)
9. 11/60 EA (CPU and memory)
10. 19" color monitor
11. CR04-A card reader
12. LP05-VA printer -
13. TS03-SA tape driver
14. RLOl-AK disk drive
15. MSl1-KE memory
16. KD1l-K CPU
17. VSl1-AA, VRVO2-BA
18. Controller documation M200
19. LPll controller
20. TS03 master
21. RL-ll controller
22. UNIBUS
23. Meg.alink 11-0016 (Computrol serial interface)
24. Global data bus
25. Control room
26. Machinery room
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37
39
Figure 2.5.7 (continued)
,*See 1 led on next paje.
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1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.-
Control room
Machinery room
Global data bus
pPD' (stand-by diagnosis microprocessor)
uPC' (stand-by control microprocessor)
pPC (control microprocessor on service)
pPD (diagnosis microprocessor on service)
H9270 (2) (power supply)
H9270 (2)
H9270 (2)
H9270 (2)
KDFl1-HD (CPU and memory)
KDFl1-HB (CPU and memory)
KOF1l-HB
KDF11-HD
11-0011 (computrol serial interface)
MSV11-DD (memory)
KDF1l-HC (CPU)
11-0011 36.
MSVl1-DB (memory)
KD1l-HA (CPU) 37.
11-0011 38.
MSV1l-DB 39.
KD1l-HA
11-0011
MSV11-DD
KDF1l-AC
Q-BUS
Q-BUS
Q-BUS
Q-BUS
ADVl1-A (5) (A/U interface)
AN/il-A (4) (U/A interface)
AAVh1-A (4)
AUV11-A (5)
MPC8S (Motorola analog
multiplexer)
Switch
Sensors
Actuators
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bus has a complete minicomputer plus its peripherals or a back-up
system. Also a redundant global bus is added. The switching is
accomplished by special software. Every microprocessor is connected to
both buses, but control microprocessors only communicate with the active
minicomputer. The detailed design for this architecture is shown in
Figure 2.5.8. The worksheets are in Appendix C.
2.6 FAULT TREE FORMULATION
Once the alternative architectures are available, the fault tree
analysis can be performed (Ref. 2.10). Fault trees can be developed to
almost any degree of detail but a very refined analysis will result in a
cumbersome and extremely lengthy effort. For that reason a reasonable
set of assumptions is therefore made in order to reduce the amount of
data processing and theoretical development without losing the generality
of the work.
The following considerations have been taken into account:
1. In order to give more flexibility to the analysis, the fault
trees are developed in two different situations. These
situations represent conditions which the architecture could be
subjected during the operating life.
- Situation One: the surveillance and control system together
with the plant are operating under normal conditions. The top
event is to find out the probability of the control system
failure.
3- I
16 15
2
8 176- 5 4
14 13 12 11 10
21 20 19 18 17
22
'1
If':
24
25
9
26
Figure 2.5.8 Dual global data bus architecture,
detailed design.
*See legend on next page.
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1. MMI
2. Secondary storage
3. Processor
4. VS1l-AP (3) (monitors and keyboards)
5. CR-li (1) (card reader system)
6. LP1l-VA (1) (printer system)
7. RL1l-AK (disk system)
8. TSO3-MA (magnetic tape system)
9. 11/60 EA (CPU and memory)
10. 19" color monitor
11. CR011-A card reader
12. LP05-VA printer
13. TSO3-SA tape drive
14. RLOI-AK disk drive
15. MSll-RE memory
16. KD1l-K CPU
17. VSIl-AA, VRVO2-BA
18. Controller documation M200
19. LPll Controller
20. TS03 Master
21. RL-l1 Controller
22. UNIBUS 1
23. Megalink 11-0016 (Computrol serial interface)
24. Global data bus 1
25. Control room
26. Machinery room
*L- J J -- 7 j LU
TTVTTV TT
35 34 33
39 38 3
42 43
44
Figure 2 . . 8 (continued). o
*See legend onl next palge.
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1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
39.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
Control room
Global data bus 2
Machinery room
Global data bus I
yPD' (stand-by diagnosis microprocessor)
iPC' (stand-by control microprocessor)
yPC (control microprocessor on service)
yPD (diagnosis microprocessor on service)
H9270 (2) (power supply)
H9270 (2)
H9270 (2)
H9270 (2)
11-0011 (Computrol serial interface)
11-0011
MSV11-DD (memory) 37.
KDF1l-AC (CPU)
11-0011 38.
11-0011
MSVll-DB (memory) 39.
KDll-HA (CPU) 40.
11-0011 41.
11-0011
MSVl1-DB 42.
KDll-HA 43.
11-0011 44.
11-0011
MSV1l-DD
KDF1l-AC
KDF1l-HD (CPU and memory)
KD11-HB (CPU and memory)
KD11-HB
KDFll-HD
Q-BUS
Q-BUS
Q-BUS
Q-BUS
ADVl1-A (5) (A/D
interface)
AAVl-A (4) (D/A
interface)
AAV11-A (4)
ADV1l-A (5)
MPC8S (Motorola analog
multiplexer)
Switch
Sensors
Actuators
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Situation Two: the plant is in an accident situation or an
accident is going on. The analysis of the top event is to find
the probability of failure for the diagnosis and surveillance
system to advise the operator properly.
There is a third important situation--to estimate the
probability of the diagnostic system to detect and prevent an
accident in the plant. This situation is very complex to
analyze, and is beyond the scope of this thesis. Nevertheless,
for the goals of the present work, that situation does need to
be evaluated in a preliminary manner.
2. Any failure mode which is common to all alternatives is not
included (i.e., external power supply failure, sensor failure,
plant failures in general).
3. The failure of one component of a subsystem will be considered
as making the subsystem fail unless there is a backup device.
4. The procedure followed is first to make a fault tree for each
alternative under situations one and two. Next the
corresponding boolean equations are obtained by applying
boolean laws, the latter equations take a reduced form.
Finally the probability equations are calculated. When the
probability equations apply to low probability events they are
approximated by the commonly used approach
p(A + B) p(A) + p(B)
When the events have high probability no approximation is made.
p(A + B) = p(A) + p(B) - p(A)p(B)
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Another implicit assumption is to consider all events
independent, thus
p(A x B) = p(A)p(B).
5. The probability of a device failing in such a way as to hold
the data bus is so low that the event is neglected in the fault
trees.
2.6.1 CENTRAL PROCESSOR ARCHITECTURE
The fault tree and its corresponding probability equations are in
Appendix D. The following comments apply to the fault tree development.
1. Communications control and data validation are done by the
central processor
2. The operator has questioning capabilities over the
communications; he also receives the validated data
3. The event "man-machine interface fails" implies bad data
reception or transmission of wrong commands because of console
failure.
4. Secondary storage covers disk drives, magnetic tape units, and
their controllers.
5. The fault tree for situation two is different from condition
one because the hardware involved in each situation is
different. For example, the D/A interface and control
microprocessor do not take part in the operator advisory
process.
6. The probability of software failure is a fixed value determined
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by the designer. When this value is stated, the program has to
be debugged up to that value. All software will be considered
with the same failure rate (see Appendix E).
Figures D.1 and D.2 show the fault trees, the legend is in Tables
D.1 and D.2. Finally, equations D.1 and D.2 are the probabilistic
equations for these fault trees.
2.6.2 DUAL CENTRAL PROCESSOR ARCHITECTURE
The following comments apply to this architecture.
1. The dual central processor has a data link between both CPUs
which is not included in the fault tree due to its low
probability of failure.
2. The processor's hardware failure related with the switch is
only the hardware which works with the switch.
3. For the software related to the switch a conservative viewpoint
has been taken, namely any software failure fails the switch.
5. It is assumed that if individual switches fail, the switch
system fails (another conservative measure).
6. The same comments in 2.6.1 apply in this architecture.
The fault trees are presented in Figures D.3 and D.4; the legend for
the fault trees is in Tables D.3 and D.4. Finally the probabilistic
equations are D.3 and D.4, all in Appendix D.
2.6.3 STAR ARCHITECTURE
The following comments apply to these architectures.
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the
esti
1. It is included fault trees for the parallel and serial
transmission alternatives (situations one and two).
2. Dedicated systems Cl, C2, C3 04, 05, and C6 are assumed to have
same hardware. Therefore, it is only necessary to calculate one to
mate the others.
3. In situation one the failure of D9 D10 , D , D12, and D13 do n
contribute to the top event.
4. The lines from D/A, A/D to microprocessor are too short to be
included.
5. A conservative approach is taken assuming the failure of one
subsystem causes failure of the whole system.
6. The switches at the microprocessor level were treated in the
same manner as the switches for the dual processor alternative.
7. Software failure is considered a constant for every processing
device (by designer decision). The parallel transmission has
the following special comments.
-In situation two "mc hardware fails" does not include the
parallel interfaces with the microprocessors
-Also in condition two "±PD 3 hardware fails" does not include
the parallel interface with the gPC3.
The serial transmission alternative has the following special
ot
comments:
- "mC hardware fails" does not include the serial interface to
the microprocessor (condition two)
-" PD3 hardware fails" does not include the parallel interface
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to the gPC3 (condition two)
Figures D.5 and D.6 show the fault trees for the parallel and serial
architectures. Equations D.5 and D.6 are the probabilistic equations for
the fault trees. Tables D.5 and D.6 have the legend for the parallel
transmission case. Tables D.7 and D.8 have the legend for the serial
transmission case.
2.6.4 DUAL STAR ARCHITECTURE
All the comments given for the single architecture apply in this case.
1. The switch used in the parallel transmission alternative has the
same properties as the switch used in the dual central computer.
2. The software switch used in the serial transmission alternative
assumes only a failure in the mC hardware which is related to
the switching functions.
Figures D.9 and D.10 show the fault trees for the parallel
transmission case. Tables D.9 and D.10 give the legends applied to these
figures. Equations D.9 and D.10 are the probabilistic equations related
with the D.9 and D.10.
Figure D.11 shows the fault tree for the serial alternative situation
-one. Figure D.10 also represents the fault tree for the serial
alternative situation two. The legend for these figures is in Tables
D.11, D.10, and D.12, respectively. Equation D.11 is the probabilistic
equation for condition one. Equation D.10 is the probabilistic equation
for condition two.
122
2.6.5 GLOBAL BUS ARCHITECTURE
The following comments apply to this case.
1. The cables from switches to microprocessors or from
microprocessors to the bus (coaxial cable) are too short to be
included.
2. All the general comments related with microprocessors and
minicomputers apply.
3. The mC hardware for conditions one and two is the same.
Figures D.13 and D.14 show the fault trees for conditions one and
two; the legend is in Tables D.13 and D.14. The equations D.13 and D.14
are the probabilistic equations.
2.6.6 DUAL GLOBAL BUS ARCHITECTURE
The following comments apply:
1. It is assumed that every validation microprocessor works
simultaneously with both minicomputers.
2. The comments in Section 2.6.5 also apply here.
Figures D.15 and D.16 show the corresponding fault trees; the legend
is in Tables D.15 and D.16. Equations D.13 and D.14 are the
probabilistic equations for this case.
Greater insight on what devices are included in each calculation is
obtained by looking at Section 2.7.
2.7 PROBABILITIES OF FAILURE OF COMPONENTS AND SOFTWARE
Up to this point, the hardware configuration and the fault trees are
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known. The next step is to find the basic probablities of failures in
order to input them into the probabilities equations.
The event probabilities related with hardware are calculated by
assuming the failure rates provided by the vendor as a constant during
the time between maintenance. The expression for the reliability of a
component is given by:
R(t) = exp[-f -2 h(t)dt] (2.7.1)
fti
where
R(t) = reliability (success probability during the mission time)
h(t) = hazard rate (instantaneous failure rate) (f/h)
t I = time when mission begins
t 2 = time when mission ends
Generally AT = t2 - t 3 is considered as the time between maintenance.
If the hazard rate is constant or equal to x, equation (2.7.1) takes
the form of
R(t) = exp(-xt) (2.7.2)
and W(t) = 1 - R(t) (2.7.3)
where W(t) is called unreliability or probability of failure.
The probability of software failure has been introduced because of
the huge software development task that an effort of this kind involves.
It is almost inconceivable to reach an error-free software for this job,
therefore the estimated software failure rate is another input to the
probability equations. In fact, software failure is included from the
beginning in the fault trees.
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For the purposes of this thesis, the software failure rate will be
considered a fixed value stated by the designer as a goal that has to be
achieved by the programmers and debuggers. To reach the given level of
reliability means a corresponding effort in debugging man-hours,
therefore the complexity of one algorithm will not only appear in its
reliability but in its costs. Appendix E explains how the debugging time
can be obtained starting fran a given software hazard function.
The following subsections are devoted to the calculation of failure
rates for each basic event. Once a basic event failure rate is
calculated in one architecture, if it appears in another architecture the
calculation will not be repeated.
2.7.1 CENTRAL COMPUTER ARCHITECTURE
Each basic event is analyzed separately and the resultant failure
rate is recorded in the corresponding table in Appendix D under the name
"generic failure rate."
The columns of the tables given in Appendix D deserve special
explanation:
-Generic failure rate (xG)--this is the basic failure rate generally
given by the vendors and calculated from their own tests under laboratory
conditions.
-Quality factor (rQ): This factor multiplies the generic failure
rate, introducing a correction which takes into account the degree of
quality control during the manufacturing process.
-Environmental factor (WE): This factor also multiplies the generic
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failure rate, introducing a correction which considers the effect of the
actual environment in which the devices are placed.
-Learning factor (WL): This factor also multiplies the generic
failure rate, introducing the degree of technical development undergone
by the component before it reaches the market. The values for each
factor are given in Ref. 2.8.
It should also be noted that the data supplied by DEC already have a
Ir= 16, then at the-tables this factor will appear as a 1.0.
Therefore
X = KG xTQ xE x7L
where x = estimated component failure rate. x is also stated in the
tables. Listed under the title "event probability" is the result of
transforming x by Equations 2.7.2 and 2.7.3. This is the estimated event
probability of failure. The remaining colums are self-explanatory.
2.7.1.1 SITUATION ONE
A. Control line fails: The most common practice is to assume a zero
failure rate for the cables, but a high number of them and their length
(approximately 35m) makes it advisable to choose a conservative value for
these components. The number given in Table D.1 and others comes from
reference 2.8.
Under the assumption that a failure in a cable makes the control line
fail (a conservative assumption), the probability of failure for the
control cables is calculated as:
P= 1 - exp(-Nxt)
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Pt = probability of failure
N = number of cables (100 control case)
x = estimated failure rate
t = time between maintenance.
Initially the maintenance policy will be assumed as one test every day.
Later the weight of this assumption will be assessed.
B. Central processor fails: It is assumed a failure in the central
processor when any of its components fails, e.g., the total failure rate
is equal to the summation of the components' failure rates. A list of
the components, their number, and the failure rates multiplied by the
component number follows:
COMPONENT NUMBER FAILURE RATE/106 Hours
CPU 1, 226.397
A/D controllers 9 694.93
Memory 1 80.095
A/D devices 18 98.12
Backplanes 14 0.21
A/D multiplexers 18 68.1
Unibus repeaters 4 21.967
D/A controllers 27 2084.79
Power supplies 5 57.55
D/A devices 27 225.041
TOTAL 3557.2
D. MMI fails: the man-machine interface failure of most concern
involves the three consoles; thus when the three consoles fail together
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it will be assumed to be an MMI failure. This means the final
probability of failure is the probability of failure for one console to
the third power.
Console (1) 173.392
E. Control software fails: The software will be required to be very
reliable; for calculation purposes it will be assumed as 0.5 failure
during the hardware lifetime (10 years) , or x = 5.71 x 10
F. Diagnosis lines fails: The same explanation for control cables
holds but now N = 1089.
2.7.1.2 SITUATION 2
G. Central processor hardware fails: The failure rate is calculated
including only the components involved in the diagnosis problem.
COMPONENT NUMBER FAILURE RATE/106 Hours
CPU and memory 1 306.493
Backplanes 14 0.21
Unibus repeaters 4 21.967
A/D devices 18 98.106
Multiplexers 18 68.102
Power supplies 5 57.55
TOTAL 1247.36
H. Secondary storage system fails: The system is made up of a disk
storage drive plus a magnetic tape drive as a back-up. A failure in the
secondary storage appears when both drives fail together. In other words,
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Pt(secondary storage) = Pt(disk) x Pt(tape)
COMPONENT NUMBER FAILURE RATE/106 Hours
Disk drive 1 181.80198
Controller 1 17.71678
Total disk 199.51876
Magnetic tape (complete) 1 203.33456
Then Pt(disk unit) = 2.97167 x 102
Pt(tape unit) = 3.0276 x 10~4
I. Diagnosis software fails: The failure rate for software is
already stated.
2.7.2 DUAL CENTRAL COMPUTER
2.7.2.1 SITUATION ONE
J. Switch hardware fails: Each analog output line has its own
switch. Taking a conservative measure it will be assumed that the
failure of one switch causes failure of the switch system. The switch
system failure rate is the summation of the individual failure rates.
Switch 1 .155
K. Processor 1 hardware fails (SR): This event only includes the
hardware related to the switch.
COMPONENT NUMBER FAILURE RATE/106 Hours
CPU and memory 1 306.49
Unibus repeaters 4 21.967
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Backplanes 14 0.21
D/A controllers 27 2084.79
Power supplies 5 57.55
D/A devices 27 225.041
TOTAL 2696.05
L. Processor 2 hardware fails: The same as event A.
M. Processor 2 hardware fails (SR): The same as event L.
2.7.2.2 SITUATION TWO
N. Central processor hardware fails:
COMPONENT NUMBER
CPU and memory 1
Unibus repeaters 4
A/D controllers 9
Backplanes 14
A/D devices 18
Multiplexers 18
Power supplies 5
FAILURE RATE/106 Hours
306.49
21.967
694.932
0.21
98.106
68.102
57.55
TOTAL 1247.36
2.7.3 STAR ARCHITECTURE
2.7.3.1 PARALLEL COMMUNICATIONS
2.7.3.1.1 SITUATION ONE
C. Central mC hardware fails: It is assumed that any component of
the minicomputer makes the mC fail, thus,
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COMPONENT NUMBER FAILURE RATE/106 Hours
CPU and memory 1 190.617
Unibus repeaters 3 16.475
Power supplies 1 11.50994
Parallel interfaces 42 311.9172
Backplanes 24 0.36
Extra memory 1 8.22293
TOTAL 539.108
E. C3 - mC line fails: This is the cable which connects the
microprocessor with the central minicomputer: x = 0.6(f/106 h).
F. gPC3 hardware fails: All the microprocessor components are
included in this calculation. For the effects of considering the
interfaces, an average number will be assumed. This assumption is more
reasonable than to assume the number of interfaces needed by the most
required microprocessor, which would be an overly conservative measure
and could distorts the final results due to the high comparative cost of
these interfaces.
COMPONENT NUMBER FAILURE RATE/106 Hours
CPU and memory 1 49.78366
Parallel interfaces 3 23.07084
D/A devices 4 21.54176
Backplanes 2 0.0003
Powe m supplies 2 12.43876
TOTAL 106.837
H. gPD3 hardware fails: Same considerations are used as for RPC 3 '
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COMPONENT NUMBER FAILURE RATE/106 Hours
CPU and memory 1 28.61452
Parallel interfaces 3 23.07084
A/D devices 5 36.9377
Backplanes 3 0.0045
Power supplies 2 12.43876
TOTAL 101.0653
M. Switch hardware fails: Assuming that the failure of one sw
makes the switch system fail, the individual failure rates is .155
(f/106h) and each system has 8 switches.
PP. pPC3 hardware fails (SR): Only the hardware related withI
switch is included.
COMPONENT NUMBER FAILURE RATE/106 Hours
CPU and memory 1 49.78366
Power supplies 2 12.43876
Backplanes 2 0-0003
D/A device 1 5.38544
TOTAL 67.6105
itch
the
2.7.3.1.2 SITUATION TWO
GG. mC hardware fails: In this situation the parallel interfaces
with the RPCs are not included, thus,
COMPONENT NUMBER FAILURE RATE/106 Hours
CPU and memory 1 190.617
Extra memory 1 8.22293
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Unibus repeaters 3 16.475
Parallel interfaces 28 207.946
Backplanes 24 0.36
Power supplies 1 11.50994
TOTAL 435.131
JJ. uPD 3 hardware fails: This event does not include the parallel
interfaces with the gPC.
COMPONENT NUMBER FAILURE RATE/10 6 Hours
CPU and memory 1 28.61452
Parallel interfaces 1 7.42666
A/D devices 5 36.9377
Power supplies 2 12.43826
Backplanes 3 0.00045
TOTAL 85.4216
2.7.3.2 SERIAL COMMUNICATIONS
The overall architecture is very similar to the parallel case; only a
few components are different to make up the serial asynchronous
communications. This fact makes the fault trees similar and also the
probabilistic equations. Only a few values change, the remaining
evaluation is exactly equal to the corresponding parallel situation.
2.7.3.2.1 SITUATION ONE
C. Central mC hardware fail s: The components included in this event
are:
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COMPONENT
CPU and memory
Serial interfaces
Extra memory
NUMBER
1
6
1
F. gPC3 hardware fails.
COMPONENT NUMBER
CPU and memory 1
Power supplies 2
Backplanes 2
A/D devices 4
Parallel interfaces 2
Serial interfaces 1
I. 9PD3 hardware fails.
COMPONENT NUMBER
CPU and memory 1
Parallel interfaces 2
A/D devices 4
Power supplies 2
Serial interfaces 1
Backplanes 3
FAILURE RATE/106 Hours
190.61766
153.8538
8.22993
TOTAL 352.6944
FAILURE RATE/106 Hours
49.78366
12.43826
12.43826
21.54176
14.8534
5.67810
TOTAL 352.6944
FAILURE RATE/106 Hours
28.61452
14.8534
36.9377
12.43826
5.6781
0.0045
TOTAL 98.52648
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2.7.3.2.2 SITUATION TWO
GG. mC hardware fails: This event does not include the serial
interfaces connecting the mC or the gPCs (one).
COMPONENT NUMBER FAILURE RATE/106 Hours
CPU and memory 1 49.78366
Serial interfaces 5 128.2115
Extra memory 1.8.22293
TOTAL 327.052
JJ. RPD3 hardware fails: The parallel interfaces connecting -with
gPCs are not included.
COMPONENT NUMBER
CPU and memory 1
Power supplies 2
Backplanes
Serial interface
A/D devices
FAILURE RATE/106 Hours
28.61452
12.43876
0.0045
5.6871
36.9377
TOTAL 83.6731
2.7.4 DUAL STAR ARCHITECTURE
The design of the dual star architecture is fairly similar to the
single star one. In the parallel transmission case, a switch which
controls the communication flow between the central minicomputer and the
control microprocessors has been added. The use of this switch
eliminates the need of unibus repeaters for the control microprocessors.
The serial communications alternative does not use a hardware switch.
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2.7.4.1 SITUATION ONE
C. Central mC1 hardware fails:
COMPONENT NUMBER
CPU and memory I
Power supplies 2
Backplanes 22
Unibus repeater 1
Parallel interfaces 28
Extra memory 1
H . uPD3 hardware fails:
COMPONENT NUMBER
CPU and memory 1
Parallel interfaces 4
A/D devices 5
Power supplies 2
Backplanes 3
EE. Switch So hardware fails:
COMPONENT NUMBER
Switch 3
Parallel interfaces 14
AAA. i 1hardware fail s (SR)
FAILURE RATE/106 Hours
190.61766
23.0199
0.33
4.49171
207.9465
8.22293
TOTAL 435.629
FAILURE RATE/106 Hours
28.61452
30.76112
36.9377
12.43826
0.0045
TOTAL 108.7561
FAILURE RATE/106 Hours
38.35223
103.97324
TOTAL 132.32547
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COMPONENT
CPU and memory
Extra memory
Power supplies
Backplanes
NUMBER
2
2
2.7.4.1.2 CONDITION TWO
VV. mC hardware fails:
COMPONENT NUMBER
CPU and memory 1
Extra memory 1
Power supplies 1
Unibus repeater 1
Parallel interfaces 28
Backplanes 14
MM. PD3 hardware fails:
COMPONENT NUMBER
CPU and memory 1
Power supplies 2
Backplanes 3
Parallel interfaces 2
A/D devices 5
FAILURE RATE/106 Hours
190 .61766
8.22293
23.01988
0.105
TOTAL 221.965
6
FAILURE RATE/10 Hours
190.61766
8.22293
23.01988
5.49171
178.23984
0.21
TOTAL 405.802
6
FAILURE RATE/10 Hours
28.61452
12.43826
0.0045
15.38
36.937 7
TOTAL 93.37498
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2.7.4.2 SERIAL COMMUNICATIONS
This dual architecture differs from the single only because it has a
complete minicomputer set as a backup, and the microprocessors have an
extra series interface to communicate with both minicomputers
2.7.4.2.1 SITUATION ONE
F. VPC 3 hardware fails:
COMPONENT NUMBER
CPU and memory 1
Power supplies 2
Backplanes 2
Serial interfaces 2
Parallel interfaces 2
D/A devices 4
H. gPD 3 hardware fails:
COMPONENT NUMBER
CPU and memory 1
Power supplies 2
Backplanes 3
Serial interfaces 2
Parallel interfaces 2
A/D devices 5
FAILURE RATE/10 6 Hours
48.78366
12.43826
0.0003
11.3562
15.38056
21.54176
TOTAL 110.50344
FAILURE RATE/106 Hours
28.761452
12.43826
0.0045
11.3562
15.38056
36.9397
TOTAL 104.731
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2.7.4.2 CONDITION TWO
VY. mC2 hardware fails:
COMPONENT NUMBER
CPU and memory 1
Extra memory 1
Power supplies 2
Unibus repeater 1
Serial interfaces 4
Backplanes 15
MM. PD3 hardware fails:
COMPONENT NUMBER
CPU and memory 1
Power supplies 2
Serial interfaces 2
Backplanes 3
A/D devices 5
FAILURE RATE/106 Hours
190.61766
8.22293
23.01988
5.49171
102.5692
0.225
TOTAL 330.1464
FAILURE RATE/106 Hours
28.61452
12.43826
11.3562
0.0045
36.9377
TOTAL 89.3502
2.7.5 GLOBAL BUS ARCHITECTURE
2.7.5.1 SITUATION ONE
A. Global bus fails: The global bus is a coaxial cable of about 35
meters in length; its generic rate, taken from references 2.8, is
xG = 0.6 (f/106 h)
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D. mC hardware fails:
COMPONENT NUMBER
CPU and memory 1
Extra memory
Control of communications
and serial- interface 1
F. PC3 hardware f ail s:
COMPONENT NUMBER
CPU and memory 1
Power supplies 1
Backplanes 2
Serial interfaces I
D/A devices 4
J. PD3 hardware fails.
COMPONENT NUMBER
CPU and memory 1
Power supplies 1
Backplanes 2
Serial interface 1
A/D interfaces 5
FAILURE RATE/106 Hours
190.61766
8.2293
25.0
TOTAL 223.84
FAILURE RATE/106 Hours
48.78366
6.219
0.0003
25.0
21.5415
TOTAL 102.547
FAILURE RATE/106 Hours
28.61452
6.219
0.0003
25.0
36.9377
TOTAL 96.776
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2.7.5.2 SITUATION TWO
GG. mC hardware fails: same as situation one.
J. PD3 hardware fails: same as situation one.
2.7.6 DUAL GLOBAL BUS
For this alternative the microprocessors have an extra serial
interface to communicate with both central minicomputers.
2.7.6.1 SITUATION ONE
H. gPC 3 hardware fails:
COMPONENT NUMBER
CPU and memory 1
Power supply 1
Backplanes 2
Serial interfaces 2
D/A interfaces 4
R. pPD 3 hardware fails:
COMPONENT NUMBER
CPU and memory 1
Power supply 2
Backplanes 2
Serial interfaces 2
A/D devices 5
FAILURE RATE/106 Hours
49.78366
6.219
0.0003
50.0
21.5415
TOTAL 127.547
FAILURE RATE/106 Hours
28.61452
12.4383
0.0003
50.0
36.9377
TOTAL 127.9935
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2.7.6.2 SITUATION TWO
The components have the same failure rate as situation one.
The tables of Appendix D contain all the estimated failure rates.
The next step is to calculate the probability of failure of each event;
this step is done using the event failure rate in equations 2.7.2 and.
2.7.3. The time between maintenance s arbitrarily set at 24 hours, the
weight of this assumption will be discussed later during senstivity
analysis.
The results are shown in the corresponding table under the title
"Event probability of failure."
The final step is to input the "event probabilities of failure" to
the corresponding.probabilistic equations. The calculational results are
the probability of failure for the respective architecture. Tables 2.9.1
and 2.9.2 show the estimated probability of failure for each
architecture, obtained by the fault tree method.
2.8 COST OF THE ARCHITECTURES
As was explained, the costs for each architecture do not include
figures for items which are seen as common expenses. Therefore, the
final numbers do not represent the true final cost of each architecture,
rather they show a composite number to facilitate comparative analysis.
All costs given in this section are net present values (NPV) for the
year 1980. The cost for each architecture is divided into three
categories:
- basic hardware cost
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- basic software cost
- special software cost.
The basic hardware cost is obtained from the corresponding worksheet in.
Appendix C. The cost of the basic software is. given by the vendor.
These cost figures are for the individual device; substantial reductions
can be obtained by large-scale buying, but because it is a relative
situation, for each alternative will be assumed that the total hardware
cost is the summation of the individual costs.
Only the special software has to be addressed in more detail. This
cost is represented by the following equation:
C = TC + T (2.8.1)
where
T= programming time (hours)
Cp= programmer cost (US$/hour)
TD = debugging time (hours)
CD = debugger cost (US$/hour)
TP is a value obtained from Table B.2 and TD is obtained by using the
following equation, developed in Appendix E:
T14 ln( C )-(2.8.2)
7.381 x 10 7.381 x 10 B
C has been set as 5.71 (failures/106h) and B as a quantity given for
each algorithm in Table B.2.
The particular cost for every architecture is now calculated.
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2.8.1 CENTRAL COMPUTER ARCHITECTURE COST
The first step is to obtain the special software cost. To do so two
assumptions are made:
- The required failure rate for the software will be 0.5 failures
during the hardware life cycle (10 years), which implies C = 5.71 x
10 [f/h].
- As it was assumed that the total memory requi red is equal to the
summation of the individual requirements, the total number of estimated
errors buried in the software is equal to the summation of the individual
estimated numbers of errors.
From Table B.2
T, = 533,498.11 (h)
B = 4041.92.
Finally, it is assumed that the programmer and the debugger have the same
cost--18.75 (US$/hour).
Replacing all the values in equations 2.8.1 and 2.8.2, the estimated
special software cost is 10,338,562 US$. The digital system is running
under the RSX-LIM operative system and it will require a FORTRAN IV
compiler:
RSX-11M 7800
FORTRAN IV 700
Basic Software cost 8500 (US$)
Finally, the hardware cost is 568,198 (US$). The costs are displayed in
the following table.
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Hardware 568,198
Basic Software 8,500
Special Software 10,338,562
Total Cost 10,915,260 US$
It is difficult not to realize~ the higher cost implied by the special
software compared with the basic software and the hardware. Also there
is an implicit assumption in the cost structure of not considering the
cost of developing the theoretical models to be implemented in the
computers. This cost figure could be reduced depending on the number of
repeated algorithms which are the same for each processing block. Thus
although the special software cost is an estimated one, this cost is
going to be the dominant cost in the design process. Because the
software does not degrade with time, and also can be used without any
extra costs in a serial production of the same control system, the
special software cost will be amortized with serial production, and with
time when the hardware degenerates. For the problem at hand, the
corresponding net present value of the special software is charged to
each architecture, making a fair comparison and leaving the subject of
how to amortize the cost to further works.
2.8.2 DUAL CENTRAL COMPUTER ARCHITECTURE COST
The hardware cost is the double of the single case plus the cost of
the switches. The basic software cost is equal to the first plus the
cost of a second package (which has a reduced price).
Hardware 1,137,827
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Basic Software 11,650
Special Software 10,338,562
Total Cost 11,488,039 US$
2.8.3 STAR ARCHITECTURE COST
The hardware costs also come from the worksheets in Appendix C.
2.8.3.1 PARALLEL TRANSMISSION
Central processor (1) 242,888
Control microprocessors (14) 156,352
Diagnosis microprocessors (28) 416,080
Hardware cost 815,320
RSX-11M 7,800
RSX-11S 33,820
FORTRAN IV 700
Basic software cost 43,320
Special software cost 10,338,562
TOTAL ARCHITECTURE COST 11,196,202 (US$)
The special software cost has been assumed similar to the other
architectures because the estimated programming time and estimated
debugging time have also been assumed similar. In the actual
implementation the special software cost can be higher because of the
extra cost in making the talking protocols between the central unit and
the distributed microprocessors.
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2.8.3.2 SERIAL COMMUNICATIONS
Central processor (1)
Control microprocessors (14)
Diagnosis microprocessors (28)
Hardware cost
Basic software cost
Special software cost
TOTAL ARCHITECTURE COST
2.8.4 DUAL STAR ARCHITECTURE COST
2.8.4.1 PARALLEL COMMUNICATIONS
Central processors (2)
Switch (1)
Control microprocessors (14)
Diagnosis microprocessors (28)
Hardware cost
Basic software cost
Special software cost
TOTAL ARCHITECTURE COST
2.8.4.2 SERIAL COMMUNICATIONS
Central processors (2)
Control microprocessors (14)
Diagnosis microprocessors (28)
Hardware cost
Basic software cost
Special software cost
TOTAL ARCHITECTURE COST
128,452
152,012
407,400
687,864
42,320
10,338,562
11,068,746 (US$)
354,400
65,958
156,352
433,440
1,010,150
45,470
10,338,562
11,394,182 (US$)
256,904
154,840
416,080
827,824
45,470
10,338,562
11,211,856 (USE)
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2.8.5 GLOBAL BUS ARCHITECTURE COST
Central processor (1) 106,895
Control microprocessors (14) 151,802
Diagnosis microprocessors (28) 401,380
Hardware cost 660,077
Basic software cost 42,320
Special software cost 10,338,562
TOTAL ARCHITECTURE COST 11,040,959 (US$)
2.8.6 DUAL GLOBAL BUS ARCHITECTURE COST
Central processor (2) 213,790
Control microprocessors (14) 183,092
Diagnosis microprocessors (28) 483,560
Hardware cost 880,442
Basic software cost 45,470
Special software cost 10,338,562
TOTAL ARCHITECTURE COST 11,264,474 (US$)
2.9 EXPECTED MONETARY VALUE (EMV) ANALYSIS
2.9.1 INTRODUCTION
Up to this point, two important factors used in the EMV analysis have
been obtained, the architecture's cost and the corresponding probability
of failure (both sets of values are summarized in Tables 2.9.1 and
2.9.2). What is left is to establish formally the decision tree faced by
the decision maker, and the payoffs involved by any decision if it is
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made. Once it is done the EMV analysis is performed.
2.9.2 DECISION TREE
The designer faces a decision tree with 8 initial branches (Figure
2.9.1), after that, because of the nature of the problem, the decision
tree follows different paths according to the situation.
2.9.2.1 SITUATION ONE
In this case, each decision branch is followed by only one chance
fork, say, the architecture fails or succeeds. The decision tree is
shown in Figure 2.9.1. The key to the figure follows:
C = cost of the architecture
PS = probability of success
POS = payoff of success
POF = payoff of failure
Subscripts:
1 central computer architecture
2 dual central computer architecture
3 star parallel architecture
4 star serial architecture
5 dual star parallel architecture
6 dual star serial architecture
7 global bus architecture
8 dual global bus architecture
1-P
Decision tree for situation one.
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PS1  POS 1
PF3 I POF 1
PS2 POS2
PF2  POF2
PS3  POS3
PF3  POF 3
PS4  POS 4
PF4  POF4
PS5  POS5
PF5 OF5
PS6 PO56
PF6 POF6
PS7  POS7
PF7  POF7
PS8 POS8
PR8 POE8
Figure 2.9.1
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2.9.2.2 SITUATION TWO
The decision tree corresponding to this situation differs from the
previous one because now, after the computer system fails, the operator
has a chance to handle the accident, or a chance of realizing that an
accident is going on. The operator may succeed or fail, and that is the
second chance fork shown in Figure 2.9.2
The extra nomenclature given in 2.9.2 is p0 , which represents the
probability of failure for the operator.
2.9.3 PAYOFF CALCULATIONS
Payoff is another form for consequences. The actual analysis is only
concerned with relative economic consequences. As far as the decision
analysis theory is concerned, the study could be broadened to see how
other attributes of the problem could affect the final decision, but to
make such broadening is beyond the scope of this project. Thus in order
to simplify the problem, and also to handle commonly used figures, the
attributes in this analysis will be only the economic ones (costs,
expected revenues, expected losses).
Next comes the very critical point of defining the consequences in
terms of the figure of merit
2.9.3.1 SITUATION ONE
Recall that situation one refers to the case where the SDCS system
and the plant are operating under normal conditions. Certain assumptions
are unavoidable in order to frame the problem. In this case we assume
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PS; IPOS IpsiSOp0 Ps
PS) ,(1-PQ) PO3
PF1 ,P0  POF1
PS2  P052
PS2  O-P0) P052
PF2 'P POF2
PS3 3
PS3 ' (1-P 0  P053
PF ,p POF 3
PS4  POS 4
PS4 ,(1-P 0 ) POS4
PF4 , P0  POF 4
PS5  P055
PS5'(-P o P5
PF5 , POF 5
PS6  P056
PS6 ' ,(1p 0 6
PF6 'p0 POF6
PS7  POS7
PS7, (1-P0) POS 7
PF7 ,P0 POF7
PS8  POS 8
PS 8(1-P ) P08
P8 ' 0 PF
Decision tree for situation two.Figure 2.9.2
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the following:
1. All the mrney figures are in their NPV terms and the rate of
inflation will be assumed equal to the discount rate all over
the time span.
2. The ship will fail to sail, and will lose revenues if the
control system fails.
3. Other reasons keeping the ship from sailing are not considered.
4. The cost of repairing the control system is negligible.
5. The revenues will be calculated in NPV during the life cycle of
the hardware (10 years).
6. The consequences are similar for each architecture; what makes
the difference is the expected value of the consequences and the
cost of the alternative.
7. One way to estimate the approximate loss of revenue when the
ship is out of service is by using the revenues obtained during
operation, and correcting this value by the accumulated
inflation index. After doing so the annual revenues of the ship
could be approximately 6,700,000 US$. The next assumption is to
say the NPV of the revenues will be exactly the same each year
during the life cycle of the hardware (10 years). Because we
have previously assumed a rate of inflation equal to the
discounting rate during this 10 years, the total NPV of the
revenue is approximately 67,000,000 US$.
Sunarizing in situation one:
P0S = 67,000,000 US$
POF = 0
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2.9.3.2 SITUATION TWO
To specify the consequences of the failure in the surveillance,
diagnostic and advising system, a set of assumptions is also established:
1. It will be assumed that if the diagnostic system fails to advise
the operator correctly, and the operator consequently makes a
mistake, the NSGS is lost, and the owner has to buy a new one to
keep the ship in business.
2. If the system succeeds in spotting an accident and advising the
operator correctly of the problem, there is no loss of plant but
the ship should stop to repair the problems.
3. The first two assumptions lead to the following approximate
values: POF = 1.89 x 106 US$
POS = 0
4. The probability of an operator's making an error is
approximately 10-3/action, assuming 10 actions/hour; the
operator will have a failure rate of 0.01 (f/h). With a duty
time of four hours (equivalent to the time between maintenance),
it is possible to conclude with an operator probability of
failure of 0.04.
2.9.4 EMY ANALYSIS
From the decision analysis theory and using Figures 2.9.1 and 2.9.2,
the figures of merit (EMY) are:
Condition one:
EMV1 = max[(1 - PFg)P0S5 - C.5] (2.9.1)
154
Condition two:
EMV 2 = max[(PFg) x (POFg) x P0 - C) (2.9.2)
All the values involved in these calculations are obtained by now, thus
after performing the operations required by equations 2.9.1 and 2.9.2,
the figure of merit is obtained. The inputs and the results are sh.own in
Tables 2.9.1 and 2.9.2, respectively.
Table 2.9.1
EMY ANALYSIS SITUATION ONE
ALT PS POSx106  PF
Central 0.5804 67 0.4197
Dual central 0.7961 67 0.2039
Star parallel 0.9173 67 0.0827
Star serial 0.9436 67 0.0563
Dual star parallel 0.9905 67 0.0093
Dual star serial 0.9965 67 0.0035
Global bus 0.96238759 67 0.0038
Dual global bus 0.99323765 67 0.0068
Table 2.9.1 shows the following rankings:
ORDER EMV PF
I dual star serial dual stay
2 dual global bus dual glot
3 dual star parallel dual star
4 global bus global be
5 star serial star ser
6 star parallel star pare
7 dual central dual ceni
8 central central
POF
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
C(x106 )
10.915
11.488
11.196
11.069
11.394
11.212
11.041
11.264
r serial
bal bus
r parallel
us
ial
allel
tral
EMV(x10 6 )
27.971
41.850
50.205
52.156
54.966
55.553
53.439
55.282
central
global bus
star serial
star parallel
dual star serial
dual global bus
dual star parallel
dual central
155
ALT
Central
Dual central
Star parallel
Star serial
Dual star parall
Dual star serial
Global bus
Dual global bus
Table
ORDER
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
PS
0.823
0.968
0.933
0.948'
el 0.996(
0.997
0.962
0.993,
2.9.2 shows the following
EMY
central
global bus
star serial
dual star serial
star parallel
dual global bus
dual star parallel
dual central
Table 2.9.2
EMV ANALYSIS SITUATION TWO
POSx106 PF POF(x10
4 0 0.1766 -18.9
8 0 0.0312 -18.9
1 0 0.0669 -18.9
7 0 0.0514 -18.9
0 0 0.0040 -18.9
5 0 0.0025 -18.9
8 0 0.0372 -18.9
7 0 0.0063 -18.9
6)
rankings:
PF
dual star serial
dual star parallel
dual global bus
dual central
global bus
star serial
star parallel
central
Cx 106
10.915
11.488
11.196
11.069
11. 394
11.212
11.041
11.264
EMV(x106
-11.046
-11.511
-1.1.246
-11.107
-11. 397
-11.214
-11.069
-11.269
C
central
global bus
star serial
star parallel
dual star serial
dual global bus
dual star parallel
dual central
Legend:
PS Probability of success
POS Payoff of success
PF Probability of failure
POF Payoff of failure
C Cost (US$)
EMV Expected monetary value (USS)
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The priorities order already shown deserves some comment:
1. In situation one the EMV figure favors dual distributed
alternatives
2. In situation two the EMV figure favors single alternatives
3. in both studies the probability of failure favors the dual
distributed alternatives
4. In both situations the costs favor the single alternatives
Final comments and conclusions are more meaningful after the sensitivity
analysis in Section 2.10 has been discussed.
2.9.5 EMV ANALYSIS WITH A FAULT TOLERANT COMPUTER
Analysis of the addition of fault tolerant computers is introduced
only as an illustrative example because:
- Fault tolerant computers are not standard market products and
therefore by using them, the initial design requirement of using only
market product is violated.
- The data supplied to the decision model are unreliable, and the
technical assumptions made to fit the fault tolerant computer inside the
model are too crude. Nevertheless, the results can be seen as trends and
a measure of the relative magnitudes involved.
The following is the set of assumptions applied to this case.
- As an example of a fault tolerant computer, the Charles Stark
Draper Laboratory fault tolerant computer will be used. Its memory
capability makes it fit only in distributed architecture as a central
mi nimcomputer.
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- The CPU and memory of the standard designs are substituted by the
fault tolerant CPU and memory.
- The data obtained for this fault tolerant CPU and memory are as
foil ows:
Cost 500,000 (US$)
-1 3 6Failure rate 10 (f/106h)
This failure rate substitutes the failure rate under the name "CPU and
memory" in the Section 2.7 calculations (only for distributed
alternatives).
After performing a new round of calculations with the probabilistic
equations, the estimated probabilities of failure are written in Tables
2.9.3 and 2.9.4.
Similar procedure was followed for costs, and the new costs also
appear in the tables.
EMY ANALYSIS
ALT
Central
Dual central
Star parallel
Star serial
Dual star parallel
Dual star serial
Global bus
Dual global bus
PS
0.5804
0.7961
0.9945
0.9724
0.9939
0.9991
0.9918
0.9944
Table 2.9.3
CONDITION ONE (FAULT TOLERANT CASE)
POS(x106) PF POF C(x106)
67 0.4196 0 10.915
67 0.2039 0 11.488
67 0.0547 0 11.661
67 0.0275 0 11.534
67 6.05x10-3 0 11.859
67 8.67x10~4 0 11.677
67 8.23x10-3 0 11.506
67 5.61x10-3 0 11.729
EMV(x 06
27.971
41.850
54.972
53.621
54.735
55.265
54.942
54.895
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Table 2.9.4
EMV ANALYSIS SITUATION TWO (FAULT TOLERANT CASE)
ALT PS POS PF POF(x1O6) C(x106)
Central 0.8234 0 0.1766 -18.9 10.915
Dual central 0.9688 0 0.0312 -18.9 11.488
Star parallel 0.9612 0 0.0383 -18.9 11.661
Star serial 0.9775 0 0.0224 -18.9 11.534
Dual star parallel 0.9981 0 0.0012 -18.9 11.859
Dual star serial 0.9996 0 0.0004 -18.9 11.677
-3Global bus 0.9922 0 7.8x10-3 -18.9 11.505
Dual global bus 0.9948 0 5.19x10-3 -18.9 11.729
With the aim of making only
eight architectures combini
ORDER EMV
1 dual start serial (S)
2 dual global bus (S)
3 dual star serial (FT)
4 star parallel (FT)
5 dual star parallel (S)
6 global bus (FT)
7 dual global bus (FT)
8 dual star parallel(FT)
EMV(xlO6
-11.046
-11.511
-11.690
-11.550
-11.860
-11.677
-11.512
-11.733
rough comparison, a ranking of the first
fault tolerant and standard design follows:
CONDITION ONE
PF
dual star serial (FT)
dual star serial (S)
star parallel (FT)
dual global bus (FT)
dual star parallel (FT)
dual global bus (S)
global bus (FT)
dual star parallel (FT)
COST
central (S)
global bus (S)
star serial (S)
star parallel (S)
dual star serial (S)
dual global (S)
dual star parallel (S)
dual central (S)
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CONDITION TWO
ORDER EMV
1 central (S)
2 global bus (S)
3 star serial (FT)
4 dual star serial (S)
5 star parallel (S)
6 dual global bus (S)
7 dual star parallel (S)
8 dual central (S)
PF
dual star serial (FT)
dual star parallel (FT)
dual star serial (S)
dual star parallel (S)
dual global bus (S)
global bus (FT)
global bus (FT)
star serial (FT)
COST
central (S)
global bus (S)
star serial (S)
star parallel (S)
dual global bus (S)
dual global bus (S)
dual star parallel (S)
dual central (S)
The ranking orders shown deserve the following comments:
1. The figure of merit in situation one favors standard distributed
architectures. In situation two, it favors single standard
architectures.
2. The probability of failure favors in both situations distributed
fault tolerant alternatives.
3. The cost favors in both situations single standard alternatives.
2.10 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
2.10.1 INTRODUCTION
From the figure of merit viewpoint, the results obtained in Section
2.9 favor the use of dual star serial architecture for situation one, and
central computer for situation two. The results obtained by introducing
a fault tolerant computer are not included because of their uncertainty.
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Nevertheless, there are several facts that should be commented upon:
1. The failure rate data input to the model is considered accurate
to the first two significant numbers.
2. The fault trees are made under conservative assumptions which
increases the estimated probability of failure for the
distributed alternatives.
3. The conservative assumptions made about the switches increase
the estimated probability of failure for the architectures which
use switches.
4. The costs for the distributed architecture are calculated based
on an "average" microprocessor, thus the precise cost can be
different. Also the final cost of the architectures can be
decreased when large-scale purchases are made.
5. The software failure rate chosen is a number set by heuristic
approach.
6. The time between maintenance policy is an arbitrary number.
7. The operator probability of failure is a number that can be
modified considering the actual training state of the operators.
These seven comments clearly indicate that some uncertainty is tied
with the obtained results. In order to identify how the variation of
these parameters could change the final conclusions, a sensitivity
analysis of the parameters on the figure of merit was performed.
To perform the sensitivity analysis, one parameter was varied over a
reasonable range while the other parameters of the model are kept fixed
at their "best estimate" previously obtained values.
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Appendix F shows the results of the sensitivity analysis in Tables
F.1 and F.2. These numbers are graphically represented in Figures 2.10.1
through 2.10.8 and 2.10.9 through 2.10.15.
2.10.2 DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS
Clearly the core of the whole work is given in Figures 2.10.1 to
2.10.15. In order to clarify the discussion, the analysis will be
divided into three groups, one for each situation and one for features
common to both situations.
2.10.2.1 SITUATION ONE
1. From the figure of merit viewpoint the winning architecture is
the dual star serial communications.
2. The sensitivity analysis shows that the assumptions made to
simplify the problem do not change the final conclusion.
3. The dual star serial architecture only presents a sizable
sensitivity to the cost, payoff of success and time between
maintenance.
4. The shape of the sensitivity curve for P(soft) suggests a
maximun point which will give the optimal P(soft) required.
This matter was investigated further for the winner
architecture, and the results are shown in Figure 2.10.16. This
figure indicates that a P(soft) 5.0 x 10-3 is the optimum
required for the architecture (fran the point of view of the
figure of merit) . The reason the P( soft) curve is not monotonic
is the cost of debugging the code. In other words, when the
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curve reaches the left side of 'the graph, the marginal
improvement in probability of software success is outweighed by
the marginal cost to reach that improvement.
5. If the probability of success is regarded alone as a figure of
merit, the dual star serial architecture is also the winner.
6. If the cost alone is regarded as a figure of merit, the central
computer architecture would be the winner.
2.10.2.2 SITUATION TWO
1. From the figure of merit viewpoint, the winner is the central
computer architecture.
2. When the sensitivity studies are considered, the only curve in
which the central computer architecture keeps its supremacy is
with P(soft) variations.
3. Figure 2.10.9 tells us that for the same cost the central
computer architecture runs in third place.
4. Figure 2.10.10 shows that the higher the operator training, the
more preferable the central computer. On the other hand, the
lower the operator training the more preferable the distributed
al ternati ves.
5. Because of the huge amount of cables involved with the central
computer alternative, the higher the probability of a cable
failure, the more attractive become the distributed
alternatives. Figure 2.10.13 proves that point, and it should
be noted that there is a general lack of sensitivity to the
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cable failure.
6. The time between maintenance policy is critical in the selection
process for situation two. The central computer architecture
shows great sensitivity to this parameter. This being the case,
the central computer architecture keeps its supremacy over the
global bus only in the range from 0 to 48 hours time between
maintenance.
2.10.2.3 BOTH SITUATIONS
If one architecture should be selected for each situation, the star
serial is the clear choice for automatic controlling purposes (situation
one).
In the case of data validation, surveillance, diagnostic and operator
adivising function (situation two), it is not so clear. Considering
first the costs, it is unlikely they could change relative positions
because the costs are reasonably accurate. If the costs do not change
relative positions, the expected conclusion from Figure 2.10.9 is the
central computer architecture still is the winner.
In the second place the question arises about the time between
maintenance. Twenty-four hours can be a reasonable time range for
shore-based power plants, but at sea the environment often gets rough and
such a strict maintenance policy could not be kept up easily. The great
sensitivity to Tmaint changes makes the central computer unattractive to
marine applications.
In the third place is the sensitivity to operator failures. The
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number used to calculate the base case is the estimated probability per
action for one operator in normal conditions. In accident situations,
this number varies from 10-3 to 10-2 per action. Under the same
assumption of 10 actions per hour on four-hour duty. The probability of
making a mistake increases from .04 to approximately 0.33. The latter
places the central computer far below the distributed alternatives.
For all the reasons explained above, even though the central computer
is the winner in the base case, the sensitivity studies pointed out the
global -bus (second winner) would be a better choice for diagnosis, data
validation, surveillance, and operator advice.
But the main problem is that typically the digital system will be
wanted to handle both situations. Making the best choice then is a
matter of trade-offs between the dual star serial and global bus
architectures, and the final decision has much to do with the personal
risk attitude of the decision maker, assuming he has a risk averse
behavior, the choice has to be the dual star serial architecture which
has the best performance in condition one, and in both situations, the
dual star serial offers the lowest probability of failure.
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CHAPTER 3
MODEL OF N.S. SAVANNAH NUCLEAR REACTOR PRESSURIZER
3.1 INTRODUCTION
As we stated in Chapter 2, one of the closed feedback control loops
that the system has to have is the pressure and volume control at the
pressurizer. The design process will go further taking this loop and
making a new design which introduces a digital processor as a
controller. This example has the aim of presenting a method which can
be used later on in other loops. The pressure and volume control loop
will be redesigned and the pressure and level responses will be analyzed
by digital simulation.
Because it is intended to isolate the control problem from the data
validation problem which is the subject of another thesis, it will be
assumed that all the data coming to the controller have been previously
validated by the appropriate data validation process.
A detailed description of the N.S. Savannah pressurizer is given in
Appendix I. More information can be found in references 3.1 and 3.2.
3.2 MATHEMATICAL MODEL FOR THE PRESSURIZER
One of the most important considerations that should be made when
modeling a system is the exact degree of compromise between the accuracy
and the algorithm size. The required compromise is even more important
in this case because if microprocessors are to be chosen for the job,
they are always limited in their processing capability. Thus, a
mathematical model has to be developed for the pressurizer with a
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balance between accuracy and complexity. The chosen model is the "two
control volumes approach." This model consists of:
- steam volume
- water volume.
The spray effect on the steam volume will be taken as a direct
contact heat exchanger. The heat exchanger takes a steam flow wc from
the steam volume and adds a water flow (wc + wsp) to the water volume.
This approach has been previously used in references 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5.
3.2.1 STEAM CONTROL VOLUME
The steam control volume has the following variables (see Figure
3.2.1.a).
Input variable:
- flashing flow (wfl) produced by evaporation from the water volume
Output variables:
- mechanical work (PVs) at the control volume interfaces,
- heat leakage (Qws) through the pressurizer wall,
- steam flow condensing by the spray (wc)
- steam flow condensing at the wall (wr)
- steam flow escaping through the relief valve (wre).
The steam control volume and its corresponding variables are shown
in Figure 3.2.1.a.
The next logical step is to apply mass conservation and energy
conservation laws to the steam volume.
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The following nomenclature will be used in developing the equations:
wre: relief steam flow
hre : relief steam enthalpy
Qws : heat leakage through the wall
Vs steam control volume
P : pressure
wc : steam flow condensed by spray
wr : steam flow condensed at the wall
Wf : flashing flow
h f : flashing flow enthalpy
Ms : s team mas.s
h : steam enthalpy
Us: steam internal energy
V : water volume
Qh :heat supplied by the heaters
h c condensed water enthalpy, just when it reaches the water volume
w su: surge flow from the primary system
h su : surge flow enthalpy
hr : natural condensed water enthalpy, just when it reaches the
water volume
: water mass
h : water enthalpy
Uw : water external energy
ws:spray flow
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h' : spray flow enthalpy, just when it reaches the water volume
hsp: spray flow enthalpy at the nozzle
All the variables are in System International (SI) units.
Mass balance:
M : -Wf wre ~w 0 c~Wr (3.2.1)
Energy balance:
Us : flhf1 -Wrehre ~ wChs ~s rhs ~ws P(3.2.2)
3.2.2 WATER CONTROL VOLUME
The water control volume has the following variables (see Figure
3.2.1.b).
Input variables
- spracy water flow Cwsp)
- steam flow condensed by the spray (wc)
- natural condensation of the wall (wr)
- heaters total power (Qh)
- surge flow from the primary system (wsu)
Output variables
- mechanical work at the control volume interfaces (PVw)
- heat leakage (Qww) through the pressurizer wall,
- flashing flow (wf1 )
The water control volume and its variables are shown in Figure
3.2.1.b.
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In order to solve the water volume equations, a few assumptions have
to be made: the pressure field is assumed to be homogeneous (gravity
effects are neglected), and the travel time of the spray water and the
condensed water through the steam volume is negligible.
Mass balance:
MN= w + w +-w + w - w(32)
w sp c r su fl(32.3)
Energy balance:
UW =Wsu h su + wrhr + Qh - wfhf - Q - PV (3.2.4)
Finally, because the pressurizer has a total constant volume
Vs + Vw = constant
and hence the volumetric time derivative becomes:
V5 + V =0 (3.2.5)
3.3 STATE EQUATIONS FOR THE PRESSURIZER
So far the equations developed in Section 3.2 are general, with only
a few assumptions. In order to decrease the size of these equations and
make the problen more tractable, further assumptions within a reasonable
framework will be stated as follows:
- The natural condensation flow is taken to be negligible
(wr 0)
- the relief steam flow is only present when the relief valve opens;
then under normal condi tions w, = 0
- the rel ief s team fl ow has the same enthal py as the steam vol ume
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(hre = hS)
- the heat leakage through the wall is taken to be negligible
(Qws Qww =0)
- the condensed steam flow exists only if the spray flow is acting
i.e., wsp = 0 implies wc = 0
- the flashing enthalpy is approximately equal to the saturated
steam at the pressurizer pressure
(hf~ h (P))fl 9
- the condensed water enthalpy is approximately equal to the
saturated water enthalpy at the pressurizer pressure
(hc ~=hf(P))
- a perfect and instantaneous mixture between an insurging primary
water and the pressure water is assumed.
Now, from the viewpoint of the assumptions, the pressurizer behavior
will be analyzed for three conditions.
- insurge condition
- outsurge condition
- quasi-steady state condition.
3.3.1 INSURGE CONDITION
In order to analyze the insurge condition, the system will be
assumed at equilibrium. The equilibrium condition is defined initially
as a state where the water volume and the steam volume exist as a
saturated element and no changes in either pressure or level are present.
A subcooled water inflow (insurge) from the primary system generates
a compression in the steam region, bringing it to a higher pressure
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state. At the same time, the mixture between the subcooled insurge
water and the saturated pressurizer water brings the water volume to a
subcooled state. Two effects are present now:
- the subcooled water does not generate flashing steam
- the rise in pressure is controlled by putting the sprays into
action.
Therefore, the general equations undergo the following change:
s =-w re~ c(3.3.1)
M w +w + w su(3.3.2)
U =wre h -wch -PV 5 (3.3.3)s res c s s
U = ws h s+wh' + w h + Q - PV (3.3.4)
w su su sp sp c C h W
V s+ V =0 (3.3.5)s w
Note that wre is different from zero only if the relief valve opens.
3.3.2 OUTSURGE CONDITION
As in the previous calculations the analysis is started at the
equilibrium condition. A volume decrease in the primary systems
originates a water outflow (outsurge) from the pressurizer. The
reduction of water volume inside the pressurizer induces a steam
expansion. This expansion produces a two-phase region in the steam
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volume, also the reduced pressure causes a two-phase region in the water
vol ume.
The two-phase region in the water volume involves a natural flashing
flow and the two-phase region in the steam volume involves a natural
condensation.
Finally, the steam expansion, which is related with a pressure
decrease, precludes any spray valve opening.
The general equations take the following form:
M = wf (3.3.6)
w sul f
M W= W s u ~wfl (3.3.7)
Uw=f 1  hf1 - PV s (3.3.8)
U =wsu hsU + wf 1 h f +QhPV (3.3.9)
V + V = 0 (3.3.10)
w s
The outsurge condition has its own special characteristics:
- the water presents a quality gradient
- part of the heat generated by the heaters is lost to the primary
system.
3.3.3 QUASI-STEADY STATE CONDITION
By definition this condition is only related with small pressure
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changes around the equilibrium point. Therefore the pressurizer is in a
quasi-steady state condition when both water and steam are very near to
their saturated state (saturated conditions corresponding to the actual
pressure).
Under the quasi-steady state condition, the relief valve never opens
and the spray valve and the heaters work intermittently. A graphic
approach for the model in quasi-steady state is displayed in Figure
3.3.1.
The general equations take the following form:
Ms Wfl ~ c (3.3.11)
M W wsp + wc + Wsu ~Wfl (3.3.12)
. s11flh w- chs Ps (3.3.13)
w h +wh =wh + wsph' (3.3.14)sp sp cs cc sp
UW =Wsu h su~ wchc + wsphsp ~fl w wPVW (3.3.15)
W fh f + W fhW + Qh (3.3.16)
V + V = 0 (3.3.17)w s
Replacing (3.3.16) into (3.3.15) we have
MN = w It + wh +I-w h' -w It +Q -PV(.18
w su su c c sp sp fi gl ~h -"w (..8
Figure 3.3.1
co
C)
20
Quasi steady state model.
*See legend on next page.
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Equations (3.3.11), (3.3.12), (3.3.13), (3.3.14), (3.3.17), and (3.3.18)
make up a complete set for describing the pressurizer in a quasi-steady
state condition.
An extra assumption made for this model is to consider a 100 percent
efficient spray nozzle, e.g., the spray flow is homogeneous and overs
the whole steam volume.
Also it is very common (Ref. 3.3) to assume the spray enthalpy when
it reaches the water volume (hsp) has approximately the same value as
the condensed water enthalpy (hc)' e'gs
h = h .
sp c
This means equation (3.3.14) changes to
wsphSp + Wchs =wchc + wsphc (3.3.19)
The set of assumptions made for the model deserves the following
comments:
- Because the system is at quasi-steady state condition, all the
thermodynamic variables can be assumed close to their saturated values
hc :h hf(P) (3.3.20)
hf ~ hs ~h9(P) (3.3.21)
- Natural flashing and natural condensation are ruled by the
following expressions:
hf(P) 
- hw M
wl- h %(P) w
=h s - hg (P) N
chfg(P)c
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Making use of equation (3.3.21) Wc can be neglected. On the other
hand, wf1 is a function of MW and Mw is a large number. Therefore wf1
cannot be assumed equal to zero, and a correction has to be included in
the model.
- Unde the near steady state condition the only source for flashing
is the heat supplied by the heaters. Replacing (3.3.21) into (3.3.16)
we have
w = h (3.3.22)fg
The last three assumptions are very good under quasi steady state
conditions, but the farther the model gets from this condition, the
worse the model behaves.
- Also the perfect mixture assumption introduces a source of
inaccuracy, especially during insurges. On the other hand, it is
expected the model will behave fairly well during outsurge conditons,
provided the transient is not very fast.
- Because the reactor plant has a system to vent the non-condensable
gases, the effect of these gases will be neglected.
- - Heat transfer through the control volume inter-face is also
neglected.
- Finally, when the pressurizer is subjected to an outsurge regime,
it is assumed that all the heat supplied by the heaters remains within
the water volume.
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3.3.4 ANALYTIC FORMULATION
Besides the need for a small algorithm, the use of the quasi steady
state condition is justified for the following reason: from the scope
of this thesis, a model of the pressurizer is required as a substitute
of it during the process of designing the related control system. Once
the design is finished, the control elements are placed inside the real
plant, and then a final turning is made.
Also the pressurizer equations are by themselves complex. Intro-
ducing the feedback equations related with the control system makes the
situation even more complicated. Therefore in order to reduce the
problem to a tractable level, it is customary to linearize the plant as
far as possible without losing its peculiar characteristics. The
quasi-steady state condition accomplishes both requirements.
Because it is required for this work to state clearly the origin of
the equations used later on, a full explanation of their development
follows:
3.3.4.1 STATE EQUATIONS FOR THE QUASI STEADY STATE CONDITION
The basic equations already developed are:
s W fl ~ C (3.3.11)
M = wsp + Wc + Wsu Wfl (3.3.12)
U= Wf hf1- Wchs - sV (3.3.13)
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M = w h + wCh +w h - wfh + Qh-PV (3.3.23)
w su su c c sp c Wflhfl +h w 33.3
wsphsp + wchs = wchc + wsp hc .(3.3.19)
Y+ V =0 (3.3.17)
The process that follows is detailed by a rather lengthy account of
the steps required to reach the state equation for pressure. Such a
process is shown in Appendix G. From Appendix G, the state equation for
pressure is:
dvf
-fl wC)s(wsp + wc ~wsu -WfQ)f - -w wsu(hsu - hf)
dlv dv dvf dvf
M( v + i) + MfYW( vf + ) (3.3.24)
Equation (3.3.24) is the quasi steady state model of the pressure inside
the pressurizer. The next step is to linearize the thermodynamic
parameters about a set point. This step is taken as a way to simplify
the process memory requirements that will imply to introduce the actual
steam tables.
By using a linear regression technique plus the data given in Ref.
3.6, the thermodynamic parameters were obtained as a linear function of
the pressure. The following linearized expressions are valid between
11[MPa] and 13 [MPa]. The working point is 11.93 [MPa].
dv-8
[ = 3.63 x 10 - 1.55 x 10~P (3.3.25)dhg p
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dv 
--4 x 109 + 2.3 x 10-10p (3.3.26)
dP h
[ ] f= -1.57 x 10 + 1.05 x 10 10p (3.3.27)
(-h=4.25 x 10-12 - 8.3 x 10-13 p (3.3.28)
h = 2942.2 - 21.5 P (3.3.29)9
h f= 1001.5 + 40.9 P (3.3.30)
h = 1940.7 - 62.4 P (3.3.31)
v = 3.35 x 10-2 - 1.60 x 10-3 p (3.3.32)
g
vf = 1.06 x 1 - 3.91 x 1- p (3.3.33)
P is measured in [MPa]-
3.3.4.2 FLASHING AND CONDENSATE FLOW EQUATIONS
Starting fron the quasi steady state condition, the equations are:
w flh fg(3.3.22)
and
wc(h9 - hf) = wsp(hf - hsp) (3.3.34)
The condensate flow is:
_ spfh - sp (3.3.35)
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It is worth noting that the condensate flow exists only when spray
flow exists. The flashing flow is:
w = h (3.3.22)fl h
As explained, the quasi steady state assumption does not allow a
natural flashing produced by a two-phase condition in the water volume.
But the natural flashing is a function of the water mass, and this mass
is a large number. Therefore even if hw is roughly equal to hf, the
natural flashing could be significant. Because of that, the quasi
steady state assumption will be relaxed, and a correction taking the
natural flashing into account will be included.
From Reference 3.3:
wf = X M f [1 - exp( )] (3.3.36)
where
fl hfg
Mt = water mass (kg)
T = integration time (numerical algorithm)
L = rising time for the bubble (5 sec)
ws(t)
a = compressor speed factor - su(m)
wsu(mx
Making a series expansion and taking the first terms
w =l -MI
nat -
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From reference 3.1, wsu(max) = 15.62 [kg/s]
h - h w (t)
wVg = wh . Mf . su(33.7
nat fg 78.1
Note that this equation is more elaborate than the ideal equation stated
in Section 3.3.1, because it considers the bubble delay time and the
effect of the compression speed.
3.3.4.3 SURGE FLOW EQUATIONS
In order to simplify the mathematical treatment, but without losing
generality, it will be assumed that any change in primary water volume
will be immediate noticed as a water volume change in the pressurizer.
The assumption is based on the incompressibility of the water.
Thus, the surge flow is represented by the following equation:
Wsu wmak + wp -wlet (3.3.38)
where
wsu = surge flow, the positive sign corresponds to an insurge flow
wmak = water flow coming from the buffer seals system. This water
is used for making up the pressurizer water level
wlet = water flow leaking from the primary circuit to the letdown
coolers system. It is used for lowering the pressurizer water
level
wp= water flow due to thermal expansion or thermal contractions
of the water in the primary circuit.
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3.4 CONTROL SYSTEM MODEL
Up to this point, the linearized equations modeling the pressurizer
have been developed but the pressurizer vessel is only one device among
several on the pressurizer system. All these components have the task
of keeping the primary pressure around an operating set point.
Therefore it is also necessary to know the equati-ons ruling all elements
making up the pressure control system.
In this section we describe the system for controlling the
pressure. After that, the whole system will be modeled in a block
diagram, and finally the particular equations for the N.S. Savannah
plant will be developed.
3.4.1 CONTROL SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
The following description corresponds to the pressure and primary
volume control furnished to the N.S. Savannah nuclear propulsion plant.
A few devices have been redesigned in order to update the technology but
all the changes were kept within the operational requirements.
Figure 3.4.1 shows a simplified diagram with all the devices related
to the pressure and level control process.
The pressure signal is detected by a pressure sensor, then it is
transformed to an electrical signal and sent to the processor. The
processor compares the incoming signal with the reference signal and
decides to put into action the corresponding actuator. If the pressure
is over the reference the spray valve has to be opened. On the other
hand, if the pressure is under the reference the heaters have to be
Figure 3.4.1 Pressure and volume control system.
*See legend on next page.
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I. Spray valve motor
2. Spray valve
3. Relief valve
4. Relief valve motor
5. Spray nozzle
6. Pressure sensor
7. Hysteresis heaters
8. Proportional heater
9. Motor and rheostat for the proportional heater
10. Hysteresis heater relays
11. Level sensor
12. Surge line
13. Primary circuit
14. Relief valve amplifier
15. Spray valve amplifier
16. Makeup valve motor
17. Makeup valve
18. Makeup valve amplifier
19. Letdown valve
20. Letdown valve motor
21. Letdown valve amplifier
22. Proportional heater amplifier
23. Processor
24. Relay amplifier
198
activated.
If the first situation is the case, the processor sends a signal to
the spray system. This signal is first ampified, and then it activates
the spray valve DC motor. In the second case the control signal is also
ampified and then it activates the heater relays (the proportional
heaters have a DC motor).
The level control process follows a similar pattern. The level
signal is detected by a level sensor; this is transformed into an
electrical signal and sent to the processor. The processor compares the
incoming signal with the reference signal and makes the decision between
opening the make-up valve or the letdown valve. In either case, the
processor sends a signal, the signal is amplified, and then it activates
the corresponding DC motor valve.
Two comments should be made: the complete and detailed description
of the old pressure control system is in references 3.1 and 3.2; the
original system has not a complete level control system. The plant was
designed to keep the level within the operating range by using an
automatic make-up water system, but it has no automatic letdown water
system. A complete level control system is added in this work in order
to have an entire package, able to be used in nuclear power plants with
only minor modifications.
3.4.2 BLOCK DIAGRAM REPRESENTATION OF THE CONTROL SYSTEMS
To develop the block diagram representation, the equations stated in
Section 3.3 and the description in Section 3.4.1 will be used. The work
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is now focused at a component level, analyzing each device in detail.
Figure 3.4.2 shows the relationship between the different blocks making
up the control system. From Figure 3.4.2 it is noted that the forcing
signal comes from the value of wp (wp is the water flow due to volume
changes in primary circuit caused by temperature changes).
Each block will be analyzed in the following section.
3.4.3 TRANSFER FUNCTIONS
The blocks shown in Figure 3.4.2 are analyzed on the basis of their
inputs and outputs. The transfer functions are studied in the more
convenient mathematical domain and the results are converted to the time
domain. The latter is because the analysis of the transients will be
performed with the model working in the time domain.
3.4.3.1 TRANSFER FUNCTIONS FOR THE PRESSURIZER
The equations used in this section were developed in Section 3.3.4.
The goal is to find a set of equations describing the pressurizer
behavior, ready to be input to the processor algorithm.
Substituting equations (3.3.25) through (3.3.33) into (3.3.24):
a 2 6
P = [-(wfl - wc)(33 5 -16P) x 10 - (w sp+ wc + wsu~ wfl)+ Yfx 10
(105P - 157) x wsu(hhsu - h) x 10E-3] -M (2.48P2 + 112P
-2780) +S M(.0041P2 - .725P + 4.08)~1 (3.4.1)
119/13
Pressure and volume control system, detailed block diagram.
*See legend on next page,
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1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
EC(t)mak
Makeup valve amplifier
ECA(t)mak
Makeup valve motor
e(t) mak
Makeup valve
wmak
wp
w
su
Et(kT) INST
A/D
EL(t) INST
Transmitter
L(t) INST
Level sensor
L(t) real
P(t) ra
Pressurizer
Pressure sensor
Lref
A/D
e[(kT)
D/A
E 1kT)let
Controller
Ec(t)let
Letdown valve amplifier
ECA(t)let
Letdown valve motor
S(t)let
Letdown valve
w let
E*(kT)mak
D/A
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
Transmitter
P(t)INST
Ep (t) INST
A/D
E*(kt) INST
A/D
P f(t)
e*(kT)p
Controller
D/A
E c(t)SP
Spray valve amplifier
ECA(t) e
Spray val ve mo tor
8(t) SP
Spray valve
w SP
E*(kT)H
D/A
EC(t)H'S
Relays amplifier
ECA(t)H' S
Relays
Hysteresis heaters
QH (2,3 , 4,5)
E(t) HI
HI heater amplifier
ECA(t)HI
HI heater motor
e(t)HI
HI heater (proportional)
QI
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Equation (3.3.38) is the working equation that is to be used as the
model implementation into the computer. Notice Vt and hf are not
included in their linearized version. The reason will be apparent when
the computer code is developed.
The values of Mf and M9 are calculated from integration in equations
(3.3.11) and (3.3.12):
t
M = M (0) + ft (wfl ~ Wc)dt, (3.4.2)
t
M = M f(0)+ (wsp + Wc +Wsu ~wfc)dt (3.4.3)
The water enthalpy (h ) is only allowed to be different from saturation
enthalpy (hf) in order to calculate the natural flashing incidence. The
water enthalpy to be used in that situation is calculated as follows.
From Appendix G:
weh Wh + (w +-w h+ Q Wh -+-PVMw hWsubsu sp c c)hc Qh flfl V
-(wSP + WC +Wsu ~ wfl)hw .(G.4)
Applying the quasi steady state conditions but keeping hw:
M h hWsubsu + (wsp'4+ wc)hf + Qh flh + PYV
sp + Wc + Wsu ~ wfl)hf
Mwhw = wsu hsu + Qn+ PVf + W f(hf - hg) - wsuhf
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PVf is a really small quantity and can be neglected. The expression for
h becomes
hwIsu(hsu hf) + W f (hf - h ) + Qh
hwM(
and the relation for hw is given by
h h 0 /t wSu (h -h ) + wf1 (h - h 9) + Qh
h h Co)- + su su f fl i 9 dt (3.4.5)
w w 0 f
It should be kept in mind that this is only an approximation of the real
behavior.
Finally, an equation for the level is needed. The development of an
equation for the level is based on the fact that the working region of
the pressurizer is cylindrical.
The level is defined as
L = Lref + 6L
V, - V
L=L + f Vrefref + rA
ref
where:
L = water level Cm)
Lref = reference water level (m)
Vref = reference volume of reference level (m3)
Aref = internal sectional area of reference level (m3
= water volume at actual level (m3
From reference 3.1:
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Lref = 0.69 (m)
Vref = 1.76 (m
3)
Aref = 1.48 (m3 )
Therefore:
Vf- 1.76
L(t) = 0.69 + (3.4.6)
From the transfer function viewpoint the input parameters are:
hspq Wsp' h' Wsul hsu, Mg(0), Mf(0), P(0), hw(0), L(0) and the outputs
are P(t), L(t)
3.4.3.2 TRANSFER FUNCTIONS FOR THE LEVEL SENSOR
Basically a level sensor is a differential pressure sensor. But its
readings are only accurate when the water is at the claibration
temperature. The calibration temperature for the N.S. Savannah level
sensors is 325*C. If the pressurizer water is at a different
temperature, the readings should be corrected. The correction chart is
given in Reference 3.7.
Furthermore, because it is a marine plant, the level readings are
only accurate when the ship has zero listing. Any angle of trimming or
heeling different from zero introducers an error.
In the case of a real application, the readings from the level
sensor are easily corrected by implementation of the temperature
correction chart, and the heel correcton functions into the validation
algorithm.
Because the scope of this work does not include validation, the
readings input to the control system model will be assumed to be already
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validated. The latter means, from the control system viewpoint, that the
output of the pressurizer model represents a validated signal.
The instrument handbook (Reference 3.8) gives characteristics that
are important to the modeling process. These properties are:
- the sensor has a 1 percent hysteresis
- the sensor has an 0.5 percent deviation from linearity.
The hysteresis effect appears only when the sensor reaches its maximum
value (50.8 MPa). This condition is beyond the pressurizer design
limits, and it is not expected to be reached by the model.
The deviation from linearity correction should be included in the
validation algorithm. In other words, the sensor transfer function is:
Linst(t) = Lmodel(t) (3.4.7)
3.4.3.3 TRANSFER FUNCTIONS FOR THE LEVEL SIGNAL TRANSMITTER
The level signal transmitter receives as an input a differential
pressure signal, and has as an output an analog electrical signal,
proportional to the pressure difference. It is also included in the
transmitter transfer function the wiring required to input the electrical
signal to the processor. The range of the output signal has to be
compatible with the range of the A/D devices in the processor.
The following are the characteristics of the transmitter:
- range of the output signal: + 5.12V
- signal delay: 250 (ms)
Thus the transfer function can be stated as:
Einstt) = max Lt - .25) (V)inst Amax
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From the handbook:
AL max = 1.62 (m)
aE max= 10.24 (V)
Einst(t) = 6.32 Linst(t - 0.25) (3.4.8)
E inst(t) is in volts
Linst(t) is in meters
t is in seconds.
3.4.3.4 ANALOG-DIGITAL, DIGITAL-ANALOG DEVICES TRANSFER FUNCTIONS
A/D devices are the components required to convert the analog signal
coming from the plant into a digital signal useful to be processed. D/A
devices convert the digital output coming from the processor into a
real-life signal (analog) useful to be input to the plant.
The most common way to represent a D/A device is by a hold, and to
represent an A/D device a sampler is used. The overall digital system
and its symbols are shown in Figure 3.4.3.
The Et (kt) signal resembles E (instt) because both signals have
1 nst is
the same value at the sampling time.
The hold device introduces a more significant change because the
sampled control signal Et (kT) is held to a constant value until the new
E* [(k+1)T] arrives.
Thus a good approximation for the whole process is to represent it
with a hold transfer function, keeping in mind that the signals flowing
Sampler(A/D)
E *INST
_kT4 Processor E* (kt) HOLD (D/A)
Figure 3.4.3 Analog-digital (A/D) , digital-analog (D/A), transfer function model.
FINST (t) Ec (t)
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between sampler and hold are sampled.
Because a digital computer will be used to simulate the system, the
blocks representing sampling and holding functions are easy to implement.
- Sampler: the digital computer processes the simulation at
discrete intervals,, then the data coming from the pressurizer
model is in fact sampled.
- Hol d: the digital computer simulating the control system
processes the data at discrete intervals of time. Between
intervals the last output is held constant. Thus the data
coming from the control system model are in fact held.
In other words,
Eit(t) = E*t(kT) (3.4.9)inst inst
E* (kt) = E*c (t) (3.4.10)
3.4.3.5 TRANSFER FUNCTION FOR THE LEVEL CONTROLLER
The level controller has two basic jobs
1. To compare the incoming level signal (sampled signal) with the
reference level signal (sampled signal). From that comparison the
controller decides
E*(kT) > E*(kT) (Open letdown valve) (Close makeup valve)L inst L ref (3.4.11)
Et(kT)inst = Er(kT)ref (No action) (3.4.12)
E*(kT)inst (kT)ref (Open makeup valve) (Close letdown valve)
(3.4.13)
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2. To perform the optimal contron action, experience has shown that this
optimal control action is obtained by using a proportional-integral
differential (PID) controller, tuning up its constant with the
controller already connected to the real plant.
The corresponding PID equations are:
E *(kT)lt = eL(kT)[Kllet + K2let dt + K3let d(34.14)
c* e L le *2etf3 d _
C kT d1(3.4.15)E c(kT)mak = eL(kT)[Klmak + K2mak dt + K3mak ](.15
** (..6
eL(kT) = EL(kT)ref - EL(kT)i nst (3.4.16)
-The expression between square brackets is an operator and not a
normal equation. The most appropriate values for K1, K2 and K3 will
appear later on when the transient analysis of the model will be
performed.
3.4.3.6 AMPLIFIERS TRANSFER FUNCTION
The amplifiers, motors, and valves are exactly the same for the
letdown and make-up circuits. Thus the analysis will be common for both.
The amplifiers are required because the voltage and the power of the
controller output are not enough to drive the motors. The amplifier
transfer function in the frequency range of interest is simply a constant.
EC(t)
cAc-- = K (3.4.17)
Ect
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K is a parametric constant and its value can be adjusted at the
designer's will. The final values for Kmak and Klet will appear during
the transient analysis.
3.4.3.7 TRANSFER FUNCTION FOR THE VALVES MOTORS
The motor chosen to drive the valves is a DC motor, arumature-
controlled. Figure 3.4.4 shows this type of motor and its block diagram,
both taken from reference 3.9.
By developing the overall transfer function from Figure 3.4.4b, the
following equation is derived:
E -K I -TL(1 + aS)
. a Ra m f TLl+aS
(1 + raS)(B + J) + KcI K
a V a
where:
a = shaft angle
Ea = controlling voltage signal
Ra = armature resistance
Ia = armature current
Km = torque constant
Jf = field current (constant)
TL = load torque
a = armature time constant = La/Ra
La = armature inductance
By = dumping coefficient
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R a La
aa
Ea Ec 1I = constant
T L
Figure 3.4.4a Armature controlled DC motor.
TL
Ia T
EaU
,KcIf 6~#
Armature controlled DC motor, block diagram.Figure 3.4.4b
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J = moment of the intertie of the armature
Kc = emf constant
Because the motors are relatively small, their Ta and J can be
neglected. Also the load torque can be assumed negligible. With those
assumptions, the initial equation is reduced to:
R a EaB+KmIz f
BV+ c s_Ra
Coming back to the time domain
Km if
a (t)= a ]tEca (t)dt (3.4.18)
By + Kc f 2Km f
Ra
3.4.3.8 TRANSFER FUNCTIONS FOR THE MAKE-UP VALVE
By definition.
Anak
wmak mak
where:
3
Vmak = specific volume of make-up water (m3/kg)
3,
qmak = make-up fl ow in m3/s
Wmak = make-up flow in kg/s
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The analysis is then divided into qmak and Vmak
The make-up flow (qmak) is related with the well-known expression
ak = F(e) Pa
where
P = primary circuit pressure
Pmak = make-up pressure
F(e) = valve parameter. This parameter is a function of the shaft
angle (e).
From reference 3.2 it is known that the make-up pressure is kept
constant at 0.345 MPa over the primary pressure (the make-up system has
an automatic control subsystem to do that). Also from reference 3.2 it
is known
3
(q ak)max = . x
But
Iak = 0.5874 F(e)
also
(qmaklrmax = 0.5874(F(e))max
Thus, F(e)max = 6.64 x 10 -3(m3 SOMP a1/2)
In order to simplify the numerical algorithm, it will be assumed that
F(e) is a linear function of e. Finally, it is posulated that emax =
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Under these conditions:
F(e) m
F(e) = _ emax
F(e) = 1.057 x10-3 e (0 < e < 27)
The final equation for qmak is:0 (ec<O)
mak 6.207 x 104 e (0 <_ e < 21)
3.9 x 10-3( > 2w)
With regard to the make-up specific volume, it is known from reference
3.2 that the make-up temeprature is kept constant at 46.67*C. Then,
Vmak ~~Vmak (46.67, Pmak
Performing a linearization with the data given in reference 3.6
Vmak 1.0116 x 10--50x10~ (P+ 0.345)
(11 MPa < P < 13 MPa)
Therefore the final equation for wmak is:
(e < 0)
wmak 6.207 x 10- e _7l1.012 x 10 -5.0 x 10 P
3.9 x 10-3
1.012 x 1 - 5.0 x10~ P
P is the primary pressure in MPa.
(3.4.20)
(0 < e < 27)
~~ ~ 7
(3.4.19)
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3.4.3.9 TRANSFER FUNCTIONS FOR THE LETDOWN VALVE
The analytical process is quite similar to the make-up analysis.
Because the actual system has no special valve for automatic letdown
flow, it is assumed an extra valve system similar to the make-up system
is added. Then,
3
(q m = 3.9 x 103
Vlet =Vp (MPa) (V = primary specific volume)
&P = 12.508 (MPa) (AP = P - Plet
Following the same procedure given in Section 3.4.38, we obtain:
F(e)max = 5.352 x 10-4 (<O < e < 2r)
F(e) = 3.013 x 10~4 e O < e < 2r)
then
0 (e < 0)
qlet(e) 6.207 xI 10~4 e O < e < Zr) (3.4.21)
3.9 x 10- 3( > 2)
and the final equation for the wlet is
0 (e < 0)
W 6.207 x 10~4 9 (0 < e < 2r) (3.4.22)
let6e
3.9 x. 10- ( > Zr)
p
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3.4.3.10 JOINT TRANSFER FUNCTION FOR THE AMPLIFIER, MOTOR AND VALVE
Analyzing first the make-up valve, a joint equation is reached by
substitution of (3.3.53) into (3.3.54) and then into (3.3.55). The
result follows:
(e c 0)
j-6.4207 x 1049e t
Wmak .1. x~ .x0 (Kmak )(Kmak )f Ec(t)dt
3.9 x 10-3
1.012 x 10~3 - 5.0 x 10~I P
Km is the motor constant given in (3.3.54) and K is the amplifier
mak roak
gain.
By a similar process:
Wiet I 6.207 x10~ (Kf et)(KEet) fEc(t)dt
-etv p1et 1tc
(e < 0)
(0 - 9 C 2r)
(0 > 2-)3.9 x103
p
K et is the motor constant and K is the amplifier gain.
3.4.3.11 TRANSFER FUNCTION FOR THE PRESSURE SENSOR
The sensor for measuring the pressure are the type called forced
balanced transmitter, its theory is very well explained in reference 3.3.
(0 < 8 < 2w)
(0 < e < 2w)
(3.4.23)
(3.4.24)
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From the instrument handbook the following data are obtained (as was
the case of the level sensor)
- hysteresis = 1 percent
- deviation from linearity = 1.5 percent
The hysteresis behavior is only reached when the sensor ranges its
maximum value. This case is not likely to occur. The deviation from
linearity error will be corrected in the validation process. Thus,
P(t) inst= P(t) real(3.4.25)
3.4.3.12 TRANSFER FUNCTION FOR THE LEVEL SIGNAL TRANSMITTER
This transmitter is designed to receive the mechanical signal from
the pressure sensor, transform it into an electrical signal proportional
to the first one, and to send the electrical signal to the processor.
The whole process is characterized by
- electrical signal range = + 5.12V
- signal delay = 250 (ms)
Thus the transfer function has the following form:
E (t). aEmax P (t - 0.25)
p inst -Amax inst
From reference 3.2
6P max= 13.79 (MPa)
Then
E (t). = 0.7426P(t - 0.25). (3..2)p inst inst (3.3.26)
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where P is in MPa, t is in seconds, Ep is in volts.
3.4.3.13 TRANSFER FUNCTIONS FOR THE PRESSURE CONTROLLER
The main task of this controller is to keep the pressurizer pressure
around the reference pressure. The pressure controller has six different
actuators to keep the pressure around the set point: one proportional
heater, five hysteresis heaters, and one spray valve. Each one of these
actuators is analyzed in the following section.
3.4.3.13.1 TRANSFER FUNCTION FOR THE HEATER BANK NUMBER 1 (PROPORTIONAL)
The controller compares the pressure signal with the reference
signal. The resultant error is subjected to a PID action. Putting the
latter in mathematical terms:
*d* * d
c hlEp(kT)ref Ep(kT)inst][KI + K2  dt + K3 it] (3.4.27)
3.4.3.13.2 TRANSFER FUNCTION FOR THE HEATER BANK NUMBER 2
This bank has a typical hysteresis cycle
0 E*(kT) > 8.96(V)
p
0 8.89 < E*(kT) < 8.96 (once the
E * (kT) heater 
is off)
c hZ2 ? 10.24(V) E*(kT) < 8.89(V)
p
10.24(V) 8.89 < E*(kT) < 8.96 (once the
~p ~heater is on)
(3.4.28)
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3.4.3.13.3 TRANSFER FUNCTION FOR THE HEATER BANK NUMBER 3
0 E*(kT) > 8.96(V)p
Ec(kT)h3
c h3 1
8.86 < Ep(kT) < 8.99 (once the
heater is off)
10.24(V)
10.24(V)
E (kT) < 8.86(V)
8.86 < Ep(kT) < 8.96 (once the
heater is on)
(3.4.29)
3.4.3.13.4 TRANSFER FUNCTION FOR THE HEATER BANK NUMBER 4
0 E*(kT) > 8.96(V)p
0
E(kT)
c h4
8.81 < Ep(kT) < 8.96 (once the
heater is off)
10.24(V) E (kT) < 8.81V
8.81 < E(kT) < 8.96 (once the
heater is on)
(3.4.30)
10.24(V)
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3.4.3.13.5 TRANSFER FUNCTION FOR THE HEATER BANK NUMBER 5
0 E*(kT) > 8.96(V)
p
0
Ec (kT)h5
10.24(V)
10.24(V)
8.76 < E (kT) < 8.96 (once the
heater is off)
E (kT) < 8.76V
*
8.76 < Ep(kT) < 8.96 (once the
heater is on)
(3.4.31)
The data for the last five equations comes from reference 3.1.
A better understanding of the.hysteresis functions is obtained by
looking at Figure 3.4.5.
3.4.3.13.6 TRANSFER FUNCTION FOR THE SPRAY
The transfer function implemented at the controller for the spray
valve operation is very similar to the proportional heater transfer
function. Using the data given in reference 3.1, the function is as
follows:
Ec(kT)p = [Ep(kT)ref - E(kT). ILK1 + K2 dt + K~d (3.4..32)
3.4.3.14 RELAY TRANSFER FUNCTION
Essentially the relays used to close or to open the heater banks 2,
3, 4 and 5 have a similar performance. They open and close their
contacts when the processor sends the corresponding signal.
f Z)N I
QII15
Power (KW)
106
50
33.4
16.7 4 09112
4 I S S * U. -~\ I
11.79 11.86 11.93 11.96 12.36 Pressure (MPa)
Figure 3.4.5 Hysteresis cycles for the heaters.
Q11
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The relays close their contacts when they reach the operating
current. A close contact means a heater bank is on.
If the mechanical inertias involved are neglected the transfer
function in the Laplace domain looks as follows:
K ECH 1I(S S + S)
where
K ECH = a constant control signal, often the amplifier
T= L/R
L = coil inductance
R = coil resistance.
In this case the relays are not very big, that means R >> L. Thus z can
be assumed very small. A very small r leads to the following
simplification.
I(s) = EGHSR
Returning to the time domain
I(t) = E- = constant (3.4.33)
In other words, for the case at hand it is possible to assume safely that
the relays close or open almost instantaneously, upon receiving the
control signal from the processor.
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3.4.3.15 TRANSFER FUNCTION FOR THE HEATERS
The analysis has been made differentiating the hysteresis heaters
from the proportional heater.
3.4.3.15.1 HEATERS WITH A HYSTERESIS CYCLE
A basic assumption is made about the heater power. It will be
assumed that as soon as the relay closes its contact, the whole heater
power is released into the water. This is not exact, but considering the
resistance nature of the heater element, and the high thermal
conducutivity of the heater well, the loss in accuracy wil not be
significant.
Mathematically the heater transfer functions are expressed as follows:
Q0 0(relay open)Q = (3.4.34)
H2 16.7 (KW) (relay closed)
0 (relay open)
pH3 =(3.4.35)
33.4 (KW) (relay closed)
0 (relay open)
QH - (3.4.36)H4 50.0 (KW) (relay closed)
0 (relay open)
-H 
(3.3.37)
106.0 (KW) (relay closed)
where QH2' QH3' H4' H5 are the powers of the respective heaters.
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3.4.3.15.2 PROPORTIONAL HEATER BANK
This heater consists of a variable resistance operated by a DC
motor. Assuming the power is delivered linear with the shaft angle, and
the maximum power delivered at e = 2r, the transfer function is expressed
as follows:
0 (e < 0)
QH1 2.66 x e (0 < e < 2r) (3.4.38)
16.7. (KW) (e > zr)
QH1 = power delivered by the heater
e = shaft angle.
3.4.3.16 TRANSFER FUNCTIONS FOR THE SPRAY VALVE
The following data come from reference 3.2:
(q p)max = 3.28 x 10-3M 3s)
aP = 0.4826 MPa
Using a similar treatment as that employed for the make-up valve, we
obtain:
0 (e < 0)
'qsp(e) 5.22x 10~4 e (0 < e <2r)
3.28 x 10-3 (0 > 27)
The value for the specific volume is a function of temperature at the
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cold leg in the primary circuit. Because the analysis of the primary
circuit is not included in this thesis, Vsp will be introduced as an
initial condition, the same as hp, 2 VP, hsu, etc.
The final equation for the spray flow is as follows:
0 (e < 0)
W Ce) 5.223 x 104 e (0 < e Z< 2) (3.4.39)spsp
3.28 x 1O-3 (0 > 2r)
ysp
3.4.3.17 JOINT TRANSFER FUNCTION FOR THE SPRAY VALVE SYSTEM
Combining the functions for the amplifier, motor, and valve, the
following equation is obtained:
0 (e < 0)
t
w (t) = 5.22 x10~ (Km )(Kp ) E(t)dt (0 < e < 2r)sp spSP sp 0  c
(3.4.40)
3.28 x 10C3 (0 > 2w)
Vsp
3.4.3.18 JOINT TRANSFER FUNCTIONS FOR THE HEATER SYSTEM
Again the analysis is repeated into hysteresis heaters and
proportional heaters.
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3.4.3.18.1 JOINT TRANSFER FUNCTION FOR THE PROPORTIONAL HEATER BANK
Substituting the equations (3.4.38), (3.4.18), and (3.4.17), the
joint transfer equation is reached.
0
QH = 2.66 . (KH)(KH1)f E(t)dtQH1 -1 HI HI0 c
16.7
3.4.3.18.2 JOINT TRANSFER FUNCTION FOR THE
CYCLE
(e < 0)
(0 < e c 2r)
(3.4.41)
(0 > 2w)
HEATER BANK UNDER HYSTERESIS
This set of equations comes from subtituting equations (3.4.28),
(3.4.29), (3.4.30), (3.4.31) into (3.4.34), (3.4.35), (3.4.36), and
(3.4.37) respectively.
o if Eta(kT) = 0 (V)
QH22 *(3.
16.7 if EC2(kT) = 10.24V
if E*2(kT)
c2
if E0c2 (kT)
if
if
E*2 kT)
Ec2(kT)
if E*2 (kT)
if Ec2(kT)
= 0 (V)
= 10.24V
= 0 (V)
= 10.24V
(3.4.43)
(3.4.44)
=0 (V)
(3.4.45)
= 10.24 (V)
4.42)
QH3 =
QH4 =
QHS=
0
33.4
0
50.0
0
106.0
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The hysteresis cycles are shown in Figure 3.4.5.
3.4.3.19 TRANSFER FUNCTIONS FOR THE VALIDATION PROCESSOR
The specific details of how the validation function will be done is
not a subject of this thesis. But it is a fact that the validation
processor is intended to keep the instrument signals as close as possible
to the true signal inside of the plant. The latter suggests that for the
objectives of this work, it is a good approximation to assume a
validation transfer function equal to one.
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CHAPTER 4
DIGITAL SIMULATION AND TRANSIENT ANALYSIS
4.1 INTRODUCTION
All the fundamentals required to prepare a digital simulation were
developed in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 is devoted to describing how the
pressurizer model and the control system might interact together. To
do so, a code simulating the pressurizer model and its control system
were developed. After that, the code was run for several situations
checking whenever possible its behavior against the real plant
behavior. The final part of the chapter is concerned with tuning up
the control systen parameters, in order to get the best response
possible.
The procedure starts with a general description of the flow diagram
appropriate to this problem. After that each main block in the general
flow diagram is explained in detail . Finally, the program itself
appears. The last section of the chapter describes the calculated
cases, their results, and the procedure to tune up the control system.
4.2 GENERAL FLOW DIAGRAM
The equations will be integrated from t to t + T assuming that the
systen is entirely known at time t. At the beginning, the initial
conditions are all that is known, thus the first iteration is made by
using those conditions as the starting point. The integrations are
performed by using the simplest approach.
F(t + T) = F(t) + T x F(t) (4.2.1)
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F(t) is a function of time t
F(t) is the derivative of F(t) at time t
T is the iteration interval
F(t + T) is the function at time t + T.
Before making the integrations, several computations must be
performed. Following the order given in Figure 4.2.1, these
computations are (the nomenclature is gi.ven in Chapter 3):
MDwlet and wmak
w su
- and
- hf and
- wc
-Wf 1
wsp
1/hfg
- vf
At this point L(t) is calculated.
Wsu(hsu -h f)
Next P(t), L(t), and t are printe
Then P(t) and P(t + T) are calcul
- hW(t) and h (t + T) are cal(
- N (t) and M (t + T) are cal
- Mf(t) and Mf(t + T) are cal
and finally the cycle is repeated
alternative is to stop the iterat
required up to this point:
d .
ated.
cul ated,
culated,
cul ated,
by making t = t + T or another
ion process. A few comments are
..
START
t= 0
I Af
2
Wlet and wrnak calculations
3
wsucalculation
\u
4
QH and wp calculations
5
hf and l/hf9 calculations
INPUT INITIAL CONDITIONS:
P(O) , Mf(O) , M9(0), wp, v su, h.&Vsu laki, h vsp'1 , K K2, K3, h (0),
K let' Kmak , Ksp, K 0V: --
N)
Li
__j
N)
ro
Figure 4.2.1 General flow chart.
w
U)
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1. Each one of the blocks shown in Figure 4.2.1 is explained in detail
in the following section.
2. The control actions are included in the flow diagrams under the
names of wlet' Wmaks H, and wsp
4.3 DETAILED ANALYSIS OF THE GENERAL FLOW CHART
4.3.1 INITIAL CONDITIONS
Because the code is programmed in a computer of low memory
capacity, several inputs are directly set into the program. The others
go in the numerical registers. The following inputs go in registers:
P(O), Mf(O), M (0), hW(0). The others are directly coded. They are:
w , vsu' h su' vmak, hsp'sp, K1, 1K2, K3, Klet' Kmak, Ksp, KQ. More
information is given in the code users manual in Appendix H.
4.3.2 LET-DOWN AND MAKE-UP FLOWS CALCULATIONS
As previously noted, the wlet or Wmak computations implicitly
describe the action of the PID controller. Therefore, a first step in
obtaining these values is to develop a simulation model for the PID
controller. At the same time, noting from equations (3.4.23) and
(3.4.24) that an integration is made over the PID output Ec(t), a
complete subroutine will be designed. This subroutine will perform the
following function:
y(k) = (K + + K3 ) et) (4.3.1)
T(k) represents an integration made over a PID operation previously
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performed upon the error e(t).
First we have the classical numerical approach for the PID function
(Ref. 4.4):
k K3
Ec(h) = K1e(k) + K2T e(n) + Ec(0) + - [e(k) - (e(k - 1)]
n=1
(4.3.2)
where
Ec(k) PID signal instant k
e(k) error signal instant k
e(k - 1) error signal instant (k - 1)
K1 proportional constant
K2  integral constant
K3  derivative constant
T iteration interval
E(O) initial PID signal
But this equation is too cumbersome to implement. A more
convenient way is to use the following:
k-i K3
Ec (k - 1) = Kle(k - 1) + K2T e(n) + E0 (0) + T [e(k - 1) - e(k - 2)]
n=1
Defining
AEc(k) = Ec(k) - Ec(k - 1)
K3
aEc( k) = K1[e(k) - e(k - 1)] + K2 Te(k) + - [e(k) - 2e(k - 1) + e(k - 2))
and Ec(k) = Ec (k - 1) + aEc(k) (4.3.3)
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Following a similar reasoning for the extra integration over the PID
function
k
y(k) = T1 Ec(n)
n=1
k-i
y(k - 1) = T Ec(n)
n=1
ay(k) = y(k) - y(k - 1)
Ay(k) = T Ec(k)
and finally
y(k) = y(k - 1) + TEc(k) (4.3.4)
By combining equations (4.3.3) and (4.3.4), the general expression for
the subroutine is obtained.
K3
y(k) =1(k - 1) + EC(k - 1) + Ki[e(k) - e(k - 1)] + K2Te(k) + T
[e(k) - 2e(k - 1) + e(k - 2)] (4.3.5)
The next step is to perform the computation of wmak and wlet. Figure
4.3.1 shows the detailed flow diagram which simulates the
computations. What the flow diagram says, step-by-step, is the
following:
1. The error in level is obtained
2. A PID function is operated over the error.
3. A test is made to see if the error is positive or negative. The
sign will point what actuator should be operated. Both branches
have the integration over the PID function, also a consistency
Figure 4.3.1 Wlet and Wmak computations.
c~J
c\
CA.
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check to avoid negative values for e is made.
4. wlIet is calculated from equation (3.4.24). A check is made
to avoid wlet gains over its maximum value, and also if the maximum
condition is reached, an expression for Ylet(k) is implemented,
keeping Ylet(k) constant.
5. wmak is calculated from equation (3.4.23), and the same comments
for wmak apply here.
4.3.3 TOTAL SURGE FLOW COMPUTATIONS
Under the assumptions made in Chapter 3 wsu is simply
Wsu Wmak + wp 
- wlet
where wp is the primary water surge.
4.3.4 TOTAL HEAT AND SPRAY FLOW COMPUTATIONS
Because wsp is only a PID controlled variable its flow diagram is
fairly similar to those of wmak and wlet- H have the PID variable
plus the back-up heaters which work under a hysteresis control cycle.
Figure 4.3.2 shows the complete flow diagram to get QH and w . The
explanation of Figure 4.3.2 step by step follows.
1. The electrical equivalent to the pressure signal is obtained.
2. The error signal is calculated.
3. A PID function is operated upon the error functions.
4. Depending on the error sign, the controller decides to actuate the
spray valve or the proportional heaters. This block has the
N)
0
YES
YES
NO YES
y <0
Y(h-1) + TE c(h) 0
Q9-, = 76 xyQ(h)
NO QH ,1.7 YES Ql3=1.
Y (h) =y (h -Tc
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NO YES
NO
QH2 
QH3 0
QH4 0
QH5 0
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computations.QH and wspFigure.4.3.2
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characteristics of the similar one in wiet and wmak calculations.
5. Q41 (the proportional heat) is calculated.
6. The hysteresis cycle for the back-up heaters is computed.
7. wsp is computed.
4.3.5 SATURATION LINE ENTHALPIES CALCULATIONS
These are two linearized functions of the pressure and they are
computed by equations (3.3.30) and (3.3.31).
4.3.6 CONDENSED WATER FLOW CALCULATIONS
Equation (3.3.35) is implemented in the algorithm to calculate wc.
4.3.7 FLASHING FLOW CALCULATION
This block is implemented with the following characteristics:
1. When h - hf < 2 W f is considered as a quasi steady state
flashing, thus wf1 is given. by equation (3.3.22).
2. If it is an outsurge and ty - hf > 2, the flashing is taken into
acount as a natural flashing, then wf1 is given by equation
(3.3.36).
3. If hf > h, wf1 is equal to zero.
4. At insurge conditions natural flashing is zero, and the quasi
steady state flashing is negligible.
All these conditions are shown in Figure 4.3.3.
4.3.8 SPECIFIC VOLUME COMPUTATION
vis computed by the linearized equation (3.3.33).
(ii
(hw-hf) Mf xwsu
wl =~78.1 x hfg
Figure 4.3.3 wcIIl Computation
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4.3.9 LEVEL (L(t)) DETERMINATION
The inputs required to calculate the level are now known. The level
is next computed by using equations (3.4.6) where Vf = Mf X Vj.
4.3.10 SURGE ENTHALPY CALCULATION
Although the expression to be calculated is wsu (hsu
term is only hsu. h su has the following characteristics:
1. If wsu > 0, hsu = hsu'
2. If wsu < 0, hsu = hf.
This behavior is shown in Figure 4.3.4.
- hf), the new
4.3.11 PRINT SEQUENCE
The pressure P(t), the level (t), and the time t are printed.
4.3.12 PRESSURE INTEGRATION
The P(t) is computed by using equation (3.4.1). After that P(t +
T) is obtained by numerical integration (equation 4.2.1).
4.3.13 WATER ENTHALPY INTEGRATION
The h(t) is computed by using equation (3.4.4). After that
h (t -+ T) is obtained by numerical integration.
4.3.14 STEAM MASS INTEGRATION
The M(t) is computed by using equation (3.3.11), under the
assumption that Ms ~M . After that M (t + T) is obtained by numerical
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wsu (h su -hf) computation.Fi gure 4. 3. 4
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integration.
4.3.15 WATER MASS COMPUTATIONS
The Mf(t) is computed by using equation (3.3.12), under the
assumption that Mw Mf. After that Mf(t + T) is obtained by numerical
integration.
4.3.16 ITERATION
If the simulation is not stopped, the process is recycled to the
beginning making the shift to calculate the next time step, so F(t + T)
= F(t) now.
4.4 THE PROGRAM
A code performing the functions explained by the flow diagrams has
been written and run on a TI-59 calculator.
The code is written in A.O.S. language and it has features that
allow us to introduce several values as a function of time for the wP
input. Also all the points for the pressure and level can be changed
at any instant of the calculations. The code is composed of a main
body and two subroutines. Subroutine X2 calculates the PID function,
meanwhile subroutine 'Xmakes the consistency checks on wlet' Wmak'
wsp, and QHe
In general, the code takes a fairly long time to perform its work,
because of the low capacity of the calculator (one iteration takes
about 46 s). That means the simulation is far from being in real time.
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The code listing and the users manual are in Appendix H.
4.5 CONTROL SYSTEM TUNING
The final section of this chapter is devoted to explaining how the
control system is tuned, and which particular constants are used in the
design. The final part of the section has the results of the study
cases and an analysis of the data obtained.
4.5.1 SIMULATION INPUT DATA
Most of the specific characteristics of the plant and the control
system have been stated in previous chapters, but one very important
parameters which has not yet been explained is the constant for the DC
motor simulation.
Because in this work an actual implementation will not be
performed, it will use generic values for small DC motors. If an
actual implementation were made, the transient calculations would have
to worked out again with the specific constants. From Reference 4.1, a
generic value for the motor constants is given to be:
KmIf = 10 newton-m/amp
Ra = 5 x (Q)
B = 0.5 newton-m/rad/sec.
Substituting these values in equation (3.4.18), the motor constant
(Km) becomes
m = 2.857.
This Km value will be used in the four motors involved in the design
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because they are assumed to be similar.
The list of initial conditions for the simulation follows:
P(o) = 11.93 (MPa)
L(o) = 0.69 (m)
V(o) = 2.605 (m3 )
V f(o) = 5.76 (m3 )
The above data were obtained from Reference 4.2.
Because the behavior of the model will be compared with real
outputs obtained from the ship's sea trials, more specific data related
to the sea trials are added (Reference 4.3):
THL = 270*C (hot leg temperature)
TCL = 260 0C (cold leg temperature)
PCL = 12.41 (MPa) (cold leg pressure)
Tmak = 37.2*C (buffer seals temperature)
Pmak = 12.75 (MPa) (buffer seals pressure)
Assuming the cold leg conditions is that of the sprays, and the hot leg
conditions is that of an in-surge
Vsp =1.26x103  (M3/kg)
hs = 1134.16 (joules/kg)
v = 1.29x10-3  (M3/kg)
hs = 1183.52 (joules/kg)
Vmak = i'OQ --3m3/kg)
By combining the above data, a value for Mf(o) and M (o) is obtained:
Mf(o) = 1153 (kg)
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M(o) = 180.75 (kg)
The water enthal py hw(o) comes from the linearized expression (Eq. 3.3.30)
at P = 11.93 (MPa) .
hw(o) = 1499.13 (joules/kg)
Finally the set point for the starting of spray action is 12.10
(MPa) (Ref. 4.2).
4.5.2 CONTROL SYSTEM TUNING
The procedure to tune up a PID controller is as follows:
1. Remove all integral and derivative action, and tune the
proportional mode to give the desired response characteristics,
ignoring any offset.
2. Increase the proportional gain, and attempt to restore the response
characteristics by adjusting the derivative time.
3. Adjust the integral constant to remove the offset.
The gain of the motor amplifier was standardized to a value of 10, then
the model was subjected to a positive step function of wp of
+2.47 (kg/s). Under this input the controller constants were changed
until the response was satisfactory. The results for the tuning
process are shown in Figure 4.5.1. The final setting was found to be:
K1  = 1.0 (proportional gain)
K2 = 0.0 (inverse of integral time)
K3  = 10.0 (derviative time)
Two comments follow:
1. What we are looking for is to reduce the overshoot and to speed up
12.17
12.12
12.07
12.02
11.97Ga
11.92
11.87
11.82
20 30
PID controller tuning.
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10
time (sec)
Figure 4.5.1
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the response without introducing instabilities.
2. The final result of K2 = 0.0 indicates that for practical purposes
the controller is a PD controller. This conclusion is similar to
that reached by the designers of the actual control system--18
years ago when they installed a PD controller (Reference 4.2).
4.5.3 STUDY CASES
After tuning the system, one may want to compare the behavior of
the model to the behavior of the real plant. It turns out to be very
difficult to do this because the N.S. Savannah propulsion plant was
decommissioned several years ago, therefore data about its performance
are scarce and difficult to find.
Nevertheless, records of the initial sea trials of the ship are
available, and they contain some pressurizer trainsient records. The
problem with this type of information is that it does not contain any
reference to the shape and size of the surge to or from the pressurizer.
The alternative solution is to test several shapes and sizes of
surges until the pressurizer water level curves (the sea trial level
curve and the simulated level curve) take a similar shape. The fact
that the levels follow a similar pattern does not ensure that the
surges are similar because the surge flow is a function of the time
derivative of the pressure and this derivative is different in the
simulated model than in the seal trial results.
A correction, taking this effect into account, can be added:
V av aP aP
su =su* +ZaP ~at a t) 451
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where V = primary water volume
* = values from similar level behavior test
v - 4.892 x 10-
v
Because of the way the sea trial data are presented, this kind of
comparison was only possible with insurge cases.
It should be kept in mind that the behavior of the simulated plant
has not been forced to be similar to the old plant. Rather, the results
of the simulation show how the behavior of the new system will differ
from that of the old system. Although the model has several
approximations and the computer code also has a few approximations to fit
it inside the small calculator, also the controller constants are
different, and the inputs to the model are only approximated to the
plant, the behavior of the model resembles fairly well the behavior of
the actual plant. (No quantification of the resemblance is added because
of the approximations made, which makes that number of little value.)
What is apparent from the simulation is that the new control system
handles the overshoots of the response better than the old system.
The study cases were:
1. Transient from 40 percent load to base load.
2. Transient from base load to 40 percent load.
3. Transient from 60 percent load to base load.
4. Transient from 40 percent load to base load without any controlling
action.
5. Transient from base load to 4.0 percent load without any controlling
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action.
6. Transient from 40 percent load to base load adding an automatic
letdown valve.
7. Transient from base load to 40 percent load adding an automatic
letdown valve.
By base load is meant the low power at which all normal ship requirements
other than propulsion power are met.
The shapes of the insurges and outsurges applying to the model are
shown in Figures 4.5.2, 4.5.3, 4.5.4, 4.5.5, 4.5.6, and 4.5.7.
To change from a system without an automatic letdown valve to one
with automatic letdown valve, the letdown valve amplifier constant in the
code was simply changed from 0 to 10.
Figures 4.5.2, 4.5.3, 4.5.4, 4.5.5, 4.5.6, and 4.5.7 also show the
results of all the tests, and, in the case of insurges, the corresponding
sea trial results.
Most of the discussion that follows is related to the insurge
pressure curves because these curves show the action of the PID
controller on the spray valve. The outsurge curves are strongly
influenced by the hysteresis heaters and their behavior should not change
very much from the original controller to the new one. (The proportional
heater gets saturated very soon with the kinds of transients under
consideration.) On the other hand, the PID action is evident in the
outsurge level curves, where the makeup valve acts upon a PID control
signal. The special case when makeup valve and letdown valve are
considered together shows the effect of the PID action in both cases.
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From Figure 4.5.2 we can see that the pressure overshoot with the new
control system reaches 0.13 percent and the rise time is approximately 7
sec. Both numbers indicate the transient is rapidly controlled and kept
inside a safe envelope of limits. This characteristic of the pressure
response appears in all the study cases.
The level behavior during an outsurge transient is shown in Figure
4.5.3 here the strong derivative actions, required by the controller,
damps the level behavior in such a way that no overshoot appears and the
pressurizer level reaches the stead state smoothly. Because the levels
do not cross the reference line, this behavior is exactly the same for an
outsurge case with or without automatic letdown valve.
Figures 4.5.2 and 4.5.3 show the pressure and level behavior of the
system when it is subjected to an insurge, and the control system does
have an automatic letdown valve. Both parameters show sharp differences
from the case without automatic letdown valve.
First, the level reaches the steady state at its reference value
although the insurge has not yet finished, and it reaches the steady
state without showing an overshoot behavior. Second, the automatic
letdown flow produces a net outsurge to recover the original level; this
net outsurge reduces the pressure to a point below its reference value.
The pressure approaches the set point before the backup heaters are
required to go into action, and the proportional heater alone is trying
to recover the pressure; the pressure will be fairly constant at 11.83
(MPa) value until the proportional heater raises the water enthalpy to a
flashing region, then the pressure will return smoothly to its reference
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value.
Figure 4.5.6 and 4.5.7 also show an insurge transient due to a
greater input. Although the input is higher than the previous one, the
control system does handle the transient by obtaining an overshoot of
0.14 percent and a rise time of approximately 7 sec in the pressure.
Finally, all the figures related with transients also show what the
behavior of the pressure and the level if there is no control at all.
These curves clearly show the positive controlling action of the designed
control system.
Recall that the model of the pressurizer is an isolated model from
the primary system, where the inputs wsu and hsu are set arbitrarily by
the designer in order to test the control system. The fact is that the
input to the pressurizer (the surge flow) does depend on the output of
the control system because the surge flow is a function of the time
derivative of the pressure. A comprehensive way of considering this is
to model the pressurizer together with the primary system, but that is
beyond the scope of this thesis. Another way to verify this effect is
by the correction implied in equation 4.5.1. Figures 4.5.2, 4.5.3,
4.5.6 and 4.5.7 show the pressure behavior for the standard insurge and
the pressure behavior for an insurge approximated by equation 4.5.1.
The overshoot is higher and the rising time is smaller that the test
case, but the fact is the control system does handle the transient
without difficulty.
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CHAPTER 5
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The study has been performed up to the point when the preliminary
design stage has been completed. Also a new pressure and volume
control system has been designed and tested with a simple pressurizer
model, in a simulation code.
The steps followed to complete the preliminary design stage were:
1. Organization of surveillance, data validation, and control tasks in
functional blocks.
2. Study of the input-output parameters corresponding to the specific
case of the N.S. Savannah nuclear propulsion plant.
3. Preselection of eight feasible digital architectures by using a
weighting factor method.
4. Hardware design of the eight preselected alternatives.
5. Development of a more accurate figure of merit (EMV) to choose the
best alternative.
6. Selection of the optimal architecture for surveillance, data
validation and control functions
The steps followed to complete the design of the pressure and
volume control systen were:
1. Selection of the stability and transient analysis method (time
domain analysis).
2. Development of the state equations for the pressurizer.
3. Selection of the controller (PID).
4. Development of the transfer functions for the plant and the control
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system.
5. Development of a simulation code.
6. Tuning up of the controller by running study cases with the
simulation code.
The remainder of the chapter is concerned with specific conclusions
related to the preliminary design, specific conclusions related to the
pressure and volume control system design, and general recommendations.
5.1 PRELIMINARY DESIGN CONCLUSIONS
1. A robust methodology to design the optimal surveillance, data
validation, and control system for a nuclear propulsion plant has
been developed. The method is general enough to be used in nuclear
power plants and even in any complex process that has to be
monitored and controlled.
2. If the digital architecture is wanted for only process controlling
purposes, the design that should be chosen is the dual star serial
transmission architecture (Figures 2.4.7 and 2.5.6).
3. If the digital architecture is wanted only for data validation and
surveillance functions in the marine envionment, the global data
bus architecture should be chosen (Figures 2.4.3 and 2.5.7).
4. For a combined task of controlling the process and performing data
validation and plant surveillance, the dual star serial
transmission architecture will be favored by a risk-averse decision
maker (Figures 2.4.7 and 2.5.6).
5. If the dual star serial alternative architecture is chosen, the
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software package should be debugged up to a a probability of
software failure = 5 x 1-3.
6. The final conclusions favor the use of distributed systems over the
centralized ones. The conclusions were reached in an environment
of assumptions unfavorable to the distributed alternative. This
fact strengthens even more the decision to opt for distributed
systems. Moreover, several other attributes favoring distributed
architectures were not included in the figure of merit, e.g.:
expandability of the system (SCDS grows as the plant grows),
external disruption resistance (the distributed physical location
of the processes gives protection against external disruptive
effects), degraded mode operation (the system can survive failures
internally or externally caused up to a certain degree of damage.
5.2 PRESSURE AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM DESIGN CONCLUSIONS
1. The pressure and volume control algorithm can be fit in a very
small microprocessor. The limitation is the processing speed of
the microprocessor to keep pace in real time.
2. A digital controller does control the pressure and volume in the
pressurizer as well as the original pneumatic controller. From the
study cases, the digital controller shows a greater flexibility to
obtain transient responses from the plant with low overshoots (0.13
percent) and fast-rising times (approximately 7 sec).
3. From an strict control viewpoint the introduction of an automatic
letdown valve is advisable as it reduces even more the peak in
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pressure and controls the level during insurges. This conclusion
can be modified for other reasons (see Section 5.3).
4. To control the pressure and the volume requires a PID controller
with the proportional gain set to 1 and the derivative time set to
10, and the inverse of the integral time set to 0.
5.3 GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS
1. If the procedure developed to design and select a digital
architecture is used to design a surveillance, data validation and
control system (SDCS) for a land-based commercial nuclear power
plant, the following suggestions are made:
- The environmental factor used to calculate the failure rate
should be adapted to the expected environment.
- By studying in detail the inputs and outputs of the plant, a
new division of the tasks has to be made.
- After calculating the memory requirements and the data
transmission requirements, the new alternatives can be
designed.
- Because of the larger size of the plant, the distributed
alternatives should be studied loop by loop (and not using an
average case as in this work).
2. The figure of merit used in this thesis--expected monetary value
(EMV) does not consider the personal attitudes of the decision
maker. The preference structure of the decision maker should be
added to the figure of merit to make the final decision as close as
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possible to the real world.
3. For future work, a more detailed analysis of the quantification of
the payoffs is recommended. In this work, this task was
complicated by the lack of updated information related to those
quantities.
4. This thesis was developed under the assumption that a SDCS has only
two states, operating or failed. A more realistic approach is to
consider a third state of degraded mode operation. This topic by
itself requires a separate study.
5. This thesis used a figure of merit under one attribute domain
(economic payoffs), but if the study were expanded to large nuclear
power plants, the analysis can be made under a rwltiattribute
domain (economic payoffs, general plant safety, availability, etc.)
6. Another field of improvement is to assess how the environmental
factor (WE) used to calculate the failure rates, could be affected
by exposing the digital device to nuclear radiation; this case is
especially interesting in the case of distributed digital systems
because some of the processors will be located closer to radiation
sources than a central computer would be.
7. This work has considered eight basic architectures. The basic
architecture can be extended by adding redundancies in critical
points of the design. For further work in the field, it is
recommended that sensitivity analysis be performed on the figure of
merit by introducing such redundancies in the design. The analysis
should start from the engineering design viewpoint, then the fault
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tree and equations should be restructured correspondingly, the
costs should be adjusted, and then the sensitivity study can be
performed.
8. Although the cost of producing the special software can be reduced
by using common algorithms in every processing block, the cost of
producing the software needed for the SDCS always will be the
dominant factor in the cost figure. That leads to the
recommendation for future work to choose a hardware package with
the maximum available software possible, decreasing in that way the
cost of developing unique software.
9. The inclusion of -protected memory devices (ROM) should be
considered in future designs.
The following set of recommendations concerns the design of a pressure
and volume control system.
10. Although it is not part of the scope of this thesis, it has been
noted that the model used to simulate the pressurizer behavior
behaves consistently faster than the actual plant. This
observations is in keeping with the results obtained by Geffray in
his thesis (Ref. 3.3). For the purposes of this work, this
behavior however does not make much difference from the actual
behavior, and will not affect the conclusions, but for the data
validation task, some of the assumptions should be relaxed in order
to get a response closer to the real one.
11. From a strict control viewpoint, the use of an automatic letdown
valve appears to be desirable, but safety considerations, or the
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possibility of a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) due to a failure
in the control system could preclude implementation of such a
device. To have a LOCA due to a failure in the automatic letdown
valve is a real possibility because the total inventory of water of
this nuclear system is small (approximately 20 m3)
13. As a conclusion of this work, and from past experience, control of
pressure and volume in a nuclear system is readily achieved using a
PD controller. The constants for the controller come from the
tuning-up of the PD controller attached to the specific plant.
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APPENDIX A
N.S. SAVANNAH REACTOR FEATURES
This appendix is included only for illustrative purposes. More
details about the N.S. Savannah nuclear plants are given in Reference A.1.
The description of the N.S. Savannah nuclear propulsion plant has
been divided into four parts: (1) the basic working cycle; (2) the
pressurizing system; (3) the purification system; and (4) the secondary
system. Figure A.1 is a block diagram with all the main components of
the ship's nuclear propulsion plant.
A.1 BASIC WORKING CYCLE
The basic working material--and neutron moderator--for the Savannah
reactor is demineralized and purified water. This "primary water" is
circulated between the reactor and two heat exchangers (steam
generators). The water is force-circulated at the rate of 16,000 gallons
per minute, at a mean temperature of 508"F. The water is pressurized to
1750 psia.
The maximum total heat generated by the reactor is 70 MW or about 240
million Btu/hr
The primary water enters the lower portion of the reactor, and leaves
near the top. The circulation takes place in two independent loops.
Each coolant loop consists of a heat exchanger and two pumps. This
two-loop arrangement provides ample flexibility to maintain reduced-power
cooling of the reactor with one heat exchanger and one pump. Such
cooling would be necessary after reactor shutdown or setback, to remove
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Figure A.] N.S. Savannah Nuclear Propulsion PlanL,
*See legend on next pages.
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Figure A.I (continued).
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VM Valve normally open
NI Valve normally half open
Valve normally closed
Globe valve
Check swing valve
Check stop valve
Diaphragm operated valve
Electrical motor operated valve
Quick closing valve piston operated
Globe valve diaphragm operated
t< Relief valve
1. Steam separator
2. Pressurizer
3. Starboard steam generator
4. Starboard primary pumps
S. Reactor vessel
6. Makeup flow
7. Port primary pumps
8. Port steam generator
10. Steam to main ejectors
11. Steam to low pressure steam generator
12. Steam to main feed pumps
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13. Steam to main turbo generators
14. High pressure heaters
15. Main turbo feed pumps
16. Deaerator tank
17. Low pressure heater
18. Condensate pumps
19. Main condenser
20. Seawater injection
21. Low pressure turbine
22. Steam separator
23. High pressure turbine
24. Ahead throttle valve
25. Astern throttle valve
26. Guardian valve
27. Steam bypass to condenser
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the decay heat from fission residues.
Each loop contains two electrically operated gate valves that can be
closed to isolate the reactor. Appropriate interlocks are provided so
that all four gate valves cannot be closed simultaneously once the
reactor has started up in normal operation. Position indicators show the
amount of gate valve openings at all times. The inlet gate valves (two)
are positioned adjacent to the reactor, whereas the outlet gate valves
(two) are adjacent to, and ahead of, the heat exchangers. The greater
length of outlet piping thus provided acts as an overflow reservoir in
the case of power surges with one loop isolated.
The circulating pumps (total of four) are of the canned rotor type.
The rotor is mounted vertically above the impeller, and has windings for
two- speeds, namely: half and full. At full speed, each pump will move
5000 gpm against a head of 70 psi. The pumps are located on the
downstream side of the heat exchangers, to minimize problems of
radioactivity and corrosivity from the primary water. A check valve is
placed on the discharge side of each pump to protect it against
back-pressure surges in the primary piping. The pumps are separately
cooled by water. The total pumping power required is about one MW (i.e.,
250 KW per pump) ... or 1.5 percent of the total reactor power.
The steam generators (total of two) consist of a U-shell, U-tube heat
exchanger section, with a steam drum on top. The heat exchanger section
contains about 800 stainless steel 3/4-inch 0.D. tubes. It is connected
to the U-shell heat exchanger by risers and downcomers. The steam drum
is equipped with cyclone separators and scrubbers which provide dry
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saturated steam at the main outlet. The total amount of steam generated
is approximately 260,000 pounds per hour at 460 psia, 475 0F. Separate
feedwater pumps supply make-up water to the steam generators. The heat
exchanger water-to-steam cycle is called the "secondary loop" of the
reactor plant.
All primary piping carrying water between the reactor and heat
exchangers is of type 304 stainless steel, 12-1/2 inch I.D. The design
pressure of this piping is 2000 psi. The secondary piping carrying steam
fran the generating drums to the turbines is 8-1/2 inch I.D., designed
for 800 psi. Appropriate steam safety valves and stop-check valves are
provided.
A.2 THE PRESSURIZING SYSTEM
A fundamental design feature of the Savannah reactor is that no
boiling of the primary water is allowed. As an initial safeguard against
boiling, the maximum temperature of the reactor water is de-rated about
100*F below its saturation value at the equilibrium pressure of 17500
psia. 'But the steam turbines don't know about this de-rating; their
demands for steam rise and recede with the ship's operational
requirements. Because of these load changes, the primary water pressure
will be altered.
The demand for increased steam in the secondary loop means that more
heat has to be taken out of the primary loop, thereby disturbing
equilibrium conditions. As a result, the reactor pressure is reduced.
At lowered primary pressure, some of the water inside the reactor could
flash into steam and local or general boiling could occur. Depending on
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the frequency and severity of load changes, the neutron moderation could
upset fission criticality conditions with the ultimate possibility of
fuel element burnout.
To prevent this possibility, a pressurizing and relief valve system
is provided. The "pressurizer" is an electrically heated pressure vessel
in which an auxiliary steam space is maintained in pressure equilibrium
with the primary water. The equilibrium pressure (1750 psia) is
maintained by the alternate use of electrical heaters or spray-cooling as
the transients of the primary system demand.
The electrical heaters are housed in heater wells which heat the
primary water (in the pressurizer only) to the saturation temperature,
thereby forming a vapor chamber above the water. Spray-coolers are
located in the vapor region to reduce the vapor pressure when necessary.
In the center of the tank, a standpipe provides the reference leg for
water-level control. To meet heavy transients, appropriate steam relief
valves and water surge lines are provided.
Due to the reactor stability provided by the Savannah's pressurizer,
steam can be delivered to the turbines varying in pressure from 450 psia
(at maximum power) to 730 psia (at zero power).
A.3 THE PURIFICATION SYSTEM
Under equilibrium pressure conditions, the primary water will become
radioactivated by the neutrons in the reactor core. Also, because of the
temperatures involved, corrosion products will accumulate. And,
furthermore, there is always the possibility that some fission products
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may find their way into the primary water. To remove the radioactive and
corrosive matter from the primary water, a purification system is
provided.
A fraction of the primary water is by-passed through the purifier at
the normal rate of 20 gpm. To permit a higher rate of purification, a
by-pass rate of 60 gpm can be handled. The driving force through the
purifier is the 1750 psia pressure head of the primary water. The 520*F
primary water is "let down" through a combination of flash coolers and
block orifices to about 65 psia, 110 0F.
After letdown, the primary water passes through a demineralizer
consisting of a bank of three ion exchangers. The-resins in these ion
exchangers chemically purify the water by removing the dissolved
radio-contaminants and corrosive products. The undissolved radioactive
and corrosive particulates are removed by effluent filters. Each ion
exchanger and filter has a useful life of at least 50 days, after which
it has to be removed and replaced. Appropriate valving permits
sequential operation of the ion exchangers and filters for at least 150
days of continuous purification.
The purified water is returned to the primary loop, via a surge tank
and charge pump. Ahead of the surge tank, primary make-up water is
added. In the surge tAnk, any radioactive and corrosive gases trapped in
the primary water will separate automatically, whereupon these gases are
vented off. Beyond the surge tank, a hydrogen addition system maintains
a minimun concentration of 20 cc/liter of dissolved hydrogen in the
primary water. This excess hydrogen scavenges the free oxygen liberated
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by dissociation of the water when in the active region of the reactor
core. The overall result is minimum corrosion in the primary loops.
A.4 SECONDARY SYSTEM
The propulsion machinery on Savannah is essentially the same as that
on a conventional steam-powered ship: a two-element steam turbine
driving a single propeller through mechanical reduction gears. The
propulsion system contributes 1,265 short tons to the total 4,348 short
tons power plant weight; the remainder is made up of reactor system
(1,665 short tons) and shielding (2,418 short tons). The only unique
feature of the engine room resulting from use of a reactor plant for
steam generation is the consolidated control room. Emergency propulsion
power is supplied by a 750 hp electric motor which engages one of the
high-speed pinions in the reduction gear via a quick-connect coupling.
An oil-fired boiler is provided for generation of air ejector motive
steam to maintain a main condenser vacuum during emergency propulsion
operation, thereby reducing blade windage losses in the main turbine.
Normal electric power is supplied by two, geared, steam-turbine
generator units; standby electric power is furnished by two diesel
generators, and emergency power by another diesel generator located on
the navigation bridge deck. The secondary system is also shown
schematically in Figure A-1. Two 16,000 gallon per day distillers of the
multiple-effect type provide ample fresh water for plant make-up (via ion
exchangers), drinking, washing, and culinary needs.
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The main propulsion unit is a cross-compound turbine with high- and
low-pressure sections coupled to a double-helical, double-reduction gear
of conventional design, this unit delivers 22,000 maximum SHP at 110 rpm
with saturated steam at a pressure of 472 psia and a condenser vacuum of
28.45 in. Hg; astern power is 8,000 SHP at 53.5 rpm, in compliance with
standard practice of 80 percent of normal ahead torque at half rpm with
100 percent normal ahead steam flow. The propeller is five-bladed, made
of nickel-manganese-bronze. The 4,500 rpm, high-pressure turbine has 9,
single-row stages of impulse type blading. The 3,000 rpm, low-pressure
turbine has 7, single-row ahead stages of impulse type blading; this
turbine also as 1 double-row and 1 single row stage of impulse type
blading for astern operation. Both turbine casings are split on a
horizontal plane. High-pressure turbine exhaust steam, with 11 percent
moisture content, passes through a 2-stage, baffle/cyclone, moisture
separator before admission to the low-pressure turbine; inter-stage
moisture collecting provisions are also included in both turbines. Steam
flow is regulated by an electric motor-operated throttle valve controlled
by an electrical servo system mounted on a maneuvering handwheel on the
main control console.
Hung from the low-pressure turbine, the main condenser is a single
pass, non-divided design with scoop sea water injection for normal
operation and a 150 hp, 20,000 gpm sea water circulating pump for standby
and maneuvering. The 3/4 in. copper-nickel tubes are welded to single,
copper-nickel tube sheets for tightness and then lightly rolled for
vibration resistance. The 2 turbine-generator condensers are two-pass
283
design, also with welded tubes, and are cooled to maintain 29 in. Hg
vacuum by continuous duty sea water circulating pumps. Feedwater is
drawn from condenser hotwells by two 40 hp condensate pumps, heated and
deaerated and returned to the steam generators at 347*F by the 650 gpm
(maximum) steam-turbine driven feed pump.
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APPENDIX B
SOFTWARE PARAMETERS FORECASTING
Maurice H. Halstead holds in his book, Elements of Software Science
(Ref. B.1) that even relative intangible objects such as computer
programs are governed by natural laws. His work starts with the
assumption that the human brain obeys a more rigid set of rules than it
has been aware of; he later proves the point.
The Halstead theory- allows us to forecast with reasonable confidence
several software parameters. Those concerning here are:
- program volume
- time to write and debug the algorithm
- number of errors non-detected, buried in the final program.
The fundamentals and theory development are given in reference B.1. For
the purposes of this thesis the equations related to those three
parameters are stated:
= 2 + (B.1)
log(n*/2) (njy - 2)(B)
n2n [ n*lg9 2 + 1)1(B.2)
2 log n ga n2  log n1 + n2 )(n* log n* 1+ 2) , ) (B3
l log n~ n2 1 og 2 (8g.ogB)
N 1 lo9 T1 +42 2(B.4)
N log (ni +in2) (B.5)
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log (2 + n()
V*= (2 + n) log 2 (B.6)
E = V (B.7).V7
A ET E= 3600 57(B.8)
A V
B = gy(B.-9)
LEGEND:
1 = number of unique or distinct operators appearing in that
implementation
n2  = number of unique or distinct operands appearing in that
implementation
N1  = total usage of all of the operators appearing in that
implementation
N2  = total usage of all of the operands appearing in that
implementation
N = N + N2
* = minimum possible number of operators for a known algorithm (2)
= minimum possible number of operators for a known algorithm
= rf +n = 2 + n
V = program volume (bits)
V*= minimum possible volume for a known algorithm, also caLled
potential volume
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E = total number of elementary mental discriminations required
to generate a given program, also called effort
A
T = estimated value of programming time (hours)
S = Stroud number (5 < S < 20 sec t1), lower limit
corresponds to an inexperienced programmer, and the higher
to an experienced one (S = 15 will be used in the code)
B = estimated number of bugs remaining in the program.
X = language constant (FORTRAN case x = 1.14)
These equations have no close form and the only way to solve them for V,
A A
T, and B is by numerical approximation.
A complete computer code solving the equation has been written, the
listing of the code, its inputs and outputs and its user's manual is
given at the end of this appendix.
To obtain the data required by the code, the following assumptions
are made:
1. af is equal to the total number of significant input parameters
plus output parameters of the system.
2. In order to calculate the input and output parameters of the
system, only the significant parameters are included. By
significant it is meant those parameters which interrelate with
others in the algorithm code, for example, status signals are
not included.
3.
4.
The input data come from Section 2.3
To calculate the input and output parameters for the advanced
control function the following assumptions are made:
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a) One parameter per peripheral (1 magnetic tape, 1 disk drive,
3 consoles, I printer, 1 card reader). Total = 7.
b) The total number of communication parameters is approximately
equal to the number of peripherals plus the number of validation
and control algorithms (49).
c) The number of polling parameters is the same as the
communication parameters (49).
d) The safety state vector has 30 parameters
-5. The input parameters to the control algorithm are the validated
parameters from the validation algorithm.
6. Any kind of signal which does not undergo a transformation
through the code is not included.
7. The significant output parameters for the advanced control
algorithm are the summation of peripheral parameters,
communication parameters, polling parameters, and the safety
state vector.
8. The significant input parameter for the advanced control
parameter is the summation of all significant output parameters
coming from the validation blocks.
The data about channels and significant parameters comes from the
analysis in Section 2.3 and the results are shown in Table B.1.
The ng values calculated in Table B.1 are the inputs to the code.
The results coming from the code are in Table B.2. The results given in
Table B.2 are the basis for making the hardware design in Section 2.5.
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Table B.1
INPUT-OUTPUT PARAMETERS
SIGN. INPUT INPUT SIGN. OUTPUT OUTPUT
FUNCTION SYMBOL PARAMETERS CHANNELS PARAMETERS CHANNELS
Level control
both steam gen. C1  7 7 3 3 10
Pressure, volume
control
pressurizer C2  12 12 13 17 25
Temperature control
and load
following C3  34 34 30 31 '64
Pressure control
sec. system C4  5 5 4 4 9
Propeller shaft
speed control C5  8 8 9 10 17
Flow, temperature
control in puri-
fication sys. C6  28 28 26 28 54
Pressure and temp.
control buffer
seals C7  15 15 15 17 30
SUBTOTAL 110
Steam generators
validation D1 24 24 16 16 40
Pressurizer
validation 02 12 39 10 19 22
Nuclear parameters
validation D3 12 12 4 4 16
Feed water system
validation D4 9 15 10 12 19
Turbines
validation De 36 51 17 22 53
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Table B.1 (continued)
INPUT-OUTPUT PARAMETERS
SIGN. INPUT INPUT SIGN. OUTPUT OUTPUT
FUNCTION SYMBOL PARAMETERS CHANNELS PARAMETERS CHANNELS a
Primary purifi-
cation validation D6 21 87 12 34 33
Buffer seals
validation D7 33 78 18 33 51
Buffer seal flow
validation D8 69 69 26 26 95
1-10 control rods
validation D9 69 138 24 47 93
11-21 control rods
validation D10 72 144 25 49 97
Electrical system
validation Dil 78 177 27 60 105
Primary pumps
validation D12 48 60 21 25 69
Primary circuit
validation D13 45 93 29 41 74
Feedwater system
validation D14 51 102 15 36 66
SUBTOTAL 1089 254
Advanced
control AC 254 254 128 128 382
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Table B.2
RESULTS FROM SOFTWARE SCIENCE CODE
BLOCK MEMORY
SYMBOL REQUIREMENTS (kby)
C1  0.214
C2  1.77
C3  17.10
C4  0.165
C5  0.712
C6  11.37
C7 - 2.74
D 1 5.53
D2 1.32
D3 0.63
D4 0.93
D5 10.38
D6 3.48
D7 9.89
D8 43.95
D9 41.79
D10 46.13
D i t55.73
D12 20.44
D13 24.18
D14 18.36
SUBTOTAL 316.811
Adv. Cont. 1163.73
TOTAL 1480.54
PROGRAMMING
(hours)
1.33
30.18
911.2
0.89
7.82
493.66
58.5
168.06
19.75
6.5
11.69
430.80
84.04
400.98
3748.8
3477.15
4030.12
5351.85
1189.66
1530.42
1011.84
22965.24
510538.87
533498.11
TI ME
T,
REMAININQ
ERRORS (B)
0.58
4.82
46.7
0.45
1.95
31.04
7.49
15.11
3.61
1.71
2.54
28.34
9.51
27.03
120
114.11
125.98
152.19
55.83
66.03
50.13
864.15
3177.77
4041.92
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SOFTWARE SCIENCE CODE USER'S MANUAL
A list with the parameters and their register locations follows:
REGISTER VARIABLE
01 ni
11n
12 n*
13 92
14 (n* log n*)
l1ogZ
15
16 N
17 V
18 V*
19 auxiliary
20 E
21 S
22 T
23 B
The procedure for use of the code follows:
1. Load the code
2. Input x (reg. 15)
3. Input S (reg. 21)
4. Input n (reg. 11)
5. input a guess of n, (reg. 01); the guess must be lower than
the realI
6. Start by pressing key A
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7. When code stops, recall reg. 17, which gives the estimated
program volume in bits
8. Recall reg. 22, which gives the estimated programming time in
hours.
9. Recall reg. 23, which gives the estimated number of remaining
errors buried inside the program.
Finally Table B.3 has the code listing in AOS language.
REFERENCE
B.1 Elements of Software Science. Maurice H. Halstead. Elsevier
North Holland, Inc., 1911.
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Table B.3
Software Science Code Listing
.7-t
r--
- -----
- 1
-_9..7
-Z4X
- t
-.- -_L ~ a
- - - __ I, -r
i =
"-t
- 9
--n
-- T
--
r Z L--L --
""P{
.. Z6 -, -
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Table B.3 (continued)
1 -4- . .3 -
-4-2-- 5
L45 4 '
1 --7- ?- -
-- T
-- I-3 -
-f5
5 -.- --0E, -E
-- 0-
45-E1 .- 0 ""J
--C - 2.-S. r- 0--1
-1--6-- 7 - --:
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APPENDIX C
CONFIGURING SHEET FOR ARCHITECTURES
The design sheets shown in this appendix are standard configuration
worksheets. They are intended as a means of calculating the power
requirements, unibus extensions, and cabinet requirements for each
architecture. Also the final hardware prices are obtained.
The first set of worksheets (C.1) corresponds to the central and dual
central architectures. The interfacing devices and others are the
recommended in DEC manuals (references C.1, C.2, C.3, C.4). The prices
are the ones for 1980. Worksheets C.2 is the configuration for the star
architecture parallel transmission. Because the CPU, memory, and
peripherals are exactly the same for every distributed architecture;
these elements are calculated only once on Worksheet C.2. The results
are used as a starting point in the following sheets. Also worksheet C.2
has the configuration sheets for the corresponding control and diagnosis
microprocessors.
Worksheet C.3 is for the star architecture serial transmission.
Worksheet C.4 has the dual star parallel transmission architecture.
Worksheet C.5 has the dual star serial transmission architecture; this
architecture has exactly the same design as the star architecture for the
central minicomputer unit. Worksheet C.6 covers the global bus
architecture; C.7 has the dual global architecture. This configuration
has the same minicomputer unit as global bus.
The microprocessor hardware has been designed based on LSI-il
devices. For light loaded control microprocessors the LSI-1l/02 CPU has
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been chosen; the heavier loaded diagnostics microprocessors use LSI-I1/23
machines.
After verifying each design can hold the heaviest loads in its
category, the configuration sheets have been written for a microprocessor
holding an average load. The reason for doing that is to avoid taxing in
cost and probability of failure the distributed alternatives. After all,
only a few microprocessors will hold the heavier load; most of them will
not be so loaded. Finally the most loaded LSI-11/02 microprocessor will
average 719 instructions per signal, and the most loaded LSII-1/23
microprocessor will have an average of 88 instructions per signal. Both
numbers are calculated on the basis of a 2-second updating time.
CJ CENTRAL PROCESSOR AND DUAl. ARCITECTURES
CONFIGURING WORKSHEET
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SALANCE 9 0-D280450
QAUNCE5 9 - -019150
DPL D -D D2 - -53200,115001
I 1 160 '65
MAKE 102 523171I
ALA.9CE 3'9-12 -5601591
CALAICE
BA-Ea a201320
'T SALANC5
terspI,1o -,0r 2 7 -2 -u og 86019;odby60po1
MAKE3 9 7 2504 1 100
3 Y I I-AP- 025- )---'4,012 960
- 9 22--3,2 415290
1309A21- - 7 2150,A11001
2I 33-4,- -2 - 6 121
DATE:
r)
CONFIGURING WORKSHEET
PAGE: .. . 0OF
EXPANSION SPACE
PANEL SSSM BUS 5oU 3-41Uox 1 omBoxeSl -2B 1
t'l SYSTEIMPTION SPACE 0U4115 IDAD, 117 T TAICKL
IT OT UBR ~ .AVAIL AVAIL AVARI X SD V .15~V I ' OIA ISV I 5 5 S X0oVi1V IJ~AJI~ SV Yo it NUMBER W' st""***
Z Eneor appcs.oWVe, O andad laui eguirqed o. suppaod by optons
a PANC SYSITM US HIX UAD lit OUAD itx UAD
SPACE UNIT S sto sOTS SLT% S sv '4sv .1sV SLOTS SLOTS iSV 1V.1 SV sOTS LOIS V SV S V
IL lZL IIIII2 - 7 20 860
BANCE 1 9 253770
1 001I-C1 - 4301530
SANCE - 9 7 2 9,-4 2 2 2 - 6.7 154200
9 LIPAll-KE 9 7 . 5.-35, 2 7 53001477001
BALANCE - - - 2 5 2 2 - - 9.7 ?01900
I DBllI-A 18 2 2 2.2 15180
PALAICE - 18 - 2 5. - - 2,2 - - 203750
OALAAcE
MAcE
BALANCE
BALANCE
IOTAL. EXPANS0C SPACE LEri
- a - a a - - - - a OTALS
DATE:
N)
k.000
CONFIGURING WORKSHEET
PAGE: _3_ OF _
EXPANSION SPACE
SYSTEM/OPTION SPACI S UN 1-3 UNIT TOKAL MONTHLY
TIM OTT NUMBER s t AVAIL AVAIL AVA I(I O s 5V I1V 15V W1N1 OAD .15V 1li OJAD -WIS lCI rYIC M
.4 0, - 20375T
O 2&soi 3jacu e , o, and Io.)dh ;equircd at aeppled by opliona
PANEL, SYSTEM EUS 1ICY auto IINX GWAD 111 00 ll'5V AddalADl
SPACE LU411S LOADS SLOWS SLOWS s* SW 5 1VW SlW 51015 OS .s 5WvSW Isy "1 SV LO tOS ISV tN v Adalp
11 960-18001800o
BALANCE1205550
1 BAll-VE (2) 5 - 0 320013200
ALA;CE 5 10 2, !208750
DO -I) 4 - - 7 2 7 2 80_12
DALMICt 118 22,1 720A721,5 210470
18 1AD1I-K 18 2 729 52 U 20003600[
DALAWICE 1 - 0,! - - 31,! 2 - 45 246470
DALANICE
PALANCE
IVAhCE
BALANCE
inPAPACSICA AAC(E -- - - TW
AVAR AV~g i s c-25V 5V 5V 1 mOA0p V 41 V lEE 0 D eSV .4V Pli P'.Mi
DAT E;
N)0
CONFIGURING WORKSHEET
PAGE;... OF '
EXPANSION SPACE
LINl SYSTEMIOPTION PANEL SYS LOADsu, 5 Box 2 Es 3-4 Box Z Ss 1-2, eox 3. U T Slavic(ACE UNITS IOAO- -j--SuljI - I- I UNIT TOTAL 4M04TPL?
vw OI NUMBER g aj AVA'L AVAIL AVAIl lES QUAD *4s *5 V 15 V 1V ED QUAD 65 ISV I ISV X c 5 5 sv PII PIE MI4
nier spice, power, erblad& luqurad a oupplod by oplions
PANEL SY1TM DUS TILT QUAD l QUAD itX AD0
SPACE UNITS LOADS SLOTS 1015 .SV o ISV V sM stolis S V . isv 5SV Sto s Ts V o *isv .1SV Add all puce]I DDI- C 2 2?4, - - .E
BAACE 2 2?4, 2 2 ----. 246900
I DBII-A l - - 2.' -1850118501
BALMCE 18 . - 2, 2 - - 248750
1 11960 - - - - -- 180011800
DAWEE - 18 - - )2, 2 '' -2 0 5
I7 BA7-KEC (3) 5 -- 0-32001 32001
VALANCE 5 18 - -2,- 2 - - 253750
I oi1 1I) 2 - - - - -- 7 2
DALANCE 3 18 - - 2,' 2 - - 7 2 254610
11 AlI-K- -- - - - 12501225001
ALCE 3 18 /2, 2 2. 7 2 62. 277110
9 LPAII-KE 2 -0 7 - 35 5300 47700
BALAce 3 9 -- -- - - - 2, - 2 27, - 324810
EALANCE
BALANCE 
-
10114 Xh, 1P0 011PC ? [ L(FT-
DATE:
Lk)
0)
0)
IOIA15 I -
CONFIGURING WORKSHEET
PAGE ., OF 7
EXPANSION SPACE
PANE SYSTEM/OPTION PA L 1.U' S l' usi Sl 1--2 lox 3 . su, 3-4 -ox 3 su s . 5 O _3 .I TOTA,
11$ O1 NUMBER V' AVAIL AVAIL "11 ^ CUA S * _V " -"AD IS 5 lT OvAD V51 c PICE
NUMBER 3 9I- -- 2] -I 41 - - -4810
Enror pace, VoWer, and Ioi? sequod ou suppoead by opions
C SPMAt L51Mp BUS IR VUAD ' QUAD l QUADd0
SrAC( UNITS LOADS SLOTS SLOTS Iv .5 1 V sto Ts St s *M V Iv , LOTI OIS I V e sv sv V15V
DOI-D 2 7 2 860 18607
lAAuNI 1 9 2 7 2 , 325670
T1 DDil-C21Lw _ - - 2 2 _ 430430
AlANCE - 9 7 7 2 4 2 2 326100
777 - 35 - -. 5300 3710
ALAWC( - 2 2 - - 2-10. 22 363200
8 AAll-K - 2 5,0 2 5, 2 2 5,0 1250j10001
PALANCE -6 - 5.0 -- 15. - 5.0 373200
DALA CE
CAME
DAWICE
BALAMCE
BALANCE
loin EAPAASI SPAC[ tllO
DATE:
--
CONFIGURING WORKSHEET
PAGE: -.. OF
EXPANSION SPACE
Lwit SYTMOTO AE YSTltABsSul.1 -2 Boax 4 sus 3-4 oo 4 sus 5 nox -A. UNIT IIOTAL RI 4(LLIE SYSTEM/OPTION SAEU11 OD 01L
11 Ol NUMBER 2 j AVAIL AVAIL AVAIL '10 QUAD 95YssV .1SV ISV1T'fUAOG4sv.tsv.TlsV 1HEXQUAD 45%V 141Y -ISV PAICI IfICEIMAI
E ie0 spacO, powe, and loads requered or suppkod by oplions
PANEL SYS11M DUS I11 1lAD lIEX OUAO ILX JUAD
SPACE U41lS LOADS SLOTS SLOTS iSV .1W .15V SLOTS SLOTS iSV *r" .15 V11SOTS TS*V 15dVal rie
110960 -.- 1800 1800
BAAICK -6 - 375000
I BAll-K (4) 5 - 50 32001 3200F
2707 2 -0 4i7P2I_ 7I
DBtLVE 1 -6 -7 2 4, 7 2 379920
1 DD) l-C1 - 2 2 430 4301
KAUE -6 7 2 7 2 2 2 f4, 5 380350
TDBIl-A U- 18 - - - - 2 2 2,2
VALAnCE - 12 7 2 2, 7 2 12. - - 2.3 382200
9 LPAll-KE - 9 7 -35,Q - - 10-5300147o00
OAwIc- - 3 - 212, 5 2 22, - - - 429900
9 AAHl-K - 9 2 5,( 5 2- 17.120121
AL.ANCE - -6 - - - 44,1 - - - . 441150
DALCE
IA CE
EALOTALE
DATE:
N
DAE:I
CONFIGURING WORKSHEET
PAGE; . OF 7
EXPANSION SPACE
FiEtD
SYSTEMIOPTION P T sa S UNIT 7T1AL MONTHLY
m 1 1 1 1 4 O iN U M B E R 2 t A V A IL A V A I 4 iv
1F--6-60WFI YL17 W57 7
a z EIcfer sice, rocor, arnd loads required or suppleod Of aprons
cz
r h t SY S TEM B U S IIp CU A D i i j i i 0X C IU D I tE U O d ll p i
ALCE-44.9 442950
jBAIIL-KE (5) 5 - -0 320013200
CALANCE 446150
2FDDl-D 4 -72 72 860117201
DALANCE 7 2 447870
1 0011-C - - - - 2 2 5143
0V4LUI - -6 7 2 5,1 1 2 2 2 F. 2.1 418300
I DBilI1-A 18 2 2 2.9 1350
DALAICE'12 7 2 2,. 7 2 2,9 450150
101 AAjll-K 10 7 2 2,'112,5 150112500
DALMCE' 2 - - 7 1 2, 462650
1-11960 - - - 180
BALANCE2 - 9,/ 1 -2.464450
1 A -KE - - - - 320
BAME5 2 - - -7, 7 1 -- - 467650e7athc7
14 2 DC05M-25--639 761
BALANCE 559126
sPC USCE 568198
I U LJ5 I- - 0C.d. 1 I -kll -toN1350 11431
1 lP! IXPWilCT SPACE LFT
w3
MP (JD Pl' ueo~l~ arVI;cIe , -- - I - , - , I -
I
IU( AL 3
C,2 STAR ARCHITECTURE (Parallel Transmission)
CONFIGURING WORKSHEET
SM-60LLA-CA PAGE: ...L OF
DATE: EXPANSION SPACE
SYSTEM/OPTIONSYSTEM USul1-2-3QCPU su 4-5 sox CP4 u 6 sax SERVICE
T1 11 ol NUMBER ~AVAIL AVAIL AVAIL 10ED UAD 5 IV 15V 1W (X10 lif I(XOUAOI SJSV 1 j PRCI JyctAIA1
02 -for space, p;onor, and foagil seguor s upphoed by opbocni
E rAPC I 51511M GUS PIER OUAD 15UA11( D PIdd l A
SPACE UNITS LOADS LOTS STS S S ,15IV SLOTS SLOTS 51 5v1W ISV SLOTSV LOISt0 5 *SV 1 A5V 15V gdV
1 11/60OEA D D 0 D 02001302001
BALA'cf ,30200
I RL-1l AK D0 D D D50 50
BALANCE . 14,1 1 6E12 9,7 35700
1 MS1-KE (extra) -_480014800 I
AACE 14 116, - - - 129,7 40500
1-1 TS02-MA 1 1 1.- - - 4100 4100
MACE 13 - 1 0 1 2 9,7 44600
I CPil-VA 1 1 1.5 - - _ 53300
CALANCE 12 - - 3,r 1 29.7 49900
I CR--ll 11-1.51750017500i
DALACE ' - - 3, 1 1 8.2 57400
BALANCE
BALANCE
101A XPE5E0 l5PA SCE LIlT
_____________________ 
m - .m uS-~ S -raw&-
0AC).
Note: Up to * the numbers are counon
to all distributed architeltflDAE:
CONFIGURING WORKSHEET
PAGE: 2... OF 4
EXPANSION SPACE
SS, Y PS sus 1-2 ODE 1 5ss 3-4 B 1. su. 5-6. SRoV OL
LIT SYSTEM(OPTION SPACI U11115 LOAD. H vISuilOA GO -. 1 UNT TO AMUL1im OTT NUMBER s u AVAIL AVAIL AVAIL a15 n U cu a ,IsvLu v TILT GO .sv . V 1 a TILE .Ev , TV $v
111NNUBER " I57400
O(I ip t e, po0.a, and loadi equ iod O fupplkod by oprons
1( SYSTM PUS TIlE QUAD tIll 0JAD 11E CUA
SPACE UNITS LOADS SLOTS LOTS I4SV Is15V Tv 1SLOTS SLOTS esV 15" .V 'LOTS LOTS S .v Iy V Add ullpucau
6 [J5 15
eALAFCe 6 11 5 5 15 57400
- 12 72 72 2
7 2 13. 4 30014 2900
11MCt 7 2 5 7 2 ?5 - - 1 100300
PA1003001
7 23,3 2 3,
EAA 9 - - 7 - - 1.- - - 1. 103800
VALANCE
BALAICE
SAL AlICE
l IM 111151M SPACE
Lto jj III.LJ
TOTALS I I
wI
0:
Ci
CONFIGURING WORKSHEET
DATE;
PAGE: _. OF _
EXPANSION SPACE
PANL SYstE4 BUS SSii:0 o xBC I Sul A U1 ,J~J ~ 1 I SRVICEtINt 1 SYSTEM/OPTIONSPACE VI Ao N OTAL1MCNIHLY
111M 0iv NU BE 2 AVA'L AVAIL AVAiLt 1111 DUAD iV SY 5 V I IL GUAD I5vIIsv . 1 5v 1 11KC WAD *4)V 4uiW v 5 AC AC AEM NUMBER 
T
o zCover sace, powp' od loadsaioveqod r suppled OA ptions
C6 d rANEL sYsitM GUS lHEX CUED IlEEX EURO illIE LUAIDd 11pieSPACE UN1tS LOADSLO5 10 1 5155~S. V . 1 5V ISV L MSSOMtS YS V 1 V IS TS SLois S 05v 4 s 1viS Ad E cs
2 11960 1 80 :00
BALANCE 127 107400
LIE IIZ8IZIE28I8XEY 7C fljj 1,9 86j11 201
ALCE9 28 8 1.?_ _ 28 8 1. _ 28 8 18, __ 109120
0II 0IIUIIIIIIII0.... 1 28 83. __28 3.2 28 83. _1_ 175121000
DAL)FC- 
- - 5, .130120
0ALJz60t131920
O~lAIIC(136070
BALMCE 138650
1 DBllI-A150 18 
BALANCE 140500
BALANCE
]II II IIr -p1-,p Ilillaatouto r uphdllCiln
127107400
BALANE
I L IN XPAIASC1i PACE L T 
r3UflfA.0
2.L f 28 8 .28 8 3.2I8 3
1WASI
.1
0
CONFIGURING WORKSHEET
PAGE: . 4 OF 4
EXPANSION SPACE
FIELD
11111 SYTM/PIO STQM BUS Sul19-28 ODE 9 3 Sul 29-38 Box 2 .3 Sul 39-44 Box 2 _ UNI.TOTAL S[RV:,CQ041 D NUMSYSTEMAOPTION VAILAI IL QUD! UT TAL v
IWOoi 0 AVIL VAL VA 111 UA 1SV 0 1V 5V 111 QAD 4 V 1!v 1 v otI I QUAD 5vIV iw15v IV nRci FAct IWAINT
3 114050
Infer ip.uc, poor, and s " e quaiodr or suppled by uptisons
- PANEL SYSINM OUS IH($ CUAD II(X OUAD Mt.X 0AD AdO1P,@
SPACE U11115 LOADS SOSt015 0 5 5Y a15V ,15V St 015St ols e05V e15" 1, 015 5S1.0 SS e45V 415V .15V Adae pce
5 1960 30 - ---- 1ia o
BALANC 
.149500
2 BA1-P 50 50 30 _ 450330
BALEE .50 50 30 15180
-IIQ__I7_2ZQ _ _?-0 ___860 1290
DALA'L. 0 70 20 50 70 20 50 70 20 30 170700
12 DBi-A (2)(336 18501 370
Vw'i 33 70 20 50 70 20 50 70 20 30 174400
207020 33 70120 33 5616 6,4
CALA5CE 5- 17 - 17 14 4 3. 223400
( e- -- - I16 1948
0 AM.-E242088
BAL.MCE
BALA4CE
SAL AJCEILI~~~PIIIII - -- EEII E
T7I0 IAIS1 0SPC! LE
TOAS I I
DATE;
LA.)
C
IRI -
308
CONTROL MICROPROCESSOR (STAR ARCHITECTURE) Parallel Transmission
MICROCOMPUTER SYSTEM CONFIGURATION WORKSHEET
Power
System Selected Bus Supply PriceOption Function Requirement Option Loading Loading $
Type # AC DC +51-1+-12
Processor - KD1l1-HB 1 2D 3.7 2 2.7 .51 1400
Processor Option
MSV11 -OB
RAM Memory-M5
PROM Memory -
Run Time Software
Serial 20Ma ASYNC
Ports EJA Non-Modem Async
EIA Modem Async
EIA Modem Sync
Parallel Program Bits In
Ports Control Bits Out
DMA Bits In 1 6 DRV1l-B 3 3Q 9.9 3 5.7 - 1860
Bits Out 16
Mass Cartridge Tape Drives
Storage Floppy Disk Drives
Cartridge Disk Drives
Mass Storage Bootstrap
Analog Inputs
Outputs AAV11-A 4 4Q 13.2 4 8 1.8 6000
Line Printer -
Programmable Clock
IEEE 488 Controller
Custom Interfaces
Terminal--
Backplanes/Boxes 9270 2 10.2 400 -
Powver Supplies 4780-H a 126 5.0 1400
CablesII
Switch 1PC8S 8 108
TOAL 7 3 9 1.4 232116
7Q 37 16.41 2. 31 11168 1TOTALS 9 .
309
BA CKPLANE SELECTOR
SKD
4 3 j
87
13 114-
1615-
18* -117
+--DOUBLE -4+- DOUSLE USER
QUAD 1D EFINED
H-H9270 IK -11 -HA 2MSVI-OB4AA1 I- 3I
4AAVll1-A 3 -
sAAV11-9 6
B -M7AAV1-A
BCVIB-06
9 1ioAAV11-A
12 DRVl 1 -8
13 DRVI11-8 114
16 A 15DRVllI -B
BCV1A-0'2
171 118
2019
21 122
24" 123
DOUBLE- DOUBLE
-'tQUAD 4
ATerrnination
required if
only two
backplane
system.
H9281-BAI KD
2 -
3
4
I.*--- DOUBLE-+
H9281-BB 1 KD
.2
.3
4
5
6
7
8
DOUBLE --
H92a1-BC 1 KD
2
3
4
5
6
.7
9
10
11
12
-- DOUBLE
*1200 Bus
Terminator
required.
Backplane AC loads
H9270 
- 5.1
H9273 . 2.6
DDV11-B 6.4
H9281-BA
H9281-BB
H9281-DC
12 -
2.4
3.6
DDVI-B
(use H0341
Card Cage)
H9273I 1 KD
2
3
4
5
6 I
7I
8
9*.
DOUBLE0--+-+CANNOT BIa dsO
L QUAD
H9270
H9270
Capacity
Power Supplies and Boxes +SV +12W
Power Supply
Master H780-H 13 A. 2.5 A.
Slave H780-K 13 A. 2.5 A.
Boxes -
H9281-BA Backplane wfps BA11-VA 5.1 A. 1.5 A.
H9270 Backplane w/ps DA11-ME 13.0 2.5 A.
H9273 Backpfane w/ps BA11-NE 15.5 A. 8.0
Enclosure for DDVJ1-B H909-C - -
310
DIAGNOSIS MICROPROCESSOR (STAR ARCHITECTURE) Parallel Transmission
MICROCOMPUTER SYSTEM CONFIGURATION WORKSHEET
Power
Option FunctionSystem Selected Size Bus Supply PriceRequirement Option Loading Loading S
Type AC DC +5 _+121
Processor. KDF1l-HO 1 2D 4 2 3.7 .57 3000
Processor Option
MSV1l-DD
RAM Memory
PROM Memory
Run Time Software
Serial 20Ma ASYNC
Ports EIA Non-Modem Async
EIA Modem Async
EIA Modem Sync
Parallel Program Bits In
Ports Control Bits Out
DMA BitsIn DRV1l-8 3 3Q 9.9 3 5.7 - 1860
Bits Out
Mass Cartridge Tape Drives
Storage Floppy Disk Drives
Cartridge Disk Drives
Mass Storage Bdotstrap
Analog Inputs ____-_ADV11-A 5 5Q 9.5 5-7.5 2 8000
Outputs
Line Printer
Programmable Clock
IEEE 488 Controller
Custom Interfaces I -
Terminal
Backplanes/Boxes H9270 3 15. 3 600
Power Supplies H780-H 2 26 5.0 14d0
Cables
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - ~ '--- ~I_
,16 -9 1 .57114860
, ,q - - - -8Q0TOTALS 38.7110
311
BACKPLANE SELECTOR
I KD 12 -
4 3
5 -6
8 7
9 110
1211I
13 114-
16 15
18 - 17
DOUBLE DOUBLE USER
1 QUAD iDEFiNED
1~~~ 7r --
H9270 I1KD F11I-HDE- 2 MSV 11-0D
4 AOVIl-A 
-
5 ADVil-A 6
7 ADV11-A
BCVIB-06
"9270 9 - 10 AOVII-A
12 11 ADVI1-A
13 DRV11-B 114
16 ~ A'1s DRVIl-B
BCV1A-02
H9270 17 T18 DRVJ 1 -B
H92S1-<A< KD H9281-BC
2
3
-D
..-- DOUBLE -
H9281-BO
20 119
21 22
124* 123
DOUBLE -- [+-- DOUBLE
QUAD
A Termination
required if
only two
backplane
syster.
*1200 Bus
Terminator
required.
Backplane AC loads
H9270 5.1
H9273 . 2.6
DOVI-B 6.4
H9281-BA 1.3
H9281-BB 2.4
H9281-BC 3.6
DDV11-B
(use H0341
Card Cage)
H9273 I KD
2
5
6
7 .
Power Supplies and Boxes +Capaciy
_______________ _____+SV +12W
Power Supply
Master H780-H 13 A. 2.5 A-
Slave H780-K 13 A. 2.5 A.
Boxes
H9281-BA Backplane wips BA11-VA 5.1 A. 1.5A.
H9270 Backplane wfps BA11-ME 13.0 2.5 A..
H9273 Backplane wfps BAI-NE 155 n8.0
Enclosure ror DDVII-B H909-C - -
CVN SUZUED
QUAD I
i
-
DATE:
C,3 STAR ARCHITECTURE (SERIAL TRANSIMISSION) (The central minicomputer Is given at parallel transmission)
CONFIGURING WORKSHEET
PAGE; ...L. CF 1
EXPANSION SPACE
L I SYSTEMIOPTION PANEL SYSIEM BUS 1 2 Bxu34 Box
il'Xv NUMBER I AVAIL AVALAVkAIL III QUOLAD .Sv 5. 111 iSV -15 X CUADO 1YIsv liv PRICE 0C ~N
[rifer spce, power, and 100s required or supplead by oplegnS
rAAELSSiEl BUS 111X QUAD liEU QUAD itXO UAD
SPACE 01015 LOADS SLOiS SOis S 0 SY IS V S LO sM Sslotsis v S V IS 'LOiS stois s isv .isv Addall peoCes
1 6 DZ11-C 6 5 23, 1 4, 2550f 1530d
BALANE 5 2 1,6 2 0. -- 15 1 115600
BC-C50 0c _ - 51 25
A.ANCE ?128452
DALANCE
EALAICE
PALAlC
EALPCE
10t, XP~50 SP- mmr
-'
rs>
I I I --
101AI5
3 1 3
S T A R  A R C [ T E C T U R E S E R [ A L  
T R A N S M I S S I O N ,  C O N T R O L  
M I C R O P R O C E S S O R
M I C R O C O M P U T E R  
S Y S T E M  
C O N F I G U R A T I O N  
V O R K S H E E T
S y s t e m  S e l e c t e d  B u s  S u p p l y  P r i c e
O p t i o n  
F u n c t i o n  
R e q u e m e n t  
O p t i o  
S i z e  
L o a d i n g  
L o a d i n g  
S
T y p e  #  
A C  D C  + 5  + 1 2
P r o c e s s o r .  
K D l - H 8  I  D  1  2 o
3 . 7  2  2 . 7  . 5 7  
1 4 0 0
P r o c e s s o r M o p t i o n
R A M  
M e m o r y - -  
- - - -  
- - - - - -
P R O M  
M e m o r y
R u n  
T i m e  
S o f t w a r e
S e r i a l  2 0 M a  A S Y N C  
O L V - 1 1 F  1  1 0  2 . 2  
1  1 . 0  - 8  3 1 0
P o r t s  
E I A N o n - M o d e m  
A s y n c
E I A  
M o d e m  
A s y n c  
-
E I A  
M o d e m  
S y n c -
P a r a l l e l  
P r o g r a m  
B i t s  
I n
P o r t s  
C o n t r o l  
B i t s  
O u t
D M A  
B i a s i n  
1 6  
O R V 1 1 - 8  
2  
2 Q  
6 . 6  
2  
3 . 8  
-
1 2 4 0
B i t s  
o u t  
1 6
M a s s  
C a r t r i d g e  
T a p e  
D r i v e s
S t o r a g e  
F l o p p y  
D i s k  
D r i v e s
C a r t r i d g e  
D i s k  
D r i v e s
M a s s  S t o r a g e  
B o o t s t r a p
A n a l o g  
I n p u t s
O u t p u t s  
A A V I l - A  
4  4 R  
1 3 . 2  4  
8  1 . 8  6 0 0 0
L i n e  P r i n t e r
P r o g r a m m a b l e  
C l o c k
I E E E  
4 8 8  
C o n  t r o l l e r
C u s t o m  [ I n t e r f a c e s -
T e r m i n a l
B a c k p l a n e s / B o x e s  
1 9 2 7 0  
2  1 0 . 2  
4 0 0
P o w e r  S u p p l i e s  
H 7 8 0 - - 1 1  2  
2 6  
5 . 0  1 4 ~ 0 0
C a b l e s
s w i t c h  M P  C S 5  
8  
. -  1 0 8
i _ _  _ _ r I
Q ( 4
T O T A L S
3 5 . 1  9  
1 . 2 . 5  1 0 5
314
BACKPLANE SELECTOR
OOVi1- 1 KD 2
(use H0341
Carcd Cage)1 4 3
9 110
1211
1314 -
1615
18* 17
+O--DOUBLE---+j+-- DOUBLE - USER
QUAD D DEF1NED
H9273
2 -
4
5
7 .
'8
I KO
2
3
4
5
6
7
+
4-DOUBLE -
H9281-BC I KO
2
a
s
3
6
7
8
10
1
12
-. -+-OOUBLE -- H
*1200 Bus
Terminator
requircd.
Backplane AC loads
H9270 -5.1
H9273 .2.6
-'DDVI1-B 6A4
H9281-BA 1.3-
H9281-B 2.
H281-BC 3.6'
H9270
H9270
H9270
H9281-88
A Termination
required it
only two
backpfane
systrn.
Capaciry
Power Supplies and Boxes +5 V +12 V
Power Supply
Master H780-H 13A. 2.5 A.
Slave H780-K 13 A. 2.5A.
BoxesI
H9281-BA ackplane wfps BA11-VA 5.1 A. 1.5 A-.
H9270 Backplane w/ps BA11-ME 13.0 25 A.
H9273 Backplane w/ps BAll-NE 15.5 A. 8.0
Enclosure for DDV1I-B 1909-C - -
-
DOUBLE -- - CANNOT BE 6s=o
QUAD
I
315
STAR ARCHITECTURE. SERIAL TRANSMISSION (Diagnosis Microprocessor)
MICROCOMPUTER SYSTEM CONFIGURATION VORKSHEET
Power
System Selected S. Bus Supply PriceOption Function Requirement Option S Loading Loading s
Type r AC DC +5 +12
Processor K OFTI1I-HO 1 20 4 2 37 .57 3000
Processor Option
MSV1l-00
RAM Memory 
- ~
PROM Memory
Run Time Software
Serial 20MaASYNC DLV-11F 1 10 2.2 1 1.0 .18 310
Ports -BA Non-Modem Async
ETA Modem Asyne
EIA Modem Sync -
Parallel Program Bits In
Ports Control Bits Out
DMA Bits In 16 0RV11-8 2 2Q 6.6 2 .8 - 1240
Bits Out 16
Mass Cartridge Tape Drives
Storage Floppy Disk Drives
Cartridge Disk Drives
Mass Storage Bootstrap
Analog Inputs ADV11-A 5 50 9.5 5 .5 2. 8000
Outputs
Line Printer
Programmable Clock
IEEE 488 Controller
Custom Interfaces
Terminal
Backplanes/Boxes H9270 3 5.3 _600
Power Supplies H780-H 2 12 50 1400
Cables
TOTALSDA,-a1 9U rLU IWCJU37/. I 0 l. -/ZI 4))TOTALS
316
BACKPLANE SELECTOR
SKD
4 3
5 16
.8 7
9 10
12 11
13 14
16 15
18* 17
4- DOUBLE - --- DOUBLE -4{L USER
OUAD - - DEFINED
H9273
- DOUBLE --+
H9281-BB 1 KD
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
4- DOUBLE -- >
1 KD
2
3
41
6
7.
8
9.
+--- DUBLE
CANNOTDOEUS-QUAD
H92B1-BC r KO
2
3
4
S
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
+---oouLE ----
*1200 Bus
Terminator
required
Backplane AC loads
H9270 5.1
H9273 2.6
DDV11-8 6.4
H9281-BA 1.3 -
H9281-BB 24
H9281-BC3.6
DDV11-B
(use H0341
CardCage)
I
H9270
9270
H9270
STermInaUon
required it
ony two
backplane
sytem.
Power Supplies and Boxes + 1Capacity
Power Supply+
Master H780-H 13A. 2.5 A.
Slave H780-K 13 A. 25A
Boxes
H9281-BA Backplane wips BA11-VA 5.1 A 1.5k.A
H9270 Backplane wfps BAl1-ME 13.0 2.5 A.
H9273 Backplanewips BA11-NE 15.5 A. 8.0
Enclosure for DDVI1-B H90-C - -
i
C,4 DUAL STAR ARCHITECTURE (Parallel Transmission)
CONFIGURING WORKSHEET
SM-60LLA-CA
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DIAGNOSIS MICROPROCESSOR (Dual Star Arctitecture) (Parallel Transmission)
MICROCOMPUTER SYSTEM CONFIGURATION WORKSHEET
Power
OtionFunctionSystem Selected Bus Supply Pricepon Requirement Option Loading Loading S
Type # AC DC +5 1+12
Processor KDFIl-HD 1 20 4 2 3.7 .57 3000
Processor Option
RAM Memory MSV11-DD _
PROM Memory
Run Time Software
Serial 20 Ma ASYNC
Ports EIA Non-Modem Async
EIA Modem Async
EA Modem Sync
Parallel Program Bits In
Ports Control Bits Out
DMA Bits InDM BitslnuDRV1l-B 4 4Q 13.2 4 7.6 - 2480
Bits Out
Mass Cartridge Tape Drives
Storage Floppy Disk Drives 
-
Cartridge Disk Drives
Mass Storage Bootstrap
Analog 
_5_put .ADVI-A 5501IQ.. 55 7.512 8000
Outputs
Line Printer
Programmable Clock
IEEE 488 Controller
Custom Interfaces
Terminal
Backplanes/lBoxes H9270 32 Il--I
PowerSupplies-00
Cables
g
142 111 18.812.5/ 15480TOTALS
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BA CKPLANE SELECTOR
SKD
4 3
5 16 I
9 10
13 14
16 15
-4- OOUBLE---+14- DOUBLE -- USER
QUAD - Q DEFINED
H9273 1KD
7
9.
OOUBLE -- + CAINOTOE USED
QUAD I
H9270 [I KDOI2- 2MSVI-DD0
H9270
H9270
H9281-A 10KO
2 -
3
. D OUBLE-+[
H9281-BB
4 ADV11I-A 3 .
5ADVil1 -A 6-
8 7 AAy I I -A
BCVI!3-06
9- 10 Agy11.-
12 -II1 ADVil-A
13 -. 14 DRV11-8
1 ~- 61.5 DRV1 1 -8
Bcv1A-oz
17- 
-i180RVIl -8
20 19 DRV11 -I
[24* 123 -
A Termination
required It
onty two
backplane
syster.
S1KO
2
a
4
5
6
7
D
+q-- OU BLE ----
H9281-JC 1KD
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
10
11
12
-H-- DOUBLE~ --
*1200 Bus
Terminator
required.
DDV11-B
(use 110341
Card Cage)
Capacity
Power Supplies and Boxes +5V +p12 V
Power Supply
Master H1780-H 13 A. 2.5 A-
Slave 1-780-K 13A. 2.5 A.
Boxes
H9281-BA Backplane wfps GA11-VA 5-1 A 1.5 A.
H9270 Backplane wips BAI1-ME 13.0 2.5 A.-
H9273 Backplane wips DA11-NE 15.5 A. 8.0
Enclosure for ODVI-B 11909-C - -
Backplane AC loads
H9270 - 5.1
H9273[ 
- .2.6
DOV11-B 6.4
H9281-BA 1.3
H9281-B8 24
H9281-DC 3.6
-'0
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C.5 DIAGNOSIS MICROPROCESSOR (Du I Star Architecture) (Serial Alternative)
MICROCOMPUTER SYSTEM CONFIGURATION VIORKSHEET.
Powver
Option System Selected . Bus Supply PriceRequirement Option S Loading Loading S
Type # __ AC OC +5 +12
Processor KDF1T-HD I 2D 4. 2 3.7 .57 3000
Processor Option
RAM Memory MSV11-00
PROM Memory 2[.3- -
Run Time Software
Serial 20 Ma ASYNC DLV-11F 2 20 4.4 2 2 .36
Ports EIA Non-Modem Async
EIA Modem Async
E1A Modem Sync
Parallel Program BitsIn 16 DRVl1-B 2 2Q 6.6 2 3.8 - 1240Ports Control Bits out
DMA Bits In
Bits Out
Mass Cartridge Tape Drives
Storage Floppy Disk Drives
rCartridge Disk DrIves
Mass Storage Bdotstrap
Analog Inputs ADV11-A 5 5Q 9.5 5 7.5 2 8000
Outputs_[ - _
Line Printer
Programmable Clock
IEEE 488 Controller
Custom Interfaces
Terminal
Backplanes/Boxes H9270 3 - 15.3 600
Power Supplies H780-H 2 25 5.0 1400
Cables
_ _-1
7Q 39.8 6111 17 2.9:1486TOTALS
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BACKPLANE SELECTOR
ODVi1-8 IKO 2
(us 10341
Card Cage) 4 3
5 6
7
9 £10
12 11
13114 I
18* 17
-- DOUBLE-- DOUBLE USER
QUAD - DEFLNED
H9273 1KD
2
3
6
S
9"
+-UDOUBLE --- 4+ cAnor a UESO
QUAD
H9270 1 KD FilI-HD 2 MSVl 1-OD
4ADVIIR-A 3 -
SADV1AI -A 6 -
a 7 ADVI11-A
H9270 91 10 ADVIl-A
1211AD)Vl -A
13 114D () RV 11 --B
16 A 150J0RV11 -B
H9281-BA 1
H9251-asB
49270
BCVIA-02
17 1 18
2D 19
21 22
24* 123
DOUBL..E 4-DOUBLE
QUAD
ATennination 120cl Bus
requIred if Terminator
only two required.
backplane
ytern.
H9281-BC
IKD
2
3
4
5
6
7
+-DOUBOLE 
->
Backplane AC loads
H9270 - 5.1
H9273 - .. 2.6
DDVI-B 6.4
H9281-BA
H9281-BB
H9281-BC
1.3
2.4
3.6
-r
Capacity
Power Supplies and Boxes +5V +12V
Power Supply
Master H780-H 13 A. 2.5 A.
Siave H780-K 13 A. 2.5 A.
Boxes
H9281-BA Backplane wips BA11-VA 5.1 A. 15 A -
W3270 Backplane wips DAll-ME 13.0 2.5 A..
H9273 Backplanc wfps BA1I-NE 15$ A. 8.0
Enclosure forDOVu1-B H909-C - -
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CONTROL MICROPROCESSOR (Dual Star Architecture) (Serial Alternative)
MICROCOMPUTER SYSTEM CONFIGURATION WORKSH EET
Power
System Selected Bus Supply PriceOption Function Requirement Option Loading Loading S
Type # AC DC +5 +12
Processor ._ K011-HB U.1 2fQ LZ.2. 2.7 .57 1400
Processor Option
RAM Memory M 1--
PROM Memory
Run Time Software
Serial 20 Ma ASYNC z_ ~ . s-20
Ports EIA Non-Modem Async
EIA Modem A -7nc
EIA Modem Sync
Parallel Program Bits In
Ports Control Bits Out
-IDRV11-8 2 ZR 6.6 2 3.8 - 1240
Bits out,
Mass Cartridge Tape Drives
Storage Floppy Disk Drives
Cartridge Disk Drives
Mass Storage Bdotstrap
Analog Inputs
Outputs AAVIl-A 4 4Q 13. 4 8 1.8 6000
Line Printer..
Programmable Clock
IEEJE 488 Controller
Custom Interfaces-
Terminal
Backplanes/Boxes Y.92O
Power Supplies H70-l 26 5.0 1400
Cables
Switch MPC8S 8 108
8 1 1 10 16.1 2.7 11168TOTALS
325
BACKPLANE SELECTOR
1 KD 2
5 I
8 - 7
9 10
1211
13 14-
16 15
18* 17 E
.DOULE --- {---DOUBLE--4 USER -
CUAD - DEFlNED-
H9270I 1KD11-B 2 MSVT1-DB
4AAV1l-A 3 -
SAAVIl-A -
_ -- 7 AAVIl-A
IBCVIEI-06
9- 1 10 AAVI1l1-A
12 DRV1 -B 114
13 DRV 1-83 14
16ULY -l [A- DY-lF
H9281-B8
aCVIA-O2f
17 118
20 19
21 122
24" 23
OUBLE -- DOUBLEQUAD
A Termination
required it
only two
backplane
system.
H9273 1 KD
2
3
6
7I
a
W Z - crOTCEOs O
CUAD
.H9281-BC 1 KO
2
3
4
5
6
7_
8
9
10
12
DOUBLE ---
1 KO
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
-- DOUBLE --
*1200 Bus
Terminator
required.
DDVII-B
(use 10341
Card Cage)
H9270
H9270
Capacity
Power Supplies and Boxes +5V +12V
Power Supply
Master H780-H 13 A. 2.5 A-
Slave K780-K 13 A. 2.5 A
Bo xes
H9281-BA Backplane wIps BA11-VA 5.1 A 1.5 A..
H9270 Backplancwfps BA11-ME 13.0 25 A.
H9273 Backplane wips BA11-NE 155A. 8.0
Enclosure for DOVII-8 tH909-C - -
Backplane AC loads
H9270 5.1
H9273 . 2.6
DDV11-B 6.4
H9281-BA 1.3 -
H9281-138 2.4
H9281-BC 3.6
C.6 GLOBAL BUS ARCHITECTURE (Serial Transmission)
CONFIGURING WORKSHEET
SM-60LLA-CA PAGE: .... OF' I
OATE: EXPANSION SPACE
SYSTEM/OPTION SPACEL USU 1-2 POE 1 suT 34 n 1 s 5-6. .x _ UNIt TOtAL
NUMBER AVAIL AVAIL AVAIL Pitt CUAD SV t ISV .yV X GA0 IIV.5vIi COVA1 ISV i PECI l MA;Nt
L2' 1 7 2 25 7 2 2'S- -15 03
Enm. spteq, pane, And odis quad a suppled byo ptons
PA't SYSTEM BUS Ilt CUED DIT QUAD 1itt JAB
SPAC( UNIITS LOAP5 SLOTS LOTS 0Vy .1 ISV SLTS STOS 5V ' AV SOIS 'LOTS *5V iv sV Add all pncei
1 11-0016 -2- 1 - - -- - - 1 3,55375f 537MA1IO 105675_____
BLnCI 10 7 2 25 7 1 21, 05675
BALANCE
omKwh2
PALANCE
PALAICE
BALACE
AiAMCE
PAlDCE
10104 EEPAHsEI rg II
TOTA5
106895 *
Lk.)
F\)
a - -
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CONTROL MICROPROCESSOR (Global Data Bus) ,(Serial Transmission)
MICROCOMPUTER SYSTEM CONFiGURATION WORKSHEET
Power
nFunctionSystem Selected S. Bus Supply PriceOption FRequirement Option Size Loading Loading S
Type r AC DC +5 +12
Processor KDll-H 1 20 3.7 2 2.7 .57 1400
Processor Option
RAM Memory MSV-I-O-
PROM Memory -- -- --
Run Time Sotwvrare
Serial 20 Ma ASYNC
Ports EIA Non-Modem Async
EIA Modem Async Comoutrol 11-0011 1 20 1.5 .1.5 - 2235
EIA Modem Sync
Parallel Program Bits in
Ports Control Bits out
DMA Bits in
Bits Out
Mass Cartridge Tape Drives
Storage Floppy Disk Drives
Cartridge Disk Drives
Mass Storage Bdotstrap
Analog Inputs
Outputs AAV11-A 4 4R 13.2 1.3 6000
Line Printer
Programmable Clock
IEEE 488 Controller
Custom Interfaces
Terminal
Backplanes/Boxes H9270 2 110.2 400
Power Supplies H780-H 1 13 2.5 700
Cables
4A - C~ .jTOTALS - . - ..- J -I - ______
44 1 - -1 1 1 -- ITOTALS 28.6-(a 12.f 1 .3 7
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BACKPLANE SELECTOR
4--DOUBLE-4-- DOUBLE USER
OUAD I DEFINED
H9273 1KO
2
3
5
6
7
8
9*
-DOUBLE -+cAprsoa se o
GUAD
I KD l11 -H A 2 M5Vll -08
4AAVI1I-A 3 -
SAA I -A 6 -
a 7 AAVll1 -A
BCV18-06
9- 10 AAV1 1-A
12 11 -00111
13 114
16 - d15
BCV1A402
27 189
21 122
24*123
89281-SB 1 KO
2
3
4
5
6
7
a
I- DOUBLE -- +
H9281-BC 1 KD
2
3
a
4
5
$
7
8
9
10
11t
12
.OU.4-O BLE--(
*1200 Bus
Terminator
required.
Backptane AC loads
H9270 -5..1
H9273 .2.6
DOV11-B 6.4
H9281-BA 1.3
H9281-BB 2.4
H9281-BC 3.6
DOV11-D
(use H0341
Card Cage)
iKD 12 i
4 3 I
5 6
8
9 I10
12 11
13 114-
1B ~ 15
18' ~ 17
H9270
H9270
H9270
A Termination
required It
only two
backplane
system.
Capacity
PowerSupplies and Boxes +- -1-12 V
Power Supply
Master H780-H 13 A. 2.5 A.
Slave H780-K 13 A- 2.5 A.
Boxes
H9201-BA Backplane wfps BAIT-VA 51 A. 1.5A
H9270 Backpane wips BA1l-ME 13.0 2.5..
H0273 Backpfanc w/ps BA11-NE 155A. 8.0
Enclosure for DODVI-B H09-C - -
DOUBLE--+{-DOCUBLE
QUAD
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DIAGNOSIS MICROPROCESSOR (Global Bus Arphitecture) (Serial Transmission)
MICROCOMPUTER SYSTEM CONFIGURATION VIORKSHEET .
Power
option Function System Sefected Bus Supply PriceRequirement Option Loading Loading $
Type t AC DC +5 +12
Processor KOFIl-HO I 20 4 2 .7 .57 3000
Processor Option
MSV1i-DO
RAM Memory
PROM Memory
Run Time Sottware
Serial 20 Ma ASYNC
Ports EtA Non-Modem Async
EIA Modem As-:nc C.nmurnl W_ L, e - .,.,?
EIA Modem Sync
Parallel Program BitsCIn
Ports Control Bi s Out
DMA Bits In
Bits Out
Mass Cartridge Tape Drives
Storage Floppy Disk Drives
rCartridge Disk Drives
Mass Storage Bootstrap
Analog Inputs ADV11-A 5 5 Q 9.5 5 715 25 00
outputs
Line Printer
Programmable Clock
TEEE 488 Controller
Custcom Interfaces
Terminal
Backplanes/Boxes H9270 2 110.2 400
Power Supplies H780-H 1 13 12.5 700
Cables
A-
TOTALS 25.2% 12.721 14335
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BACKPLANE SELECTOR
I KD 2 -
4 3
5 I6
7
9 10 1
12 11
13 1 -I
16 15
18* 17
-- DOUBLE -- 4+-- DOUSLE -4 USER
H9273I
-UAD DEFNED
6 Bt
7-
DOUBLE -++ cANNOT8 as
QUAD
H9270 I1KD Fl1I-HO 2 MSV 11-00
4ADVllI-A 3
SADV11I-A s6
a 7 ADVllI-A
BCV1BO6
H9270 9 110 ADVI l -A
1211AD VII -A
131l1l-0011 114
16 i15
BCVIA-02
H9270 -17 18
20 119
21 122
24"123
00DUBL.E -- I{4--- DOUSLE 
M
OUAD :
A Termination
required it
only two
backplane
systerr
H9281-BB 1 KD
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
+-- DOUBLE -- P
H9281-BC 1K 0
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
-D-OOUBLE-
*120fl Bus
Terminator
required.
Backplane AC loads
H9270 5.1
H9273 . 2.6
-' _DDVI1-B 64
H9281-BA 1.3
H9281-0B 2.4
H9281-BC a6
DOVI1-B
(use H0341
Card Case)
1 KD
2
Capacity
Power Supplies and Boxes +5V +12V
Power Supply
Master H780-K 13 A. 2.5 A.
Slave H780-K 13 A. 2.5A.
Boxes
H9281-BA Backplane wfps BA11-VA 5.1 A 1.5 A.
19270 Backplane w/ps BA11-ME 13.0 2.5 A.
H9273 Backplane w/ps BAl1-NE 15.5 A. 8.0
Enclosure for DDVI1-B H909-C - -
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C.7 CONTROL MICROPROCESSOR (Oual Global Bus) (Serial Transmission)
MICROCOMPUTER SYSTEM CONFIGURATION VIORKSHEET
Pover
System Selected S. Bus Supply Price
Option Function Requirement Option Size Loading Loading S
Type 16 AC DC +5 +12
Processor KD11-HB 1 20 3 .37 2..7 1.57 1400
Processor Option
RAM Memory ~
PROM Memory
Run Time Software
Serial 20Ma ASYN C
Ports EIA Non-Modem Async
EIA ModemAsync Comoutrol 11-0011 21 4D1 .043 - . 7Z
ElA Modem Sync
Parallel Program Bits in
Ports Control Bits Out
DMA Bits In
Bits Out
Mass Cartridge Tape Drives
Storage Floppy Disk Drives
Cartridge Disk Drives
Mass StorageBootstrap
Analog Inputs
Outputs AAV11-A 44 3Q 2 4 8 1.8 6000
Line Printer
Programmable Clock
IEEE 488 Controller
Custom Interfaces
Terminal
Backplanes/Boxes 19270 2 10.2 400
Power Supplies H780-H 1 13 2.5 700
Cables
Switch_ _ _rRS__ I.u t1T8
%AW 30.1 I P3.7 2 .37 13078JitTOTALS
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BACKPLANE SELECTOR
DDV11-B 1 KD 2
(use H0341
Card Cage) 4 3
5 6
87
9 110
12 11I
13 14 -
16 15
18 m17
D4- OoUBLE--+(-- DOUBLE L uSERQUAD - DEFINED
H9273 1KD
2
3
6
7f
9.
DOUBLE 4 csNor ta Csso
QUAD -
IKD 11-HA 2 MSVIl-SDa
4 AAVIl-A 3
5 AAVll-A 6
8 7 AAVII-A
B0v/8-OS
9 io AAVII-A
12 iI-001i 1
1 11-0011 14
16 15'i
BCVIA-02
H9270 17 118
20 19
21 122
24' 23
r . .. . -r .I. . . - '
A Termination
required it
only two
backplane
system.
1
H9281-BA
H9281-8I 1 KDO
2
3
6
7
a
-+-DOUBLE 
-+
H9281-SC 1KO
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
- 4- DOUBLE --.
*1200 Bus
Terminator
required.
H9270
H9270
Capacity
Power Supplies and Boxes +5V +12V
Power Supply
Master H780+ 13A. 2.5 A-
Slave H780-K 13A- 2.5 A.
Boxes
H9281-BA Backplane wips BAl1-VA 51 A. x1.5 A.
H9270 Backplane wips BA11-ME 13.0 2.5 A..
19273 Backplane vps BATI-NE 15.5 A. 8.0
Enclosure for DDV11-B H909-C - -
Backplane ACloads
H9270 - 51
H9273.2.6
DDV11-B 6.4
H9281-BA 1.3
H9281-BB 2.4
H9281-BC j 3.6-
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DIAGNOSIS MICROPROCESSOR (Dual Global Bus Architecture) (Serial Transmission)
MICROCOMPUTER SYSTEM CONFIGURATION VJORKSHEET
Power
System Selected S. Bus Supply PriceOption Functon Requirement Option Size Loading Loading S
Type f AC OC +5 +12
Processor.KDFll-HD 1 2D 4 2 3.7 .57 3000
Processor Option
RAM Memory MSV11 -DD
PROM Memory
Run Time Software
Serial 20 Ma ASYNC
Ports EIA Non-Modem Asyncl
EIA Modem Async ]10Q11 2 AD -2.20 .n-. :70
EIA Modem Sync
Parallel Program Bits in
Ports Control Bits Out
DMA Bits In
Bits Out
Mass Cartridge Tape Drives
Storage Floppy Disk Drives
Cartridge Disk Drives
Mass Storage Bootstrap
Analog inputs ADl 1 -A 5 50 .5 5 .5 2 8000
outputs
Line Printer
Programmable Clock
IEEE 488 Controller
Custom Interfaces
Terminal
Backplanes/Boxes H322.. ?.ion
Power Supplies 87-H 75.
Cables
TOTALS 14.212.57117270
334
BACKPLANE SELECTOR
1 KD 2
1(30
5 6
8 17
9 110
1211
13 114 -I
16 15
17
4- DOUBLE -- ++-- DOUBLE USER
QUAD f DEFINED
H9273 1
a
9'
DOUBOLE -+ CANNOTOE 6SED
QUAD
H9270 1 KO Fl -HD MSV 11-DD
4 ADVI11-A 3
5 ADV11I-A s
7 ADV11I-A
H97 1BCV18-OS
H920f 10 ADyll1 -A
12i11 ADV11-A
13 11-0011 14
16 A'is 11-0011
H9270
EICVIA-021
17- I8s
2019
21 122
24* 123
I---DOUBL.E--01+-- DOUBLE-
QUAD 1
A Termination
required it
only two
backplane
system.
H9281-BA 1KD
- 2 -
3
4 D
(4-DOUBLE -- {
89281-88 I KD
2
3
4
5
6
7
D
4- DOUBLE -- +(
H9281-BC I1 KD
2
3
4
S
6
7
a
9
10
11
12O
+--DOUBLE 
-
*1200 Bus
Terminator
required.
Backplane AC loads
H9270 - 51
H9273
DDV11-0
H9281-BA
H9281-BB
H92320
2.6
6.A
1.3
24
3.6
DOVl-B
(use 110341
Card Cage)
1KD
2
3
Capacity
Power Supplies and Boxes +5V +12 V
Power Supply
Master H780-H 13 A- 2.5 A-
Slave H780-K 13 A 2.5 A
Boxes
H9281-BA Dackplane wfps BA11-VA 5.1 A- 1.5 A-.
H9270 Backplane wtps BA1l-ME 13.0 2.5 K.
H9273 Backplane w/ps BAI-NE 15.5 A 8.0
Enclosure for DDV11-B H909-C - -
Ii
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APPENDIX D
FAULT TREE ANALYSIS
The following fault trees (FT) have been developed under the
assumptions made in Chapter 2, Section 2.6. Each alternative has a
separated fault tree and its own set of equations. The only exception
to that rule are fault trees for the single star serial alternative,
conditions one and two, and dual star serial condition two. The former
have exactly the same FT and equations that single star parallel
architecture; they only differ in the values to be input to the
probability equations. The latter has the same FT and equations than
dual star parallel architecture, and also they differ in the values to
be input to the probability equations.
The probability equations are given in implicit form which makes
them easier to implement in a computer code.
At the end of each set of FT and equations there is a table which
serves the purpose of identifying the symbols given in the fault tree
diagram with their incomings as events. These tables also have the
results of the numerical analysis of the fault trees. The way the
numbers given in the tables are obtained is explained in Subsection 2.7.
CJ
Central computer architecture, situation one.
Automatic control system
fails to control the
propulsion plant
Figure D.1
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Table D.1
CENTRAL COMPUTER ARCHITECTURE (SITUATION ONE)
GENERIC ENVIRON- LEARN-
EVENT FAILURE QUALITY MENTAL ING FAILURE
SYMBOL RATE (xG) FACTOR FACTOR FACTOR RATE Cx)
(F/106h) rQ WE WL (F/10 hi
A .06 3.0 1.0 1.0 .18
B 3557.2 1.0 6.3 1.0 2.241x104
D 173.392 1.0 6.3 1.0 1.092x103
E 5.71 1.0 1.0 1.0 5.71
F .06 3.0 1.0 1.0 .18
MEANING OF EVENT SYMBOLS:
EVENT SYMBOL COMPONENT
A Control cables
B Central processor
D Monitor and keyboard
E Control software
F Diagnosis cables
EVENT
PROBA-
BILITY
-4
4.457x10
0.41599
1.731x10 5
-4
1.3149x10
4.69343xl0-3
EVENT
Control line fails
Processor hardware fails
MMI system fails (Man-
machine interface)
Control software fails
Diagnosis line fails
CENTRAL COMPUTER ARCHITECTURE
PROBABILISTIC EQUATIONS (SITUATION ONE)
TE = A + B + 0 + E + F + H (from the fault tree)
TE = F3 + F4  p(TE) = p(F3 ) + p(F4 ) - p(F3 )p(F4)
F3 = F + F2  p(F3 ) = p(Fi) + p(F2 ) - p(F1 )p(F2 )
F4 = A + E p(F4 ) = p(A) + p(E) - p(A)p(E)
F1 = B p(FI) = p(B)
F2 = D + F + H p(F2 ) = p(D) + p(F) + p(H) + p(D)p(F)p(H)
- p(D)p(F) - p(D)p(H) - p(F)p(A)
0o
Figure D.2 Central computer architecture, situation two.
Control system fails to
diagnose and to advise
the appropriate corrective
measures
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Table D.2
CENTRAL COMPUTER ARCHITECTURE (SITUATION TWO)
GENERIC
EVENT FAILURE QUALITY
SYMBOL RATE (XG) FACTOR
(F/106h) tIo
1247.36
G 5.71
1.0
1.0
ENVIRON-
MENTAL
FACTOR
6.3
1.0
LEARN-
ING
FACTOR
WL
1.0
1.0
FAILURE
RATE Cx)
(F/10 6h)
7.858x103
5.71
EVENT
PROBA-
BILITY
0.17187
8.997x10-4
1.3149x10 4
MEANING OF EVENT SYMBOLS:
EVENT SYMBOL COMPONENT
Central processor
Secondary storage
Diagnosis software
Processor hardware fails
Storage system fails
Diagnosis software fails
CENTRAL COMPUTER ARCHITECTURE
PROBABILISTIC EQUATIONS (SITUATION TWO)
TE = F + I + H + D + G (from the fault tree)
P(TE) = F 1 + F2 + G
F1 = F + I
F2 = H + D
p(TE) = p(FI) + p(F 2 ) + p(G) + p(FI)p(F2)p(G)
- p(FI)p(F 2 ) - p(F 1 )p(G) - p(F 2 )P(G)
p(FI) = p(F) + p(I) - p(F)p(I)
p(F 2 ) = p(H) + p(D) - p(H)p(D)
I
H
G
EVENT
Standby system
fails
D E S
Dual central computer, situation one.
Automatic control system
fails to control the
propulsion plant
A B C
Figure D.3
w~~
Figure D.3 (continued)
N)
Figure D.3 (continued)
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Table D.3
DUAL CENTRAL COMPUTER ARCHITECTURE (SITUATION ONE)
GENERIC ENVIRON- LEARN- EVENT
EVENT FAILURE QUALITY MENTAL ING FAILURE PROBA-
SYMBOL RATE (0 G) FACTOR FACTOR FACTOR RATE (x) BILITY
(F /10 6h) 1 T rL(F/10 6h) .
A 3557.2 1.0 6.3 1.0 2.241x104  0.41599
B .06 3.0 1.0 1.0 .18 4.578x10 4
C 5.71 1.0 1.0 1.0 5.71 1.3149x104
D 173.392 1.0 6.3 1.0 1.092x10 3  1.731x10-5
E .06 3.0 1.0 1.0 .18 4.6934x10 -3
H 3557.2 1.0 6.3 1.01 2.241x10 4  0.41599
1 5.71 1.0 1.0 1.0 5.71 1.3149x10 4
J 173.392 1.0 6.3 1.0 1.092x10 3  1.731x10-5
K .06 3.0 1.o 1.0 .18 4.6934x10-3
G .155 1.0 6.3 1.0 9.765x10~ 2.4811x10-3
L 2696.05 1.0 6.3 1.0 1.698x104  0.3347
M 2696.05 1.0 6.3 1.0 1.698x104  0.3347
S 8. 997x10
4
R 8.997x10~4
MEANING OF EVENT SYMBOLS:
EVENT SYMBOL COMPONENT EVENT
Processor 1
Control cables
Control software
MMI 1
Diagnosis cables 1
Processor 2
MMI 2
Diagnosis cables 2
Central processor hardware 1 fails
Control line fails
Control software 1 fails
MMI I system fails
Diagnosis line 1 fails
Central processor hardware 2 fails
MMI 2 system fails
Diagnosis line 2 fails
A
B
C
D
E
H
K
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Table D.3 (continued)
DUAL CENTRAL COMPUTER ARCHITECTURE (SITUATION ONE)
MEANING OF EVENT SYMBOLS:
EVENT SYMBOL COMPONENT
Switch hardware
Processor 1 hardware
Processor 2 hardware
Secondary storage system 1
Secondary storage system 2
Switch hardware fails
Processor hardware 1 fails (SR)
Processor hardware 2 fails (SR)
Secondary storage system 1 fails
Secondary storage system 2 fails
DUAL CENTRAL COMPUTER ARCHITECTURE
PROBABILISTIC EQUATIONS (SITUATION ONE)
TE = (A + B + C + D + E + S) x [H + B + I + + R J + K + G + (L+C) x
(M + I)] (fran the fault tree)
TE = F0 p(TE) = p(FO)
F0 =F1 x F2
F1 = F8 + F9
F8 = F3 + F4
F = B + C
F3 = A + D
F4 = E + S
F2 = F10 + F
F10 = F5 + F6 + F7
F1l = B + I + G
F5 = H + R
F6 = J + K
F7 = (L+C) X (M + I)
p(F0 ) = p(F1 ) x p(F2 )
p(F1) = p(F8 ) + p(F9 ) - p(F8 )p(F9 )
p(F 8 ) = p(F 3 ) + p(F 4 ) - p(F3 )p(F 4 )
p(F9 ) = p(B) + p(C) - p(B)p(C)
p(F3 ) = p(A) + p(D) - p(A)p(D)
p(F4 ) = p(E) + p(S) - p(E)p(S)
p(F2 ) = p(F 10 ) + p(F1i) - p(F 10)p(F1 i)
p(F2) = p(F5 ) + p(F6 ) + p(F7 ) + p(F5 )p(F6 )p(F7 )
- p(F5 )p(F6 ) - p(F5 )p(F7 ) - p(F6 )p(F7 )
p(F11 ) = p(B) + p(I) + p(G)
p(F5) = p(H) + p(R) - p(H)p(R)
p(F6 ) = p(J) + p(K) - p(J)p(K)
p(F7 ) = [p(L) + p(C) - p(L) + p(C)] x
[p(M) + p(I) - p(M) x p(I)]
G
L
M
S
R
EVENT
Control system fails to diagnose and to
advise the appropriate corrective measures
LA.)
.N 0 S D
Figure D.4 Dual central computer architecture, situation two.
E
Figure D.4
c~J
(con t inied)
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Table D.4
DUAL CENTRAL COMPUTER ARCHITECTURE (SITUATION TWO)
GENERIC
EVENT FAILURE QUALITY
SYMBOL RATE (xG) FACTOR
(F/106h) Ir
ENVIRON-
MENTAL
FACTOR
rE
LEARN-
ING
FACTOR
1L
FAILURE
RATE (x)
(F/106h)
1.0 7.858x1O3
1.0 5.71
1.0 5.71
1.0 7.858x103
0.1719
1.3149x10~4
8.997x10~4
1.3149x10 4
0.1719
8.997x10~4
MEANING OF EVENT SYMBOLS:
EVENT SYMBOL
N
0
S
P
Q
R
COMPONENT
Processor
Diagnosis
Secondary
Diagnosis
Processor
Secondary
EVENT
1 hardware
software 1
storage system 1
software 2
2 hardware
storage system 2
Central processor hardware 1 fails
Diagnosis software 1 fails
Storage system 1 fails
Diagnosis software fails
Processor 2 hardware fails
Storage system 1 fails
DUAL CENTRAL COMPUTER ARCHITECTURE
PROBABILISTIC EQUATIONS (SITUATION TWO)
TE = (E + N + 0 + S + D) x (J + K + P + Q + R) (from the fault tree)
TE = F1 x F2
F1 = F3 + F4 + 0
F3 = E + N
p(TE) = p(FI) x p(F2 )
p(F1 ) = p(O) + p(F3 ) + p(F4 ) + p(F3 )p(F4 )p(O)
- p(F3)p(F4 ) - p(F3)p(FO) - p(F4 )p(FO)
p(F 3 ) = p(E) + p(N) - p(E)p(N)
0
EVENT
PROBA-
BILITY
1247.36
5.71
5.71P
Q
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
6.3
1.0
1.0
6.31247.36
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F4 = S + D-
F2 = P + F5 + F6
F5 = J + K
F6 = Q + R
p(F 4 ) = p(S) + p(D) - p(S)p(D)
p(F 2 ) = p(P) + p(F 5 ) + p(F 0 ) + p(F 5 )p(F 6 )p(P)
- p(F5 )(F6 ) - p(F 5 )p(P) -p(F6 )p(P)
p(F5) = p(J) + p(K) - p(J)p(K)
p(F6 ) = p(Q) + p(R) - p(Q)p(R)
Automatic control system fails to
control the propulsion plant
EE B
InD
Distributed Distributed listribute Distribute Distributed Distributed
system 2 system 3 system 4 system 7 system 5 system 6
fa11s fails fai ls failts fails fails
C D
2
Figure D.5 Star architecture, parallel transmission alternative,
situation one,
(A)
01
0
Switch3
3JN> 0>fa ilIs
Figure D.5 (continued)A4
w1
Figure D.5 (continued)
N)
Figure D.5 (continued)
5P Q9
5
R
ccS DD
(Al
Switch 7
fails
6
(continued)Figure D.5
x LU,
Standby pPD on service Standby
pPC', fails faivs pPD' fails
r .5+
Figure D.5 (continued)
w
U1
r 
U1
pPC7 onservice fails Standby pPC'7 fails
S DD RRR
Figure D.5 (continued)
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STAR ARCHITECTURE PARALLEL
Table D.5
TRANSMISSION ALTERNATIVE (SITUATION ONE)
GENERIC
EVENT FAILURE
SYMBOL RATE (XG)
(F/106h)
B 173.392
C 539.1
D 5.71
E .06
F 106.837
G 5.71
H 101.065
1 5.71
.06
K 101.065
L 5.71
N 106.837
0 5.479
M .155
PP 67.6105
QQ 67.6105
Q 106.837
P .06
R 5.71
QUALITY
FACTOR
ITQ
1.0
1.0
1.0
3.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
2.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
-1.0
3.0
1.10-
ENVIRON- LEARN-
MENTAL
FACTOR
E3
6.3
6.3
1.0
1.0
1.0
6,3
1.0
1.0
6.3
1.0
1.0
1.0
6.3
6.3
6.3
6.3
1.0
1.0
ING FAILURE
FACTOR RATE (x)
WL (F/106h)
1.0 1.092x103
1.0 3.396xl03
1.0 5.71
1.0 .18
1.0 673.07
1.0 5.71
1.0 636.71
1.0 5.71
1.0 ~18
1.0 636.71
1.0 5.71
1.0 673.07
1.0 916.00
1.0 .9765
1.0 425.95
1.0 425.95
1.0 673.07
1.0 .18
1.0 5.71
EVENT
PROBA-
BILITY
1.731x107
-2
7.827x10 2
1.3149x10~4
4.32x10 6
- -2
1.602x10
1.3149x10~4
1.516x10-2
-4
1.3149x10
4.32x10 6
1.516x10 2
1.3149x10~4
1.602x40-2
-4
1.31419x10
1.8747x10~4
1.017x10-2
1.017x10-2
1.602x10-2
4.32x10 6
1.3149x10~4
357
Table D.5 (continued)
STAR ARCHITECTURE PARALLEL
GENERIC
EVENT FAILURE QUALITY
SYMBOL RATE (XG) FACTOR
(F/106h)
.06
101.065
5.71
101.065
5.71
101.065
5.71
101.065
5.71
106.337
5.71
.155
67.6105
67.5105
rq
3.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
I.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
-1.0
TRANSMISSION ALTERNATIVE (SITUATION ONE)
ENVIRON- LEARN-
MENTAL ING
FACTOR FACTOR
WE
1.0
6.3
1.0
6.3
1.0
6.3
1.0
6.3-
1.0
6.3
1.0
6.3
6.3
6.3
'L
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
FAILURE
RATE (x)
(F/106h)
.18
636.71
5.71
636.71
5.71
636.71
5.71
636.71
5.71
673.07
5.71
0.9675
425.95
S
T
U
V
w
x
Y
z
AA
CC
DD
BB
RR
SS
EVENT
PROBA-
BILITY
-64.32x106.
1.516x10-2
1.3149x10~=
1.516x10 -2
1.3149x40
1.516x10-2
1.3149x10~4
1.516x10- 2
1.3149x10~4
1.602x10-2
1,.3149x10~4
1.8747x10~4
1. 017x10-2
1.017x10-2
8.997x10 4
MEANING OF EVENT SYMBOLS:
EVENT SYMBOL COMPONENT
B MMI
C MC hardware
D MC control software
E Cable
F 4PC3 hardware
EVENT
MMI system fails
Central MC hardware fails
MC control software fails
C3-MC line fails
gPC3 hardware fails
l.a 425.95
EE
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Table D.5 (continued)
STAR ARCHITECTURE PARALLEL TRANSMISSION ALTERNATIVE (SITUATION ONE)
MEANING OF EVENT SYMBOLS:
EVENT SYMBOL COMPONENT
gPC3 software
Cable
pPD 3 hardware
gPD3 software
gPD'3 hardware
OPD'3 software
gPC'3 hardware
4PC'3 software
Switch 3
pPC3 hardware (SR)
LPC3 software (SR)
Cable
RPC7 hardware
gPC3 software
Cable
PD7 hardware
,PD7 software
pPD'7 hardware
pPD'7 software
gPD8 hardware
uPD8 software
gPD'8 hardware
gPD'8 software
±PC'7 hardware
1PC'7 software
Switch 7
gPC7 hardware (SR)
RPC'7 software (SR)
Secondary storage system
LPC3 software fails
C3'-MC Vine fails
PD3 hardware fails
giPD3 software fails
1 PD'3 hardware fails
iPD' 3 software fails
gPC'3 hardware fails
vPC'3 software fails
Switch 3 hardware fails
,PC3 hardware fails
gPC3 software fails
C7-MC line fails
gPC7 hardware fails
wPC3 software fails
C7-MC line fails
RPD7 hardware fails
gPD7 software fails
PD' 7 hardware fails
gPD'7 software fails
1PD8 hardware fails
pPD8 software fails
gPD'8 hardware fails
pPD'8 software fails
pPD'7 hardware fails
vPD'7 software fails
Switch 7 hardware fails
4PC7 hardware (SR) fails
uPC'7 software (SR) fails
Secondary storage system fails
STAR ARCHITECTURE
PROBABILISTIC EQUATIONS PARALLEL TRANSMISSION ALTERNATIVE (SITUATION ONE)
TE = B+EE + <C + D + E + F + G + [H + I] xEK + LL x J + N + 0 + M
+ [PP + GI x [QQ + 01 + [H + I] x [K + L + + + +
+lP + Q + R + CT + UI x [V + WI + [X + Y] x [Z + AAI >x< S + CCI I I
EVENT
G
J
H
I
K
L
N
0
mI
PP
QQ
P
Q
R
S
T
U
V
W
x
Y
z
AA
CC
DD
BB
RR
SS
EE
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+ DD + BB + [R + RRJ x [DD +SS] + [T + U] x [V + WI + [X + Y]
x LZ + AA]t >
(from the fault tree)
Note: Blank parentheses represent the other five similar distributed
control systems; these are not the same events, but because the
hardware and the software will be similar, they will end up with the
same probability of failure. (All the sofware is debugged until it has
reached a required probability of failure, in this case the (Pf)reg is
the same for all the distributed systems.)
By using the following Boolean law (C + C2 ) x (C1 + C3) = I + (C2 X
C3), the latter expression is reduced to:
TE = B + EE + C + D +[H + 1] + [K + L] + [J + N + 0 + M + (PP + G)]x [(QQ + 01
x[E + F + G] +1+1 1+ + i 1+T + U] x [V + WI +1 LX + Y] x
[z +AA] + [P + Q + R] x[S + CC + DD +-BB + (R + RR) x (DD + SS)]
The next step is to apply the probabilistic equations to the Boolean
expressions. When the probabilities involved are higher (0.1 or
higher) the full equation is used. If values of probabilities are
small, it will be used the standard approximation of deleting the
product terms of the full equation.
The expressions for the full equations are:
p(A + B) = p(A) + p(B) - p(A)p(B)
p(A + B + C) = p(A) + p(B) + P(C) + p(A)p(B)p(C) - p(A)p(B)
- p(A)p(C) - p(B)p(C)
Applying the Boolean expression to the probabilistic equations, the
following implicit equations are obtained.
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TE = F + F2 + F3
F1 = D + F4 + F5
F4 = B
F5 = EE + C
F6 = F7 + F7 + F7
F7 = F8 + F9
F8 = (H + I) x (K + L)
F9 = F10 x F 11
F10 = E + F + G
Fi1 = F1 2 + F1 3
F12 = J + N + 0 + M
F13 = F1 4 x F15
F14 = PP + G
F15 = QQ + 0
F3 = F1 6 + F1 7 + F18
F16 = (T + U) x (V + W)
F17 = (X + Y) x (T + AA)
F18 = F19 x F20
p(TE) = p(FI) + p(F2 ) + p(F3 ) + p(FI)p(F2)p(F 3)
- p(F1)p(F 2 ) - p(FI)p(F 3 ) - p(F2)p(F3 )
p(FI) = p(D) + p(F4 ) + p(F5 ) + p(F4)p(F5)p(D)
- p(F 4 )p(F 5 ) - p(F 4 )p(D) - p(F5)P(D)
-p(F5)p(D)
p(F4 ) = p(B)
p(F5 ) = p(EE) + p(C) - p(EE)p(C)
p(F6 ) = 3p(F 7 ) + p(F7) 3 - 3p(F 7 )2
p(F7 ) = p(F8 ) + p(Fg) - p(F8 )p(Fg)
p(F8 ) = [p(H) + p(I)] x [p(K) + p(L)]
p(F9) = p(F10 ) x p(F11)
p(F 10 ) = p(E) + p(F) + p(G)
p(F11 ) = p(F12 ) + p(F13 ) - p(F12 )p(F13)
p(F12 ) = p(J) + p(N) + p(0) + p(M)
- p(O)p(N)
p(F13) = p(F14) x p(F15)
p(F14 ) = p(PP) + p(G)
p(F15 ) = p(QQ) + p(0) - p(QQ)p(0)
p(F3) = p(F16 ) + p(F17) + p(F18)
+ p(F16 )p(F17 )p(F18 ) - p(F16 )p(F17 )
- p(F16 )p(F18 ) - p(F17 )p(F18)
p(F16 ) = [p(T) + p(U)] x [P(V) + p(W)]
p(F17 ) = [p(X) + p(Y)] x [P(z) + p(AA)]
p(F18) = p(F1 g) x pCF20)
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F19 = P + Q + R
F 20 F21 + F22
F2 1 = S + CC + DD + BB
F 2 2 = (R + RR) x (DD + SS)
p(F ) = p(P) + p(Q) + P(R)
p(F2 0 ) = p(F2 1 ) + p(F22 ) - p(F2 1 )p(F22 )
p(F2 1 ) = p(S) + p(CC) + p(DD) + p(BB)
- p(CC)p(BB)
p(F22 ) = [p(R) + p(RR)] x [p(DD) + p(SS)]
613 12 11 10 9 8
20 19 18 17 16
A23
Figure D.6 Star architecture, parallel transmission alternative, situation 2
See legend next page
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1. Control system fails to diagnose and to advise the appropriate
corrective measures
2. +
3. FF
4. Digital diagnosis system fails
5. EE
6. +
7. System D1 fails
8. System D2 fails
9. System D4 fails
10. System D5 fails
11. System D6 fails
12. System D7 fails
13. System D8 fails
14. System D9 fails
15. System D10 fails
16. System D11 fails
17. System D12 fails
18. System D13 fails
19. System D14 fails
20. System D3 fails
21. GG
22. HH
23. 1
Cy)
Fir 6K K LL mm00
Figure D.6 (continued)
ID
365
STAR ARCHITECTURE PARALLEL TRANSMISSION ALTERNATIVE (SITUATION TWO)
GENERIC
EVENT FAILURE
SYMBOL RATE (XG)
(F/106h)
QUALITY
FACTOR
ENVIRON-
MENTAL
FACTOR
LEARN-
ING
FACTOR
Qr
FAILURE
RATE (x)
(F/106h)
1.0 1.092x103
1.0 2.741x103
1.0 5.71
1.0 .18
1.0 538.157
1.0 5.71
1.0 .18
EE
FF
GG
HH
II
J
KK
LL
MM
00
8.997x10~4
1.731x10-5
6.367x10-2
1.3149x104
-64.32x10
1.283x02
-4
1. 3149x10
-64.32x10
1.283x10
-2
1.3149x10 4
MEANING OF EVENT SYMBOLS:
EVENT SYMBOL COMPONENT
Secondary storage system
MMI
MC hardware
MC Diagnosis software
Cable
gPD3 hardware
gPD3 software
Cable
gPD'3 hardware
RPD' 3 software
Secondary storage sysem fails
MMI system fails
MC hardware fails
MC diagnosis software fails
D3-MC line fails
gPD3 hardware fails
gPD3 software fails
D3-MC line fails
gPD'3 hardware fails
gPD'3 hardware fails
EVENT
PROBA-
BILITY
1.0 538.157
1.0 5.71
173.392
435.31
5.71
.06
85.4216
5.71
.06
85.4216
5.71
1.0
1.0
1.0
3.0
1.0
1.0
3.0
1.0
1.0
6.3
6.3
1.0
1.0
6.3
1.0
1.0
6.3
1.0
EVENT
EE
FF
GG
HH
II
KK
LL
MM
00
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Table D.6 (continued)
STAR ARCHITECTURE PARALLEL TRANSMISSION ALTERNATIVE (SITUATION TWO)
PROBABILISTIC EQUATIONS PARALLEL TRANSMISSION ALTERNATIVE (SITUATION TWO)
TE = EE + FF + GG + HH + [II + JJ + KKI x [LL + MM + 00] + [ ] + [ ]
+ I[ ]+I[] +[ ]+ [ ]+[ ] I[ ]I+[ ]+ [ + [3 +[ ]+[ I
(from the fault tree)
The same observation about the blank brackets applies here. After
applying the probability laws, the equations are:
TE = F1 + F2
F = F8 + F9
F8 = EE + FF
F9 = GG + HH
F2 = F3 + F3
F3 = F 4 + F5
F 4 = F6 + F6
F5 = F7 + F7 + F7
F6 = F7 + F7
F7 = [II + JJ + KIK] x ELL + MM
p(TE) = p(F) + p(F 2 ) - p(F1 )p(F
p(F1) = p(F8 ) + p(F 9 ) - p(F8 )p(F
p(F8 ) = p(EE) + p(FF) - p(EE)p(FI
p(F9) = p(GG) + p(HH) - p(GG)p(H
p(F2 ) = 2p(F 3 ) - p(F3 2
p(F3) = p(F4 ) + p(F5 ) - p(F4 )p(F
p(F4 ) = 2p(F 6 ) - p(F6)2
p(F5) = 3p(F 7 ) + p(F7) 3 - 2p(F 7)
p(F6) = 2p(F 7 ) - p(F7) 2
+ 00] = Ep(II) + p(JJ) + p(KK)] x
[p(LL) + p(MM) + p(OO)]
2)
9)
F)
H)
5)
2
367
Table D.7
SERIAL TRANSMISSION ALTERNATIVE (SITUATION ONE)
GENERIC
EVENT FAILURE QUALITY
SYMBOL RATE (XG) FACTOR
(F/106h) Ir
ENVIRON-
MENTAL
FACTOR
LEARN-
ING
FACTOR
FAILURE
RATE (x)
(F/106h)
1.0 2222.00
1.0 651.096
1.0 620.7
1.0 651.096
1.0 620.7
1.0 620.7
1.0 620.7
1.0 620.7
1.0 651.096
5.193x10-2
1.5647x10 2
1.4786x10 2
1.5647x10-2
1.4786x10-2
1.4786x10-2
1.4786x10-2
1.4786x10-2
1.5647x10-2
MEANING OF EVENT SYMBOLS:
EVENT SYMBOL COMPONENT
mC hardware
4PC3 hardware
gPD3 hardware
LPC7 hardware
gPD7 hardware
gPD8 hardware
1PD'7 hardware
uPD'8 hardware
gPC'7 hardware
Central mC hardware fails
LPC3 hardware fails
pPD 3 hardware fails
4PC7 hardware fails
gPD7 hardware fails
uPD8 hardware fails
vPD'7 hardware fails
1PD'8 hardware fails
LPC'7 hardware fails
EVENT
PROBA-
BILITY
352.6944
104.301
98.256
104.301
98.256
98.256
98.256
98.256
104.301
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
6.3
6.3
6.3
6.3
6.3
6.3
6.3
6.3
6.3CC
C
F
H
Q
T
x
V
z
CC
EVENT
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Table D.7 (continued)
PROBABILISTIC EQUATIONS D.7 SERIAL TRANSMISSION ALTERNATIVE
(SITUATION ONE)
The fault tree and the probablistic equations are exactly the same
as the case of parallel transmission. Only few probabilities are
different and these values are given in Table D.7.
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SERIAL
GENERIC
EVENT FAILURE
SYMBOL RATE (XG)
(F/106h)
GG 327.052
JJ 83.6731
MM 83.6731
Table D.8
TRANSMISSION ALTERNATIVE (SITUATION TWO)
ENVIRON- LEARN-
QUALITY MENTAL ING FAILURE
FACTOR FACTOR FACTOR RATE (x)
lrQ
1.0
1.0
1.0
rE
6.3
6.3
6.3
L0
1.0
1.0
1.0
(F/106 h)
2060.43
527.14
527.14
EVENT
PROBA-
BILITY
-24.825x10
-2
1.257x10
1.257x10-2
MEANING OF EVENT SYMBOLS:
EVENT SYMBOL COMPONENT
GG mC hardware
JJ gPD 3 hardware
MM gPD'3 hardware
EVENT
Central mC hardware fails
gPD3 hardware fails
pPD'3 hardware fails
STAR ARCHITECTURE
PROBABILISTIC EQUATIONS D.8 SERIAL TRANSMISSION ALTERNATIVE
(SITUATION TWO)
The fault tree and the probablistic equations are exactly the same
as the case of parallel transmission. Only few probabilities are
different and these values are given in Table D.8.
Automatic control system fails to
control the propulsion plant
System 1 on service fails Standby system 2 fails
DC B II
Dual star architecture, parallel transmission alternative,
situation one.
1 -
(-4
C)
figure D.9
Switchf iI sFfa I < GG > < liH JJFF
Figure 0,9 (continued)
(4J
C~j 10
r-.
13 1
14 1
Figure BA (continued)
See legend next page
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1. 1
2. +
3. Distributed system 7 fails
4. Distributed system 6 fails
5. Distributed system 5 fails
6. Distributed system 4 fails
7. Distributed system 3 fails
8. Distributed system 2 fails
9. Distributed system 1 fails
10. X
11. 5
12. Standby system 3' fails
13. System 3 on service fails
14. +
15. +
16. 0
17. N
18. M
19. Switch 3 fails
20. 3
21. 3
22. F
23. E
24. G
25. 4
wFigure D.9 (continued)
U1
vice fails Standby jPC' fails
ww 0
Figure 0.9 (continued)
t+(+
A6P QR
Switch 7
6 BB cc>DD fails
7
Figure D.9 (continued)
('3
Figure D.9 (continued)
*14
1111 Standby PC'7 fails
aDD
Figure D.9 (continued)
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Table D.9
DUAL STAR ARCHITECTURE PARALLEL TRANSMISSION ALTERNATIVE (SITUATION ONE)
GENERIC
EVENT FAILURE QUALITY
SYMBOL RATE (XG) FACTOR
(F/106h) W9Q
B 173.392 1.0
C 435.629 1.0
D 5.71 1.0
E .06 3.0
F 106.837 1.0
G 5.71 1.0
H 108.576 1.0
1 5.71 1.0
J 5.71 1.0
K 108.76 1.0
M 0.06 3.0
N 106.837 1.0
0 5.71 1.0
L .155 1.0
WW 67.6105 1.0
XX 67.6105 1.0
P .06 3.0
Q 106.837 1.0
R 5.71 1.0
S 108.576 1.0
ENVIRON-
MENTAL
FACTOR
r E
6.3
6.3
1.0
1.0
6.3
1.0
6.3
1.0
1.0
6.3
1.0
6.3
1.0
6.3
6.3
6.3
1.0
6.3
1.0
6.3
LEARN-
ING
FACTOR
L0
1. 0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
FAILURE
RATE (x)
(F/10 6h)
1.092x103
2.7445x103
5.71
.18
673.07
5.71
685.16
5.71
5.71
685.16
5.71
673.07
5.71
9. 765x10 1
425.95
425.95
.18
673.07
5.71
685.16
EVENT
PROBA-
BILITY
1.731x10 5
6.374x10-2
1. 3149x10~4
-64.32x10
1.602x10-2
1.3149x10~4
1.6309x10-2
1.3149x10 4
1.3149x104
1.6309x10-2
1.3149x0 -2
1.602x10-2
-4
1.3149x10
1.875x10 4
1.017x10-2
1.017x10-2
4. 32x10-6
1.602x10-2
1.3149x10~4
1.6309x10-2
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Table D.9 (continued)
DUAL STAR ARCHITECTURE PARALLEL TRANSMISSION ALTERNATIVE (SITUATION ONE)
GENERIC
EVENT FAILURE
SYMBOL RATE (kG)
(F/106h)
T 5.71
U 108.576
V 5.71
W 108.576
X 5.71
Y 108.576
Z 5.71
BB .06
CC 106.837
DD 5.71
AA .155
YY 67.6125
ZZ 67.6125
FF 173.392
GG 435.629
HH 5.71
EE 142.3255
AAA 221.965
BBB 221.965
I I
QUALITY
FACTOR
lrQ
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
3.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
ENVIRON-
MENTAL
FACTOR
WE
1.0
6.3
1.0
6.3
1.0
6.3
1.0
1.0
6.3
1.0
6.3
6.3
6.3
6.3
6.3
1.0
6.3
6.3
6.3
LEARN-
ING
FACTOR
0L
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
FAILURE
RATE (x)
(F/106h)
5.71
685.16
5.71
685.16
5.71
685.16
5.71
.18
673.07
5.71
0 .9763
425.95
425.95
1092.00
2744.00
5.71
896.65
1398.4
1398.4
EVENT
PROBA-
BILITY
-4
1.3149x.10
1.6309x1402
1.3149x0~4
1.6309x10-2
1.3149x10 4
1.6309x10- 2
1.3149x10 4
4.32x10-6
1.602x10-
2
1.3149x10~
4
1.8747x10-4
1.017x10 2
1.017x10-2
1.731x10-5
6.374x10-
2
1.3149x104
2.129x10-2
3.3x10-2
3.3x10-2
8.997x10~4
8.997x10~4
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Table D.9 (continued)
DUAL STAR ARCHITECTURE PARALLEL TRANSMISSION ALTERNATIVE (SITUATION ONE)
MEANING OF EVENT SYMBOLS:
EVENT SYMBOL COMPONENT
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
K
M
N
0
L
ww
xx
P
R
R
S
T
u
w
z
BB
cc
Do
A
U:
FF
GG
HH
EE
A
BBB
ii
JJ
MMI 1
MC 1 hardware
MC 1 software
Cable
vPC3 hardware
±PC3 software
RPD3 hardware
vPD3 software
vPD'3 software
RPD'3 hardware
Cable
iiPC'3 hardware
LPC'3 software
Switch 3
PC3 hardware (SR)
4PC3 hardware (SR)-
Cable
gPC7 hardware
RPC7 software
gPD7 hardware
gPD7 software
gPD'7 hardware
gPD'7 software
gPD8 hardware
gPD 8 software
uPD'8 hardware
uPD'8 software
Cable
gPC'7 hardware
gPC'7 software
Switch 7
;PC7 hardware
gPC'7 hardware
MMI2
MC 2 hardware
MC 2 software
Switch SO
MC 1 hardware
MC 1 software
Secondary storage I
Secondary storage 2
EVENT
MMI 1 system fails
MC 1 hardware fail s
MC 1 software fails
SO-C3 line fails
gPC3 hardware fails
gPC3 software fails
PD3 hardware fails
pPD 3 software fails
IPD'3 software fails
PD' 3 hardware fails
SO-C3' line fails
±PC'3 hardware fails
PC'3 software fails
Switch 3 hardware fails
PC3 hardware (SR) fails
pPC3' hardware (SR) fails
SO-C7 line fails
RPC7 hardware fails
gPC7 software fails
PD7 hardware fails
PD7 software fails
±PD'7 hardware fails
gPD'7 software fails
gPD8 hardware fails
gPD8 software fails
gPD'8 hardware fails
gPD8 software fails
SO-C7' line fails
gPC'7 hardware fails
gPC'7 software fails
Switch 7 fails
gPC7 hardware fails
RPC'7 hardware fails
MMI2 fails
MC 2 hardware fails
MC 2 software fails
Switch SO fails
MC 1 hardware fails (SR)
MC 1 software fails (SR)
Secondary 1 storage fails
Secondary 2 storage fails
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Table 0.9 (continued)
DUAL STAR ARCHITECTURE PARALLEL TRANSMISSION ALTERNATIVE (SITUATION
PROBABILISTIC EQUATIONS PARALLEL TRANSMISSION ALTERNATIVE (SITUATION
TE =<B + C + D + II + E + F + G + [H + II x [J + K] M+ N + 0
+ [G + WWl x [0 + XX] +[H + I] x J + KJ + 1+ + + 1 +
+jP + R + Q + [S + T] x EU + VI + [W + X] x YE + ZI > x< BB + CC
+ AA + [R +YYI x [DO +ZZI+ [S +T] x [U + V] + [W + XI x [Y +2
x FF + GG + HH + JJ + EE + [D + AAA] x [HH + BBBI + E + F + G
+ [H + I] x [J + K] x M+ N + 0 + L + EG + WWI x [0 + XX] +
+ [EH + I] x [J+ K] + + +11 +1 +1 P + Q + R + [S + T-
x EU + VI + [W + XI xEY + ZI x BB + CC-+ DD + AA +
ER + YYI x [DD + ZZl + [S + TI x [U + V] + [W + X] x [y + Z] >
Now making Boolean reductions:
TE =< B + C + D + II +1EH + J] x [J + K] + [E + F + GI x [M + N + 0 + L4
x (0O+ XX)I + + + + + + 1S + T] x [U + V] + [W
x EY + ZI + [P + R + Q] x EBB + CC + DD + AA + (R + YY) x (DO +2
A furth
TE =< I
ONE)
ONE)
+ L
+
+ DD
ZI
]
+ (G+WW)
+ X]
ZZ) >
x < FF + GG + HH + EE + JJ + ED + AAA] x [HH + BBBI + [EH + I] x
+ EJ + K] + EE + F + GI x EM + N + 0 + L + (G + WW) x (0 + XX)
+ + + + + + [S + TI x [U + V] + [W + X
x EY + ZI + [P + Q + RI x EBBB + CC + DD + AA + (R + YY) X (DD + ZZ)] 1
er reduction follows:
[H + I] x [J + K] EE + F + GI x EM + N + 0 + L + (G + WW) x (0 + XX)]
+1 + + I + +I1+ I  [1CS + TI x [U + VI + [W + XI
x EY + ZI + [P + R + QI x EBB + CC + DD + AA + (R + YY) x (DD + ZZ)]1
+ EB + C + D + III x EJJ + FF + GG + HR + EE + (D + AAA) x (HH + BBB) 1 1
C
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Applying the probabilistics laws, the
obtained.
TE = F1 + F2  p(TE)
F1 = F3 + F3  p(F1)
F3 =F 4 + F4 + F4  p(F4)
F4 = F5 + F6  p(F4)
F5 = (H + I) x (J + K) p(F5)
F6 = F7 + F8  p(F6)
F7 = E + F + Gp(F 7)
F8 = F9 + F10 p(F8)
F9 M + N + 0 + Lp(F 9)
F10 = (G + WW) x (0 + XX) P(Fic
F = F 1+F 12
F11 = F13 + F14
F1 3 = F15 + F16
F15 = (S + T) x (U + V)
F16 = (W + X) x (Y + Z) p(F1
F14 = F17 x F18
F18  P + Q + R
F 19 =BB + CC + DD + AA
F20 = (R + YY) x (D + ZZ)
F12 = F21 x F22  p(F11
F21 F27 + F28
F27 = C + D
F28 = B + II
lawsFthe
22p(3E)4
following implicit equations are
3)
= )
6
=
=
=)
I)
p(FI) + p(F2 ) - p(Fl)p(F2)
2p(F 3 ) - 2
3p(F 4) + p(F4)3 - 3p(F4)2
p(F5 ) + p(F6 ) - p(F5 )p(F6)
Lp(H) + p(I)] x [p(J) + p(K)]
p(F7) x p(F8)
p(E) + p(F) + p(G)
p(F9 ) + p(F10 ) - p(F9 )p(F10 )
p(M) + p(N) + p(0) + p(L)
= [p(G) + p(WW)] X [p(O) + p(XX)]
= p(F 11 ) + p(F12 ) - p(F11 )p(F12)
= p(F1 3 ) + p(F 1 4 ) - p(F 13 )p(F 14 )
= p(F15 ) + p(F16 ) - p(F1 5 )p(F 16 )
= [p(S) + p(T)] x [p(U) + p(V)]
) =[p(W) + p(X)] x [p(Y) + p(Z)J
= p(F 1 7 ) x p(F18 )
= p(P) + p(Q) + p(R)
= p(BB) + p(CC) + p(DD) + p(AA)
= [p(R) + p(YY)] x [p(DD) + p(ZZ)J
= p(F21 ) x p(F22 )
= p(F 2 7 ) + p(F 2 8 ) - p(F 2 7 )p(F 2 8 )
= p(C) + p(D) - P(C)p(D)
= p(B) + p(II) - p(B)p(II)
= p(F 2 3 ) + p(F 24 ) - p(F 2 3 )p(F 2 4 )
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F2 3 = F2 5 + F2 6
F25 = FF + GG
F26 = HH + EE + JJ
F24 = (D + AAA) x (HH + BBB)
p(F2 3 ) = p(F2 5 ) + p(F26) - p(F25 )p(F26)
p(F2 5 ) = p(FF) + p(GG) - p(FF)p(GG)
p(F2 6 ) = p(HH) + p(EE) + p(JJ) - p(EE)p(JJ)
p(F24 ) = [p(D) + p(AAA)] x [p(HH) + p(BBB)]
Control system fails to diagnose and to advise
the appropriate corrective measures
System Ion service fails Standby system 2 fails
| t
KK UU B J
RR VV>
Figure D.O
FF JJ
Dual star architecture, parallel transmission,
situation two.
(A.)
co
Ul
-A
] 1 N13 12
191
21 20
<2726 2 
4 <23> 22
Figure D.10 (continued)
*See legend next page,
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1. 1
2. +
3. System D9 fails
4. System D8 fails
5. System D7 fails
6. System D6 fails
7. System D5 fails
8. System D4 fails
9. System D3 fails
10. System D2 fails
11. System Di fails
12. System D14 fails
13. System D13 fails
14. System D12 fails
15. System D>l fails
16. System D10 Fails
17. X
18. Standby system D' fails
19. System D3 on service fails
20. +
21. +
22. RQ
23. PP
24. TT
25. NN
26. MM
27. SS
388
Table D.10
DUAL STAR ARCHITECTURE PARALLEL TRANSMISSIC
GENERIC ENVIRON- LEARN-
EVENT FAILURE QUALITY MENTAL ING
SYMBOL RATE (XG) FACTOR FACTOR FACTOR
(F/106h) Q 7 TE7rL
II
JJ
VV
RR
SS
MM
NN
TT
PP
QQ
UU
KK
LL
00
B
FF
405.802
5.71
.06
93.375
5.71
.06
93.375
5.71
405.802
5.71
0.06
0.06
173.392
173.392
1.0
1.0
3.0
1.0
1.0
3.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
3.0
3.0
1.0
1.0
6.3
1.0
1.0
6.3
1.0
1.0
6.3
1.0
6.3
1.0
1.0
1.0
6.3
6.3
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
)N ALTERNATIVE
FAILURE
RATE (x)
(F/106h)
2556.55
5.71
.18
588.262
5.71
.18
588.262
5.71
2556.55
5.71
.18
.18
1092.00
1092.00
(SITUATION TWO)
EVENT
PROBA-
BILITY
8.997x10~4
8.997x10~4
5.591x10-2
1.3149x10~4
4.32x10-6
1.4019x10-2
1.3149x10 4
4.32x10-6
1.4019x10 2
1.3149x10~4
5.951x10-2
1.3149x10~4
4.3210-6
4.32106
1.731x10-5
1.731x10-5
MEANING OF EVENT SYMBOLS:
EVENT SYMBOL COMPONENT
Secondary storage 1 fails
EVENT
I I Secondary storage 1I
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Table D.10 (continued)
DUAL STAR ARCHITECTURE PARALLEL TRANSMISSION ALTERNATIVE (SITUATION TWO)
MEANING OF EVENT SYMBOLS:
EVENT SYMBOL COMPONENT
JO Secondary storage 2
VV MC 2 hardware
RR MC 2 software
Ss Cable
MM gPC3 hardware
NN LPD3 software
TT Cable
PP RPD'3 hardware
QQ vPD'3 software
UU MC 1 hardware
KK MC 1 software
LL Cable
00 Cable
B MMI1
FF MMI 2
EVENT
Secondary storage 2 fails
MC 2 hardware fails
MC 2 diagnosis software fails
D3-MC 2 line fails
gPD3 hardware fails
PD3 software fails
D3-MC 2 line fails
4PD'3 hardware fails
gPC'3 software fails
MC 1 hardware fails
MCl software fails
D3-MCi line fails
D3'-MC1 line fails
MMI 1 fails
MMI 2 fails
PROBABILISTIC EQUATIONS PARALLEL TRANSMISSION ALTERNATIVE (SITUATION TWO)
From the corresponding fault tree:
TE B + II + UU + KK + [LL +MM + NN] x [00+ PP + QQ] + [ ]+ [ ] +
+r [ ] + [] + [ J + [ J + [3 + [ ] + [ ] + [ 3 + [1] + [ 3 +
+-[ ] x FF + JJ + VV + RR + [SS + MM + NN] x [TT + PP + QQ]
+ [ 3' + [3' + [3' + [3' + [3' + [3' + [3' + [3' + [3'
+ [3'+ [3]- [3'+ [
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Table D.10 (continued)
DUAL STAR ARCHITECTURE PARALLEL TRANSMISSION ALTERNATIVE (SITUATION TWO)
Applying the probabilistics laws, the following implicit equations are
obtained.
TE = F1 x F2  p(TE) = p(FI) x p(F2 )
F1 F3 + F 4 p(F1) = p(F3 ) + p(F4 ) - p(F3 )p(F4 )
F3 1 F9 + F 20 p(F3) = p(F19 ) + p(F2 0 ) - p(F 1 g)p(F 20 )
F19 = B + II p(F19) = p(B) + p(H) p(B)p(II)
F20 = L + KK p(F20) = p(UU) + p(KK)-p(UU)p(KK)
F4 = F5 + F5  p(F 4 ) = 2p(F 5 ) - p(F5 )
F5 = F6 + F7  p(F5 ) = p(F6 ) p(F7 )-p(F 6 )p(F 7 )
F6 = F15 + F1 5  p(F6 ) = 2p(Fis)1)
F15 = F8 + F8  p(F15) = 2p(F8)-p(F 8)2
F7 = F8 + F8 + F8  p(F7) = 3p(F 8 ) + p(F8 )3  3p(F8 )2
F8 = (LL-MM+NN) x (00+ PP+QQ) p(F8 ) = [p(LL) + p(MIM) + p(NN)]
F2 = F9 + F 10
F9 = F1 7 + F1 8
F1 7 = VV + RR
F1 8 = FF + JJ
F10 = F1 1 + F1 1
Fi = F1 2 + F1 3
F1 2 = F14 + F1 4
F14 = F16 + F16
x [p(OO) + p(PP) + p(QQ)J
p(F2 ) = p(F9 ) + p(F10 ) - p(Fg)p(F 10 )
p(F 9 ) = p(F 1 7 ) + p(F 18 ) - p(F 17 )p(F 18 )
p(F 17 ) = p(VV) + p(RR) - p(VV)p(RR)
p(F 18 ) = p(FF) + p(JJ) - p(JJ)p(FF)
p(F10 ) = 2p(FII) -p(F1)2
p(F11 ) = p(F12 ) + p(F 1 3 ) - p(F12)p(F 13
p(F12 ) = 2p(F 14 ) - p(F )2
p(F 14 ) = 2p(F16 ) - p(F16)2
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F13 = F1 6 + F16 + F16
F16 = (SS+MM+NN) x (TT+PP+QQ)
p(F13 ) = 3p(F 16 )3 -p(F16)2
p(F16 ) = [p(SS) + p(MM) + p(NN)] x
[p(TT) + p(PP) + p(QQ)]
Automatic control system fails
control the propulsion plant
System 1 on service fails
1 0 IM
D C RR
to
Standby system 2 fails
B
Software
switch fails
LL MM
2
Ss II
Dual star architecture, serial transmission alternative,
situation one,
1
8
LA.
Figure 1,11
i - mow q
wFigure D.11 (continued)
13 12
Figure 0.11 (continued)
* See legend on next page.
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1. 1
2. +
3. Distributed system 7 fails
4. Distributed system 6 fails
5. Distributed system 5 fails
6. Distributed system 4 fails
7. Distributed system 3 fails
8. Distributed system 2 fails
9. Distributed system 1 fails
10. 3
11. X
12. Standby system 3' fails
13. System 3 on service fails
14. +
15. +
16. N
17. M
18. L
19. Switch 3 fails
20. 4
21. 4
22. G
23. F
24. E
25. 5
Figure 0.11 (continued)
LA.
LO
LA.)
k0
Figure D.11 (continued)
co
Figur 0.11>(cotnRu
Swi tch 7
6 fails
z < EE < DD >cc > I-__
7
Figure 0.11 (continued)
wO
ko
ko
Figure D.l (continued)
Figure D.11 (continued)
0
13 12
14 15
Figure D.11 (continued)
*Soe legend on nexd page.
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1. 8
2. +
3. Distributed system 7 fails
4. Distributed sygtem 6 fails
5. Distributed system 5 fails
6. Distributed system 4 fails
7. Distributed system 3 fails
8. Distributed system 2 fails
9. Distributed system 1 fails
10. 9
11. X
12. Standby system 3 fails
13. System 3 onservice fails
14. +
15. +
16. 00
17. M
18. N
19. Switch 3 fails
20. 4
21. 4
22. NN
23. F
24. G
25. 5
6 PP S T
Switch 7
6 cc DD QQ fails
Figure 0.11 (continued)
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Table 0.11
DUAL STAR ARCHITECTURE SERIAL TRANSMISSION (CONDITION ONE)
GENERIC
EVENT FAILURE QUALITY
SYMBOL RATE (XG) FACTOR
(F/106h) 
.r1Q
B 173.392 1.0
C 352.6944 1.0
o 5.71 1.0
E .06 3.0
F 110.503 1.0
G 5.71 1.0
H 104.731 1.0
I 5.71 1.0
J 104.731 1.0
K 5.71 1.0
L .06 3.0
M 110.503 1.0
N 5.71 1.0
0 .155 1.0
P 67.6105 1.0
Q 67.6105 1.0
P .06 3.0
S 110.503 1.0
T 5.71 1.0
u 104.731 1.0
ENVIRON- LEARN-
MENTAL ING FAILURE
FACTOR FACTOR RATE (x)
rIf6Ir
irE
6.3
6.3
1.0
1.0
6.3
1.0
6.3
1.0
6.3
1.0
1.0
6.3
1.0
6.3
6.3
6.3
1.0
6.3
1.0
6.3
S L
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.092x10
2.222x103
5.71
.18
696.169
5.71
659.801
5.71
659.801
5.71
.18
696.169
5.71
9.765x10
425.95
425.95
.18
696.169
5.71
659.8
EVENT
PROBA-
BILITY
-5
1.731x10
5.193x10-2
-4
1.3149x10
4.32x10-6
1.657x10-2
1.3149x10~4
-2
1.571x10
1.3149x10 4
1.571x10-2
1.3149x10~4
4.32x10-6
1.657x10-2
-4
1. 3149x10
1.8747x10 4
1.017x10- 2
1.017x10-2
4.32x10-6
1.657x10-2
1.3149x10~4
1. 571x1O- 2
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Table D.11 (continued)
DUAL STAR ARCHITECTURE SERIAL TRANSMISSION (CONDITION ONE)
GENERIC
EVENT FAILURE QUALITY
SYMBOL RATE (XG) FACTOR
x
V
z
AA
BB
CC
DD
EE
FF
GG
HH
II
KK
LL
MM
NN
(F/10 6 h)
5.71
104.731
5.71
104.731
5.71
104.731
5.71
110 .503
5.71
.06
.155
67.6105
67.6105
173.392
352.6944
352.6944
5.71
352.6944
.06
ENVIRON- LEAR
MENTAL ING
FACTOR FACT
lrQ
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
3.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
3.0
rE
1.0
6.3
1.0
6.3
1.0
6.3
1.0
6.3
1.0
1.0
6.3
6.3
6.3
6.3
6.3
6.3
1.0
6.3
1.0
N-
FAILURE
rL
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
OR RATE Cx)
(F/10 6 h)
5.71
659.8
5.71
659.8
5.71
659 .8
5.71
696.169
5.71
.18
.9765
425.95
425.95
1092.00
2222.00
2222.00
5.71
2222.00
.18
EVENT
PROBA-
BILITY
1.3149x10~
4
1.571x10-
2
-'4
1.3149x10
-21.571xlO
1.3149x10~
4
1.571x10
2
1.3149x10
4
1.657x10
2
1.3149x104
4.32x10
6
1.8747x10
4
1.017x10
2
1.017x10-
2
1.731x10
5
5.193x10
2
5.193x10
2
1.3149x10
4
-2
5.193x10
-64.32x10
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Table D.11 (continued)
DUAL STAR ARCHITECTURE SERIAL TRANSMISSION (CONDITION ONE)
1.0
1.0
1.0
.18
.18
.18
.18
4.32x10-6
4.32x10-6
4.32x10-6
8.997x10 4
8.997x10~4
MEANING OF EVENT SYMBOLS:
EVENT SYMBOL COMPONENT
MMI 1
MC 1 hardware
MC 1 control software
Cable
gPC3 hardware
gPC3 software
gPD3 hardware
gPD3 software
gPD'3 hardware
gPD'3 software
Cable
gPC'3 hardware
gPC'3 software
Switch 3
gPC3 hardware (SR)
pPC'3 hardware (SR)
Cable
gPC7 hardware
gPC7 software
pPD7 hardware
gPD7 software
gPD'7 hardware
gPD'7 software
PD8 hardware
gPD8 software
gPD'8 hardware
gPD'8 software
±PC'7 hardware
gPC'7 software
MMI 1 system fails
MC 1 hardware fails
MC 1 control software fails
C3-MC 1 line fails
gPC3 hardware fails
gPC3 software fails
gPD3 hardware fails
4PD3 software fails
gPD'3 hardware fails
1 PD'3 software fails
C3-MC 1 line fails
PC'3 hardware fails
gPC'3 software fails
Switch 3 hardware fails
gPC3 hardware fails (SR)
1 PC'3 hardware fails (SR)
C7-MC line fails
vPC7 hardware fails
gPC7 software fails
gPD7 hardware fails
gPD7 software fails
gPD'7 hardware fails
gPD'7 software fails
gPD8 hardware fails
gPD8 software fails
gPO'8 hardware fails
gPD'8 software fails
gPC'7 hardware fails
gPC'7 software fails
.06
.06
.06
00
pp
QQ
RR
SS
3.0
3.0
3.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
EVENT
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
K
L
M
N
0
p
Q
R
S
T
U
V
w
x
Y
z
AA
BB
CC
DD
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Table D.11 (continued)
DUAL STAR ARCHITECTURE SERIAL TRANSMISSION (CONDITION ONE)
Cable
Switc h 7
pPC7 hardware
uPC7 hardware
MMI 2
MC 1 hardware
MC 2 hardware
MC 2 software
MC 2 hardware
Cable
Cable
Cable
Cable
Secondary storage 1
Secondary storage 2
C'7-MC 1 line fails
Switch 7 hardware fails
PC7 hardware (SR) fails
PC7 hardware (SR) fails
MMI 2 system fails
MC 1 hardware fails (SR)
MC 2 hardware fails (SR)
MC 2 software fails
MC 2 hardware fails
MC2-C3 line fails
MC2-C3' line fails
MC2-C7 line fails
MC2-C7' line fails
Secondary storage 1 fails
Secondary storage 2 fails
DUAL STAR ARCHITECTURE
PROBABILISTIC EQUATIONS SERIAL TRANSMISSION ALTERNATIVE (SITUATION ONE)
From the corresponding fault tree:
TE = < B + C + D + RR + E + F + G + LH + I] x [J + K] x L
+ [G + P]x (N +Q]+[H + J] x[J + K] + + +
+ RT+[ [I4- +5 + T + [U + V] x [W + X1 + LY + Z] x [PA + BB]I
14
XI
+ N +
CC +
0
+ DD + EE + FF + [T + GG] x [DD + HH] + [U + V] x [W + X] + [Y + Z]
x [AA + BB]( > x < [D + JJ] x [LL + KK] + II + MM + LL + SS +
NN + F + G + [H + I] x [J + K] x00 + m + N
x [N + Q] + [H + I] x [J + K] + 1 + 1 1+ ZI [A + B
+S + T +E + [ V- Ix [w -+-X1 + [y + z] x [PA+ 88)
+ 0 + [G + P] x
+c
x CC
+ pp+
+ DD + QQ
+ FF + ET + GG] x [DD + HH] + LU + V] x LW + X] + [Y + Z] x
+ [AA + BB1>
Reducing the equations by Boolean laws:
TE =<B +C + D + RR + 1]H + I x [J + K] + LE + F + GJ x [L + M + N +
EE
FF
GG
HH
II
KK
LL
MM
NN
00
PP
QQ
RR
SS
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+ 0 + (G + P) x (N + Q)] + + + +1
+ [U + VI + LW + X] + LY + ZI x EAA + BBI + ER
+ DD + EE + FF + (T + GG) x (DD + HH)I >+ < ED +
+ II + MM + LL + SS + EC[H + I] x EJ + K] + ENN +
+ M + N + 0 + (G + P) x (N + Q)]I+ + 1+
EU + VI x EW + X] +[Y + ZI x EAA + BB] + EPP +
[CC + D + QQ + FF + (T + GG) x (DD + HH)] 1 >
Applying the probabilistic laws:
TE = F1
F1 = F2 + F3
F2 = F3 5 + F6
F3 5 = F4 + F5
F4 = F33 + F3 4
F3 3 = B + C
F3 4 = D + RR
F5 = F7 + F7
F7 = F8 + F8 + F8
F8 = F1i + F12
F1, = [H + I] x EJ + K]
F12 = (E + F + G) x F13
F1 3 = F1 4 + F1 5
F1 4 = L + M + N + 0
F1 5 = (G + P) x (N + 0)
F6 = F1 6 + F17 + F1 8
+
+ S +
JJ] x
F + GI
S1
S + TI
TI x [CC
ELL + KKI
+ [00 +
1
x
+4
p(TE) = p(FI)
p(F 1 ) = p(F 2 ) + p(F3)
p(F 2 ) = p(F 3 5 ) + p(F 6 ) - p(F 3 5 )p(F 6
p(F35 ) = p(F4 ) + p(F5 ) - p(F4 )p(F5)
p(F 4 ) = p(F 3 3 ) + p(F 3 4 ) - p(F 3 3 )p(F 3 4 )
p(F33 ) = p(B) + p(C) - p(B)p(C)
p(F 34 ) = p(D) + p(RR)
p(F5 ) = 2p(F 7 ) - p(F7)2
p(F7 ) = 3p(F 8 ) + p(F8 )3 - 3p(F8)2
p(F8 ) = p(F11 ) + p(F12 ) - p(F1 )p(F12)
p(Fl 1 ) = Ep(H) + p(I)I x p(J) + p(K)
p(F1 2 ) = Ep(E)+p(F)+p(G)I x p(F13)
p(F13 ) = p(F14 ) + p(F15 ) - p(F14 )p(F15)
p(F14 ) = p(L) + p(M) + p(M) + p(N) + p(O)
p(F15 ) = p(G) + p(P)] x [p(N) + p(0)I
p(F6 ) = p(F 1 6 ) + p(F17 ) + p(F18 )
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F16 = (U + V) x (W + X)
F17 = (Y + Z) x (AA + BB)
F18 = (R + S + T) + F19
Fi9g F20 + F 21 ~
F2 0 = CC + DD + EE + FF
F21 = (T + GG) x (DD + HH)
F3 = F22 + F23 + F24
F22 = F25 + F26
F25 = (D + JJ) x (LL + KK)
F26 = F33 + F34
F3 3 = I + MM
F34 = LL + SS
F23 = F27 + F27
F27 = F28 + F28 + F28
F28 = F11 + F29
F29 = (NN + F + G) x F30
+ p(F16 )p(F17 )p(F18 ) - p(F16 )p(F17 )
- p(F16 )p(F18 ) - p(F17)p(F 18 )
p(F16 ) = [p(U) + p(V)]J+ [p(W) + p(X)3
p(F17 ) = [p(Y) t p(Z)]Jx [p(AA) + p(BB)3
p(F18 ) = [p(R) + p(S) + p(T)] x p(F 19 )
p(F19 ) = p(F20 ) + p(F21 ) - p(F20)p(F 2 1)
p(F20 ) = p(CC) + p(DD) + p(EE) + p(FF)
p(F21) = [p(T) + p(GG)] x [p(DD) + p(HH)3
p(F3) =p(F22) + p(F23 ) + p(F24 )
p(F2 2)p(F2 3 )p(F24 ) - p(F22)p(F24)
- p(F22 )p(F23 ) - p(F2 3 )p(F24)
p(F22 ) = p(F25 ) + p(F26 ) - p(F25 )p(F26)
p(F2 5 ) = [p(D) +
x[p(LL)
p(F2 6 ) = p(F33 )
p(F 33 ) = p(II) +
p(F 3 4 ) = p(LL) +
p(F2 3 ) = 2p(F 2 7 )
p(F 27 ) = 3p(F 2 8 )
p(F28 ) = p(F)11
p(F2 9 ) = [p(NN
p(J) -
+ p(KK)
+ p(F34)
p(MM) -
p(SS) -
- p(F 27
+ p(F28
+ p(F2 9 )
+ p(F)
p(D)p(J)]
- p(LL)p(KK)]
- p(F33 )p(F34
p(II)p(MM)
p(LL)p(SS)
3)- 3p(F 2 8 )
2
- p(F11)p(F29 )
+ p(G)J x p(F30 )
= F3 1 + F1 5
= 00 + M + N + 0
= F1 6 + F1 7 + F3 2
F32 = (PP + S + T) x F19
p(F3 0 ) = p(F 3 1 ) + p(F15 ) - p(F31 )p(F15 )
p(F3 1 ) = p(00 ) + p(M) + p(N) + p(0)
p(F2 4 ) = p(F 16 ) + p(F17 ) + p(F 3 2 ) +
p(F 1 6 )p(F 17 )p(F 3 2 ) - p(F 16 )p(F 17 ) -
p(F16)p(F 32 ) - p(F17 )p(F32)
p(F32 ) = [p(PP) + p(S) + p(T)] x p(F19 )
F30
F3 1
F24
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Table D.12
DUAL STAR ARCHITECTURE SERIAL TRANSMISSION (SITUATION TWO)
GENERIC ENVIRON- LEARN- EVENT
EVENT FAILURE QUALITY MENTAL ING FAILURE PROBA-
SYMBOL RATE (xG) FACTOR FACTOR FACTOR RATE (x) BILITY
(F/106h) rQ TrE '7L (F/106h)
B 173.392 1.0 6.3 1.0 1092.00 1.731
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
2079.92
5.71
.18
562.906
5.71
.18
562.906
5.71
2079.92
5.71
.18
.18
1092.00
-5
.x10
8.997x10~4
8.997x10 4
4.869x10-2
1. 3149x104
4.32x10-6
1.3149x10-2
1.3149x10' 4
4.32x10-6
1.3149x10-2
1. 3149x104
4.869x10-2
1.3149x10~4
4. 32x10-6
4.32x10 -6
1.731x10-
II
i
RR
MM
NN
TT
PP
QQ
Uu
KK
LL
00
FF
330.1464
5.71
.06
89.3502
5.71
.06
89.3502
5.71
330.1464
5.71
.06
.06
173.392
1.0
1.0
3.0
1.0
1.0
3.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
3.0
3.0
1.0
6.3
1.0
1.0
6.3
1.0
1.0
6.3
1.0
6.3
1.0
1.0
1.0
6.3
411
Table D.12 (continued)
DUAL STAR ARCHITECTURE SERIAL TRANSMISSION (CONDITION TWO)
MEANING OF EVENT SYMBOLS:
EVENT SYMBOL
B
II
VV
RR
SS
MM
NN
TT
PP
QQ
UU
KK
LL
FF
COMPONENT EVENT
M 1l1IMMI 1 system fails
Secondary storage 1 Secondary storage1fails
Secondary storage 2 Secondary storage 2 fails
MC 2 hardware MC 2 hardware fails
MC 2 diagnosis software MC 2 diagnosis software fails
Cable D3-MC 2 line fails
gPD3 hardware PC3 hardware fails
gPD3 software PC3 software fails
Cable D3-MC 2 cable fails
4PD3' hardware .PD3'hardware fails
PD3' software PD3'software fails
MCI hardware MCI hardware fails (SR)
MCI hardware MCI hardware fails (SR)
Cable D3-MC 1 cable fails
MMI 2 MMI 2 system fails
DUAL STAR ARCHITECTURE
PROBABILISTIC EQUATIONS SERIAL TRANSMISSION ALTERNATIVE (SITUATION TWO)
The fault tree and the equations are similar to the parallel
transmission case; a few probabilities change. The values of the
probabilities used in this case are given in Table D.10 and Table D.12.
Automatic control system fails to
control the propulsion plant ,
pJ
Global bus architecture, situation one.Figure D.13
Figure D.13 (continued)
cr
Figure D.13 (continued)
0
Switch 3
G H fails
7
Figure D.13, (continued)
CD
Figure 0.13 (continued)
Figure D.13 (continued)
-t
Figure D.13 (continued)
4 h
Standby pPC7 fails
REE
Figure D.13 (continued)
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Table D.13
GLOBAL BUS ARCHITECTURE SERIAL TRANSMISSION (SITUATION ONE)
GENERIC
EVENT FAILURE
SYMBOL RATE (XG)
(F/106 h)
A .06
C 173.392
D 223.84
E 5.71
F 102.517
G 5.71
H 102.517
I 5.71
J 96.776
K 5.71
L 96.776
m 5.71
N .155
0 67.6105
P 67.6105
Q 102.517
R 5.71
S 102.517
T 5.71
U 96.776
QUALITY
FACTOR
1TQ
3.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
ENVIRON-
MENTAL
FACTOR
S E
1.0
6.3
6.3
1.0
6.3
1.0
6.3
1.0
6.3
1.0
6.3
1.0
6.3
6.3
6.3
6.3
1.0
6.3
1.0
6.3
LEARN-
ING
FACTOR
rL
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
FAILURE
RATE (x)
(F/106h)
.18
1. 092x103
1410.19
5.71
646.046
5.71
646.046
5.71
609.688
5.71
609.688
5.71
0.9765
425.95
425.95
646.046
5.71
646.046
5.71
609.688
EVENT
PROBA-
BILITY
4.32x10-6
1.731x10 5
3.328x02
1.3149x10~4
1.538x10-2
-41.3149x10
1.538x10-2
1.3149x10~4
1.452x10-2
-41.3149x10
1.452x10-2
1. 3149x10~4
1.8747x10~4
1.017x10-2
1.017x10-2
1.538x10-2
1.3149x10~4
1. 538x10-2
1.3149x0~4
1.452x10-2
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Table D.13 (continued)
GLOBAL BUS ARCHITECTURE SERIAL TRANSMISSION (SITUATION ONE)
GENERIC
EVENT FAILURE
SYMBOL RATE (XG)
(F/106h)
V 5.71
W 96.776
X 5.71
Y 96.776
Z 5.71
AA 96.776
BB 5.71
CC .155
DO 67.6105
EE 67.6105
FF
QUALITY
FACTOR
lrQ
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
ENVIRON-
MENTAL
FACTOR
rE
1.0
6.3
1.0
6.3
1.0
6.3
1.0
6.3
6.3
6.3
LEARN-
ING FAILURE
FACTOR RATE (x)
WL (F/106h)
1.0 5.71
1.0 609.688
1.0 5.71
1.0 609.688
1.0 5.71
1.0 609.688
1.0 5.71
1.0 .9765
1.0 425.95
1.0 425.95
EVENT
PROBA-
BILITY
1.3149x10~4
1.452x10- 2
1.3149x10~4
1.452x10-2
1.3149x10~4
1.452x10-2
1.3149x10~4
1.8747x10~4
1.017x10-2
1. 017x10-2
8.997x10~4
MEANING OF EVENT SYMBOLS:
EVENT SYMBOL COMPONENT
A Coaxial cable
C MMI
0 MC hardware
E MC control software
F wPC3 hardware
G uPC3 software
H gPC'3 hardware
I uiPC'3 software
J PD'3 hardware
K PD3 software
L uPD'3 hardware
EVENT
Global bus fails
MMI system fails
MC hardware fails
MC control software fails
PPC3 hardware fails
vPC3 software fails
PC'3 hardware fails
tiPC'3 software fails
1 PD'3 hardware fails
PD3 software fails
gPD'3 hardware fails
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Table D.13 (continued)
GLOBAL BUS ARCHITECTURE SERIAL TRANSMISSION (SITUATION ONE)
gPD3' software
Switch 3
gPC3 hardware
1PC'3 software
gPC7 hardware
gPC7 software
gPC'7 hardware
uPC'7 software
gPD 7 hardware
wPD7 software
gPD'7 hardware
uPD'7 software
gPD8 hardware
gPD8 software
gPD'8 hardware
gPD'8 software
Switch 7
gPC7 hardware
gPC'7 hardware
Secondary storage
gLPD 3' software fails
Switch 3 fails
gPC3 hardware fails (SR)
gPC'3 software fails (SR)
gPC7 hardware fails
±PC7 software fails
gPC' 7 hardware fails
gPC'7 software fails
gPD7 hardware fails
4PD7 software fails
PD'7 hardware fails
4PD'7 software fails
4PD8 hardware fails
PD8 software fails
gPD'8 hardware fails
gPD'8 software fails
Switch 7 fails
gPC7 hardware fails (SR)
1PC'7 hardware fails (SR)
Secondary storage fails
GLOBAL BUS ARCHITECTURE
PROBABILISTIC EQUATIONS D.13 SITUATION ONE
Fran the fault tree:
TE = A + C - D + E + F + [F + GI x [H + I +
+ [i+ K] x [L + M]1+1 + +
N +- (0 + G) x (P +
+ + +
x [S + T + CC + (DD + R) x CEE + T)I + LU + VI x [W + X] + [Y + ZI
x [AA + BBI'
Applying the probabilistics laws:
TE = FI + F2 + F3
F1 = F17 + F18
p(TE) = p(F1 ) + p(F2 ) + p(F 3 ) + p(FB)p(F2)p(F3 )
- p(F1)p(F2 ) - p(FI)p(F3 ) - p(F 2 )p(F 3 )
p(F 1 ) = p(F1 7 ) + p(F1 8 ) - p(F1 7 )p(F 18 )
m1
N
0
P
Q
R -
S
T
U
V
w
x
A
BB
cc
DO
EE
FF
I)]
[Q + RI
F1 7 = C
F18 = D + E + FF + A
F2
F4
F5
F6
F7
F8
F9
F10
F3
F11
F12
F13
F14
FI5E
FI6E
= F4
= F5
= F6
F4
F5 + F5
F7
= (J + K) x (L + M)
= (F + G) x F8
= F9 + F1 0
=H + I + N
= (0 + G) x (P + I)
=F + F12 + F13
- (U + V) x (W + X)
(Y +Z) x (AA + BB)
= CQ + R) x F14
= F1 5 + F1 6
= S + T + CC
= (DD +R) x (E + T)
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p(F 17 ) = p(C)
p(F 18 ) = p(D) + p(E) + p(FF) - p(D)p(FF) + p(A)
p(F2) = 2p(F 4) - p(F4)2
p(F4 ) = 3p(F 5) + p(F5
3 
-3p(F5 2
p(F5 ) = p(F6 ) + p(F7 ) - p(F6 )p(F7 )
p(F6) = [p(J) + P(K)J x [p(L) + p(M)1
p(F7) = [p(F) + p(G)] x p(F8 )
p(F8 ) = p(F9 ) + p(F10 ) - p(Fg)p(F10)
p(F9) = p(H) + p(I) + p(N)
p(F10 ) = [p(O) + p(G)] x [p(P) K p(I)]
p(F3 ) = p(F1i) + p(F12 ) + p(F13 ) +
p(F11)p(F12)p(F1 3 ) - p(Fll)p(F 12 ) ~
p(F12 )p(F13 ) - p(F11)p(F13 )
p(F1l) = [p(U) +p+(V)] x [p(W) + p(X)]
p(F12 ) = [p(Y) + p(Z)] x [p(AA) + p(BB)]
p(F12 ) = [p(Q) + p(R)] x p(F14 )
p(F 14 ) = p(F15 ) + p(F16 ) - p(F15 )p(F1 6)
p(F 15 ) = [p(S) + p(T) + p(CC)
p(F16 ) = [p(DD) + p(R)] x [p(EE) + p(T)]
6 5
a)
Global bus architecture, situation two.
*See legend on next page.
Figure D.14
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1. Control system fails to diagnose and to advise the appropriate
corrective measures
+
FF
Digital diagnosis system fails
A
C
+
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
system
system
system
system
system
system
system
system
system
system
system
system
system
system
D fails
D8 fails
Dy 7fails
D 6 fails
D5 fails
D fails
D2 fails
D fails
Dg 4fail s
D13 fails
D12 fails
D 11fails
D10 fails
D3 fails
Distributed
Distributed
Distributed
Distributed
Distributed
Distributed
Distributed
Distributed
Distributed
Distributed
Distributed
Distributed
Distributed
Distributed
GG
HH
1
Figure D.14 (continued)
OD
419
Table D.14
GLOBAL BUS ARCHITECTURE SERIAL TRANSMISSION (SITUATION TWO)
GENERIC
EVENT FAILURE QUALITY
SYMBOL RATE (XG) FACTOR
(F/106h) ir
FF
GG 223.84
HH 5.71
1 96.776
5.71
L 97.776
M 5.71
E 173.392
A 0.06
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
3.0
6.3
1.0
6.3
1.0
6.3
1.0
6.3
1.0
ENVIRON-
MENTAL
FACTOR
LEARN-
ING
FACTOR
rE L
FAILURE
RATE (x)
EVENT
PROBA-
BILITY
(F/10 h9
1.0 1410.19
1.0 5.71
1.0 609.688
1.0 5.71
1.0 609.608
1.0 5.71
1.0 1.092x10 3
1.0 0.18
8.997x10
3. 328x10-2
1.3149x10 4
1.452x10-2
1. 314910~4
1.452x10-2
1.3149x10
4
1.731x10-
5
4. 32x10
6
MEANING OF EVENT SYMBOLS:
EVENT SYMBOL COMPONENT
Secondary storage
MC hardware
MC diagnosis software
uPD3 hardware
±PD3 software
wPD'3 hardware
0PD' 3 software
MMI system
Coaxial cable
Secondary storage fails
MC hardware fails
MC diagnosis software fails
LPD3 hardware fails
gPD3 software fails
1gPD'3 hardware fails
gPD'3 software fails
MMI system fails
Global bus fails
From the faul t tree:
TE = FF + A + C + GG + HH + [J + K] x [L + M] + [ ] + [ J + [ I + [ ] +
FF
GG
HH
i
K
L
M
E
A
EVENT
I+c
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Applying the probabilistics laws:
TE = F1 + F2  p(TE)
F1 = F8 + F9  p(F I
F8 = FF + GG p(F8 )
F9 = A + C + HH . p(F9 )
F2 = F3 + F3  p(F2 )
F3 = F4 + F5  p(F3 )
F4 = F6 + F6  p(F4 )
F6 = F7 + F7 p(F6)
F 5 = F7 + F 7 + F7 p(F5 )
F7 = (J+K) x (L+M) p(F )
= p(FI) + p(F2 ) - p(FI)p(F 2 )
= p(F8 ) + p(F9) - p(F8 )p(F9 )
= p(FF) + p(GG) - p(FF)p(GG)
= p(A) + p(C) + p(HH)
= 2p(F 3 ) - p(F3)2
= p(F4 ) + p(F5 ) - p(F4 )p(F5)
= 2p(F 6 ) - p(F6)2
= Zp(F 7 ) - p(F7) 2
= 3p(F 7 ) + p(F7 )3- 3p(F7 )2
= [p(J) + p(K)] x [p(L) + p(M)]
AG F NN C B
Figure D.15 Dual global bus architecture, situation one.
-P,
N
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Figure D.15 (continued)
Figure .15 (continued)
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1.- 1
2. +
3. Distributed system 7 fails
4. Distributed system 6 fails
5. Distributed system 5 fails
6. Distributed system 4 fails
7. Distributed system 3 fails
8. Distributed system 2 fails
9. Distributed system 1 fails
10. +
11. +
12. Data validation system fails
13. pPC 7 system fails
14. yPD3 system fails
15. pPC 3 system fails
16. 3
17. 4
18. 5
19. 6
Figure D,15 (continued)
(31
Figure D.15 (continued)
o
Figure D.15 (continued)
N'
00
Figure 0.15 (continued)
A
to
Figure 0.15 (continued)
4C:h
Figure D.15 (continued)
DUAL GLOBAL
GENERIC
EVENT FAILURE
SYMBOL RATE (XG)
(F/106h)
B 0.06
C 173.392
D 0.06
E 173.392
F 223.84
G 5.71
H 127.547
1 5.71
J 127.547
K 5.71
L 127.993
M 5.71
N 127.993
0 5.71
P 127.547
Q 5.71
R 127.547
S 5.71
T 127.993
U 5.71
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Table D.15
BUS ARCHITECTURE SERIAL TRANSMISSION
QUALITY
FACTOR
lrQ
3.0
1.0
3.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
ENVIRON- LEARN-
MENTAL ING FAILURE
FACTOR FACTOR RATE (x)
ltE rL {F/10
6h)
1.0 1.0 0.18
6.3
1.0
6.3
6.3
1.0
6.3
1.0
6.3
1.0
6.3
1.0
6.3
1.0
6.3
1.0
6.3
1.0
6.3
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.092x10 3
0.18
1. 092x103
1410.19
5.71
803.546
5.71
803.546
5.71
806.36
5.71
806.36
5.71
803.546
5.71
803.546
5.71
806.36
5.71
(SITUATION ONE)
EVENT
PROBA-
BILITY
4.32x06
1.731x10-5
-6
4.32x10
1.731x10-5
3.328x10-2
-4
1.3149x10
1.91x10-
2
1.3149x10
4
1.91x10-
2
1.3149x10~4
1.9166x10-
2
1.3149x10~
4
1.9166x10-2
1.3149x10~
4
-2
1.91x10
1.3149x10~
4
1.91x10-
2
-4
1.3149x10
1.9166x10-
2
A.3149x10~ 4
DUAL GLOBAL
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Table D.15 (continued)
BUS ARCHITECTURE SERIAL TRANSMISSION (SITUATION ONE)
GENERIC
EVENT FAILURE
SYMBOL RATE (XG)
(F/106h)
V 127.993
w 5.71
X 127.993
Y 5.71
Z 127.993
AA 5.71
BB .155
CC 67.6135
DD 67.610
EE .155
FF 67.610
GG 67.610
LL 223.84
MM
NN
NN
5.71
QUALITY
FACTOR
lrQ
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
3.0
3.0
1.0
3.0
3.0
1.0
1.0
ENVIRON-
MENTAL
FACTOR
WE
6.3
1.0
6.3
1.0
6.3
1.0
6.3
6.3
6.3
6.3
6.3
6.3
6.3
1.0
LEARN
ING
FACTC
L
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1-
FAILURE
)R RATE (x)
(F/106h)
806.36
5.71
806.36
5.71
806.36
5.71
.9765
425.95
425.95
.9765
425.95
425.95
1410.10
5.71
EVENT
PROBA-
BILITY
1.9166x10- 2
1.3149x10~4
1. 9166x10 2
1.3149x10 4
1.9166x10-2
1.3149x10~4
1.8747x10 4
1. 017x10 2
1.017x10
1.8747x10 4
1.017x10- 2
1.017x40-2
3. 328x10- 2
1.3149x10~4
8.997x10~4
8.997xlO
MEANING OF EVENT SYMBOLS:
EVENT SYMBOL COMPONENT
B Coaxial cable
EVENT
Global bus 1 fails
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C
D
E
F
G
H
I
K
L
M
N
0
P
Q
R
S
T
U
V
w
x
y
z
AA
BB
cc
DD
EE
FE
GG
LL
mm
00
MMI I system
Coaxial cable
MMI 2 system
MC 1 hardware
MC 1 software
gPC3 hardware
gPC3 software
4PC'3 hardware
gPC'3 software
±PD3 hardware
gPD3 software
vPD'3 hardware
gPD'3 software
RPC 7 hardware
gPC7 software
gPC'7 hardware
PC'7 software
4PD7 hardware
RPD 7 software
uPD' 7 hardware
4PD'7 software
gPD8 hardware
gPD8 software
gPD'8 hardware
gPD'8 software
Switch 7
gPC7 hardware
gPC'7 hardware
Switch 3
gPC3 hardware (SR)
RPC'3 hardware (SR)
MC 2 hardware
MC 2 software
Secondary storage 1
Secondary storage 2
PROBABILISTIC EQUATIONS
Fran the fault tree:
<B + C4+NN + F + G EH + I] EJ + K + EE + (FF
(GG + K)] + EL + MI x [N + 0](+ + ' + + I
+ [P + Q] x ER + S + BB + (Q + CC) x (S + DO)] +
ET + U] x [V + WI + EX + Y] x [Z + AA] > z c 9 + E + 00 +
MMI 1 system fails
Global bus 2 fails
MMI 2 system fails
MC 1 hardware fails
MC 1 software fails
pPC3 hardware fails
gPC3 software fails
1 PC'3 hardware fails
,,PC'3 software fails
4PD3 hardware fails
1 PD3 software fails
1 PD'3 hardware fails
1 PD'3 software fails
RPC 7 hardware fails
uPC7 software fails
gPC'7 hardware fails
gPC'7 software fails
4PD7 hardware fails
PD7 software fails
gPD'7 hardware fails
4PD'7 software fails
4PD8 hardware fails
1gPD8 software fails
LPD'8 hardware fails
gPD'8 software fails
Switch 7 hardware fails
1PC7 hardware fails (SR)
1 PC'7 hardware fails (SR)
Switch 3 hardware fails
gPC3 hardware fails (SR)
gPC'3 hardware fails (SR)
MC 2 hardware fails
MC 2 control software fails
Secondary storage 1 fails
Secondary storage 2 fails
TE = +- I) x
+-
GI x ELL + MM] + LL
(GG + K)] + EL + M]
+ (EP + Q] x ER + S
+ w] + LX + Y] x Ez
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+ MM + EH + I] x [J
x EN + 0]1+ +
+ BB + (Q + CC) x (S
+ AA] >
+ K + EE + (FF +
+ + +
+ DD)] + [T + U]
By using the boolean laws the equation is reduced to:
TE = [H + I] x [J + K + EE + (FF + I) x (GG + K)] + EL + M] x [N + 0]
4 4+ s JEP +Q]x [R + S + BB +
(Q + CC) x (S + DD)] + UT + U] x [V + W1] x [X + Y] x [Z + AA]
+ [B + C + F + G + NN] x ED + E + LL + MM + 00]
Applying the probabilistics laws:
TE = F1 + F2 + F3  p(TE)=p(F1) + p(F2) + p(F3) - p(F1)p(F2)p(F3)
-p (F 1)p(F 2 ) - p(F1 )p(F3 ) - p(F2 )p(F3 )
F1 = F4  p(F1 )=p(F4)
F4 = F18 x F19  p(F4)=p(F18)x p(F19)
F18 = B + C + F + G + NN p(F18) p(B) + p(C) + p(F) + p(G) + p(NN)
+ p(C)p(F)p(NN) - p(C)p(F) - p(C)p(NN)
- p(F)p(NM)
F19 = D + E + LL + MM + 00 p(F19) p(D) + p(E) + p(LL) + p(MM)
+ p(00) + p(E)p(LL)p(0O) - p(E)p(LL)
- p(E)p(00) - p(LL)p(00)
F2 = F5 + F5  p(F2)=p(F5) p(F5)2
F5 = F6 + F6 + F6  p(F5)=3p(F 6) + p(F6)-3p(F6)
F6 = F7 + F8 p(F6 ) = p(F7 ) + p(F8 ) + p(F3)-p(Fp8 )
[F +
I) x
x [V
F7 = (L+M) x (N+0)
F8 = (H+I) + F9
F 9 = F10 + Fil
F10 = J + K + E
Fr i= (FF+I) x (GG + K)
F3 = 12 + F13 + F=F4
F12 = (T+U) x (V+W)
F13 = (X+Y) x (Z+AA)
F14 = (P+Q) + F15
F15= F16 + F17
F 16 = R + S + BB
F17 = (Q+CC) X (S + DD)
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p(F7 ) = [p(L) + p(M)J x [p(N) + p(O)]
p(F8 ) = [p(H) + p(I)] x p(F9 )]
p(F 9 ) = p(F 10 ) + p(F 1i) - p(F10 )p(F1 1 )
p(F10 ) = p(J) + p(K) + p(E) - p(J)p(E)
p(F1i) = [p(FF) + p(I)] x [p(GG) + p(K)]
p(F3 ) = p(F12 ) + p(F13 ) + p(F13 ) + p(F12)
p(F13)p(F 14 ) - p(F12 )p(F14 ) -
p(F12)p(F 13 ) - p(F13 )p(F14 )
p(F12 ) = [p(T) + p(U)] x [p(V) + p(W)]
p(F13 ) = [p(X) + p(Y)] x [p(Z) + p(AA)]
p(F14 ) = [p(P) + p(Q) ] x p(F15)
p(F15 ) = p(F16 ) + p(F17) - p(F16 )p(F17 )
p(F 16 ) = p(R) + p(S) + p(BB)
p(F17 ) = [p(Q) + p(CC)] x [p(S) + p(DD)]
1112
3
('3
C)
13
Figure D.16 Dual global bus
*See legena on
architecture, situation two.
next page.
*
4
10 9 8 7
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1. Control system fails to diagnose and to advise the appropriate
corrective measures
2. X
3. Standby diagnosis system No. 2 fails
4. Diagnosis system No. 1 on service fails
5. +
6. +
7. NN
8. C
9. B
10. F
11. PP
12. 1
13. 00
14. E
15. D
16. QQ
17. LL
18. 1
Figure D.16
co
(continued)
*See legend on next page,
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2. Distributed digital system fails
3. +
4. Distributed system D9 fails
5. Distributed system D8 fails
6. Distributed system D7 fails
7. Distributed system D6 fails
8. Distributed system D5 fails
9. Distributed system D4 fails
10. Distributed system D3 fails
11. Distributed system D2 fails
12. Distributed system D1 fails
13. Distributed system D 14 fails
14. Distributed system D13 fails
15. Distributed system D12 fails
16. Distributed system D 11 fails
17. Distributed system D10 fails
18. 2
Figure D.16 (continued)
C
DUAL GLOBAL
GENERIC
EVENT FAILURE
SYMBOL RATE (XG)
(F/10 6h)
NN
00
Pp 5.71
QQ 5.71
LL 127.547
M
N
0
B
C
F
E
LL
5.71
127.547
5.71
.06
173.392
223.84
173.392
223.84
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Table D.16
BUS ARCHITECTURE SERIAL TRANSMISSION (SITUATION TWO)
ENVIRON- LEARN- EVENT
QUALITY MENTAL ING FAILURE PROBA-
FACTOR FACTOR FACTOR RATE Cx) BILITY
(F/10 6h)lT Q i
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
3.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
_1.0
6.3
1.0
6.3
1.0
1.0
6.3
6.3
6.3
6.3
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
5.71
5.71
803.546
5.71
803.546
5.71
.18
1092
1410.19
1092
1410.19
8.997x10~4
8. 997x10C4
-4
1. 3149x10
1.3149x10~4
1. 91x10-2
-4
1.3149x10
1. 91x10-2
1.3149x10 4
-6
4.32x10
1.731x10-5
3.328x10- 2
1. 731x10-5
3.328x10-2
MEANING OF EVENT SYMBOLS:
EVENT SYMBOL COMPONENT
NN Secondary storage 1
00 Secondary storage 2
PP MC 1 software
QQ MC 2 software
L gPD3 hardware
M PD3 software
N 4PD'3 hardware
EVENT
Secondary storage 1 fails
Secondary storage 2 fails
MC 1 software fails
MC 2 software fails
wPD3 hardware fails
LPD3 software fails
1 PD'3 hardware fails
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PD'3 software
Coaxial cable
MMI 1
MC I hardware
Coaxial cable
MMI2
MC 2 hardware
gPD'3 sof tware f ails
Global bus 1 fails
MMI 1 system fails
MC I hardware fails
Global bus 2 fails
ItI 2 system fails
MC 2 hardware fails
PROBABILISTIC EQUATIONS
corresponding fault tree:
+ C + NN + F + PP [L + MI x [N + 0] +[] + [3] + [1] +
+ [ [ ]+[ ]+[ ]+[ ]+[ ]+[ ]+[ ]+
+[ + x D + E + 00 + LL + QQ + [L + M]x
[N + 0] +[ ] +[ ]I+[ ] +.[ ]J+I[ ]+I[ ]+[
+[ ] + I[ ]+I[ ]+[ ]+[ ] +[]
Applying boolean laws the equation is reduced to:
TE =EL + M] x [N + 0] + []+ []+ []+ []+ []+[]
+ML[N+O]+[ ]+[ ]+I[ ]+[ ]+[ ]++
[D + E + 00 + LL + QQ] x [B + C + NN + F + PP]
Applying the probabilistics laws:
TE = F1 + F2
F1 = F3 x F4
F3 = B + C + NN + F + PP
F4 = D + E + 00 + LL + QQ
p(TE) = p(FI) + p(F2 ) - p(FI)p(F2 )
p(F1 ) = p(F 3 )p(F 4 )
p(F3 ) = p(B) + p(C) + p(NN) + p(F) + p(PP) +
p(C)p(NN)p(F) - p(C)p(F) - p(C)p(NN)
- p(NN)p(F)
p(F 4 ) = p(D) + p(E) + p(OO) + P(LL) + P(QQ)
p(E)p(O0)p(LL) - p(E)p(OO) - p(E)p(LL)
0
B
C
F
D
E
LL
From the
TE = (B
]3+
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+ F5
x F7
x F8
+ F 9
+ F9 + F9
+ M) x (N + 0)
p(F2)
p(F5)
p(F6 )
p(F8)
p(F7 )
p(F9)
- p(00)p(LL)
= 2p(F5 ) - p(F5)2
= p(F 6 )p(F 7 ) -p(F6 )p(F7 )
= 2p(F 8 ) - p(F8 )2
= 2p(F9 ) - p(Fg)2
= 3p(F9 ) + p(F9 )3 - 3p(F9)2
= [p(L) + p(M)] x [p(N) + p(O)]
F2
F5
F6
F8
F7
F9
= F5
= F6
= F8
= F9
= F9
= (L
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APPENDIX E
DEBUGGING TIME CALCULATIONS
The theory behind the debugging time calculations has been stated in
references E.1 and E.2. In those references it is proved that the
expected number of software errors or failures detected at time t is a
non-decreasing function of t. Also this expression is a function of the
expected total number of errors to be detected until complete and perfect
debugging. This expression has the following form:
m(t) = a(1 - e)bt (E.1)
where
m(t) = expected number of errors detected at time t
a = total expected number of errors
b = software parameter characteristic of each program.
The theory has been developed aiming to predict the expected
reliability of a program when it has not been completely debugged. In
other words, the actual parameters for Eq. (E.1) come from direct
observation during the debugging process.
Performing a time derivative on Eq. (E.1)::
dm(t) = b e-bt (E.2)t
a = 9, the expected remaining bugs in the program.
drn t)can be interpreted as the hazard function of the software.
The following step is to assume that the debugging process is done by
running the code under study and looking for the errors buried in it.
This assumption equates the time variable in Eq. (E.1) with the debugging
445
time.
For a debugging time TD
dm(t)1 = 6 b ebTD
dt Jt=t 0
making the hazard function a fixed value (at designer will).
dm(t)] t =C .(E.3)
-at- t=TD
A .-bTDC = B b e
Solving the equation
T n C (E.4)T = - in ( 0)(E4D b7 b
In our case the values for come from Table B.2 where the estimated
number of errors at the end of programming stage are calculated. The
parameter C is fixed value by the designer. Only the parameter b offers
difficulties to obtain it, because this is a value which can only be
acquired after the real debugging process has been started. This point
presents a problem that cannot be accurately solved at this stage of the
analysis but from past experiences a general number for b can be assumed.
b = 7.381 x 10~ Ch1]
More accurate calculations must wait until the real debugging process is
started.
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APPENDIX F
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
The results of the sensitivity analysis are written in two tables,
one for each situation. The first three options in each sitatuion have
been chosen for the sensitivity analysis: dual start serial, dual global
bus, and dual star parallel in situation one and central computer, global
bus, and star serial in situation two.
The parameters (variables) analyzed are the following:
1. Situation One
cost (C)
payoff of success (POS)
probability of uPC hardware failure (P(gPC))
probability of gPD hardware failure (P( PD))
probability of mC hardware failure (P(mC))
probability of line failure (P(lines))
time between maintenance (Tmaint)
probability of software failure (P(soft))
2. Situation One
cost (C)
probability of wrong operator intervention (P(OP))
probability of vPD hardware failure (P(uPD))
probability of mC hardware failure (P(mC))
probability of line failure (P(line))
time between maintenance CTmai nt)
probability of software failure (P(soft))
448
The tables show the values of the variables, the corresponding
probability of failure for the architecture, and the related EMV. All
the numbers are graphically shown in Figures 2.10.1 through 2.10.15.
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Table F.1:
Dual Star
Variable
Cos t 10.9x106
11 .21xl1O6
11.5x106
P(LaPC) 1.0x106
1.66x10 -2
3.0x10-2
P ( PD) 1.0x10 -2
1.57x10-2
3.0x10~2
P(mC) 1.0x10-2
5.10x10
7.0x10-2
P(soft) 1.0x10-5
1.37x144
l.0x10-3
POS 33.5x106
67x106
1 .0x108
P(lines) 0
4.32x0-6
1.0x10-5
T (tes ts) 24( h)
72(h)
120(h)
Sensitivity Analysis: Situation One
Serial
P f(ACT)
.0035
.0035
.0035
.0033
.0035
.0042
.0034
.0035
.0041
.0003
.0035
.006-
.0034
.0035
.0035
.0035
.0003
.0035
.0035
.0035
.0035
.0035
.0037
.1136
Dual Global Bus
EMVx1O6
55.865
55.553
55.265
55.566
55.553
55.507
55. 567
55.553
55.512
55.770
55.553
55.379
55.499
55.553
55.605
22.171
55.553
88.438
55.553
55.555
55.553
55.553
53.295
48.174
Variable
10.9x106
11.26x106
11. 5x106
1 .0x10-2
1.91x10
3.00x12
.x1-2
1.90-2
3.11-21.92x10-
3.01x10-2
-2
1.xO10
3.33x10
7.040o'2
-
5
1.0x10-3
33.5x106
67x106
1x108
0
4.32x10-6
1.0x10 5
24(h)
72(h)
120(h)
P (ACT)
.0068
.0068
.0068
.0049
.0068
.0107
.0046
.0067
.0011
.0057
.0068
.0106
.0068
.0068
.0073
.0067
.0068
.0068
.0068
.0068
.0068
.0068
.0058
.1500
EMVx1O6
55.646
55.282
55.047
55.408
55.282
55.020
55.426
55.282
54.998
55.352
55.282
55.025
55.222
55.282
55.295
22.01
55.282
88.059
55.282
55.282
55.282
55.282
51. 846
45.677
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Table F.1:
Variable
Cost 10.9x106
11.39x106
11. 5x106
P( VPC) 1.Ox10-2
1. 60x10-2
3.0x10 2
P(4PD) 1.0x10-2
1.63x10-2
3.x0-23. OxlO2
P(mC) 1.0x10-2
6.37x10-2
9.0x10 2
P(soft) 1.0x10-05
1.37x10 4
1.0x10 3
POS 33.5x106
67x106
1 .0x108
P(lines) 0
4.32x10-6
-5
T (tests ) 24(h)
72(h)
120( h )
Sensitivity Analysis: Situation One (continued)
Dual Star Parallel
P f (ACT)
.0095
.0095
.0095
.0084
.0095
.0142
.0082
.0095
.0146
.0044
.0095
.0147
.0095
.0095
.01
.0095
.0095
.0095
.0095
.0095
.0095
.0095
.0079
.1944
EMV x106
55.461
54.967
54.861
55.041
54.967
54.654
55.056
54.967
54.679
55.313
54.967
54.623
54.906
55.967
54.987
21.786
54.967
87.652
54.967
54.967
54.967
54.967
50.341
42. 579
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Table F.2: Sensitivity Analysis: Situation Two
Central Global Bus
Cos t
P (op)
Variable
10 .8x106
10.91x106
11.3x106
0.01
0.039
0.1
P f (ACT)
.177
.177
.177
.177
.177
.177
EMVx 106
-10.93
-11.05
-11.43
-10.95
-11.05
-11.25
P( 1 PD)
P (mC) 0.1
0.172
0.3 '
P(lines) 5.0x10~4
4.69x10-3
5.0x10-2
P(soft) 1.0x10-5
1.31x10~4
1.0x103
T(tests) 24(h)
72(h)
120(h)
.105
.177
.304
.173
.177
.2141
.176
.177
.177
.177
.445
.628
-10.99
-11.05
-11.14
-11.04
-11.05
-11.07
-11.11
-11.05
-10.99
-11.05
-11.24
-11.38
Variable
10 .8x106
11.04x106
11.3x106
0.01
0.039
0.1
1.OxlO-
1.45x10-2
3.0x10 2
-a
1. 0x10
3.33x10-2
7.0x0-2
0
4.32x10-6
.x1-51.OxIO-
-5
1.0x10-
-
41.31x10
1.0x10-3
24(h)
72(h)
120(h)
Pf(ACT) EMVx1O6
.0037 -10.83
.0037- -11.07
.0037 -11.33
.0037 -11.05
.0037 -11.07
.0037 -11.11
.0036 -11.067
-11.068
.0465 -11.075
.014 -11.051
.037 -11.068
.073 -11.095
.037 -11.068
.037 -11.068
.037 -11.068
.0370 -11.134
.0372 -11.018
.0383 -11.068
.0372 -11.068
.1274 -11.135
.2313 -11.212
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Table F.2: Sensitivity Analysis: Situation One
Star Serial
Variable
10.
11.07
11.3x10 6
0.01
0.039
0.1
1 .0x10-2
1 .26x10-2
3.0x10 -2
1.0x10-2
4.8x10-2
7 .0x10 2
Pf(ACT)
.0514
.0514
.0514
.0 514
.0514
.0514
.0506
.0514
.0613
.0133
.0514
.073
.0514
.0514
.0514
.051
P( lines) 0
4.32x10-6
1,.0x10-5
P(soft) 1.0x10-5
1.31x10 4
1.0x10-3
T(test) 24(h)
72(h)
120(h)
.052
.0514
.162
.277
(continued)
Cost
P (op)
P(gPD)
P (mC)
EMVx1O6
-10.84
-11.11
-11.34
-11.08
-11.11
-11.16
-11.06
-11.06
-11.114
-11.078
-11.107
-11.123
-11.107
-11.107
-11.107
-11.172
-11.107
-11.056
-11.107
-11.189
-11.273
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APPENDIX G
STATE EQUATIONS FOR THE QUASI STEADY STATE CONDITION
The basic equations to start the process of obtaining the state
equations are:
M s W fl ~wc
M =wsp + c + w su ~wfl
(3.3.11)
(3.3.12)
(3.3.13)
(3.3.23)
(3.3.19)
(3.3.17)
Us W fl hfl- wchs s-
U, =wsuhsuschc +V hsph ~flhfl+QhPV
Wsphsp + wchs W chc + wsphc
V+Vs = 0
By definition
UH =H -PV -PV ~
Substituting (3.3.13) into the defnition
Hs -Ps PV =fl h -wch 
-PVs
cancelling equal terms
H s w fl h - wchs + PVs (G.1)
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Also by definition
H =MSh + Mh
ss s s s
Substituting the definition into (G.1)
Mshs + Mshs= hflhfl 
- wchs + PVs
Substituting (3.3.11) into the former equation
(Wfg 
- wc)hs + Mshs = wf1 hf1 - wchs + Vs
C s a
Mshs =w"fl h 
- wchs + wchs ~swfl hs + PVs
Msh S w fl(hf1 - hs) + PMsv s(G-2)
Also by definition
U= H~ - PV - Pw w w pi w
Substituting the definition into (G.1)
Hw wwWsubsu + wchc + wsph0 - w h +fl Qh Pw
H= wsuhsu + (wc + wsp)hC+ Qh - Wfl hg + PVW (G.3)
By definition
Hw = M h + Mwhw
Substituting the definition into (G.3)
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Mwh + Mwh = w h + (w + w )hc + Q - w1h1+PV
w w w w su su sp c c hwflfl 1PW
Substituting (3.3.12) into the former equation
hw(w sp + wc + wsu -w f) + M h =
Wsubsu + (wSP + wc)hc + Q h -wflh f+PV
M h = w h + (w + w )hc + Qh - w h + PV
w w su su sp c c h flhfl+PW
(wsp + wc + Wsu - Wfl)hw (G.4)
Taking equation (3.3.17) and developing it:
M v + M v + Mwv + Mwv
s 55s w w w w
Substituting (3.3.11) and (3.3.12) into the former equation
Msys + Mwv w+ (wf 1 - WC)vs + (wsp + wc + Vsu wfi)vw = 0 (G.5)
The general case is:
V s VS(h s',P
Vw = v (hyP)
Taking the derivative of the expressions
avs . avs
5 5 S ap
av . av
v V= hs+ t
+
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Substituting the former derivatives into (G.5)
av . av .av 
. aV, .
Ms[ hs + PJ + M[I h + wr =
s wt
s-(w -a w v -w - +w-
f(wi - wc s sp - wc + wsu-~ fl Vw
Substituting (G.2) and (G.4) into (G.6)
av5  avs. av .
wl(hf - hs) + PMsvs) + Ms P + v LP +
s
av
-_s-[w h +(w + w )h + Q - w hfI + PV
ah, su su )h c- ~h -W~f
-(w + wc + wsu -wfl)hw] = (w - wc)vs
-(w sp + w + w -su ~fl
At this point the quasi steady state assumptions are applied.
hs h hg(P)
hc ~c h ~ h (P) w H~ h/h
.av av . avf . avf
P* MS gMV g + M9 P + M a*P + my[wsuhsu + (wp + wc)hf
+ PV -(wsp + Wc + wsu fl1)hf + Qh Wflhg] =
- (wif - wc)Vg ~ Vsp +Vwc+ Wsu~ tfl Vf
. av av av avf
P[M ( ~ v9 + ) + M( V + )
fi( - c g sp c w V+su~tfl)Vf~
(G.6)
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avf
-i [wsu(hsu - hf) + w fhf- wh 9 + Qh1
Noting that
w fh f - wihg = Wf(hf 
- h) = - Wflhfg
the final equation is
-(SW)w(h w)av
(w -c g sp wc wsu~ fl f at suhsu-hf
av av avav
M ( v + g) +MC( v + ) (G.7)
Equation (G.7) is the quasi steady state model for the pressure in
the pressurizer.
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APPENDIX H
CONTROL SYSTEM SIMULATION PROGRAM
The code simulates the behavior of the pressure and level in the N.S.
Savannah pressurizer. Although only the pressure and the level appear in
the print sequence, with minor changes it is possible to call a different
couple of variables and print them. The code has been writtein in AOS,
which is the appropriate language for TS-58 and T5-59 programmable
calculators. This code only fits in the T5-59 calculator.
The inputs to the code are divided into two groups:
1. Inputs directly to memory registers
2. Inputs directly to program locations. The meaning of each input and
its location is given in Table H.1.
Also the code uses 30 numerical registers, leaving the remaining as
program memory locations. This means that the memory partition is 719.29.
Because of the code size, no automatic stop feature has been added,
that is, the code has to be started and stopped by hand. The most
practical way to stop the code is to press the R/S key immediately after
the print sequence has finished. If the code has to be restarted press
GTO 478, R/S.
Every set point for the pressurizer control system can be changed at
the programmer's will. Table H.2 shows the set points and their
locations. Table H.3 has the step-by-step sequence for using the code;
and finally Table H.4 displays the code listings. -
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Table H.1
INPUTS To THE PROGRAM
Inputs to Memory Registers
Variable Register Number
P(k) 10
Mf (k) 11
M (k) 12
L(k-1) 14
hw(k) 17
P(k-1) 21
Mote: Every other register is initiated with 0 value.
Inputs to Code Locations
Variable Value.
Klet 14.0
Kk-L 18.0
maIO
w p
K Q
K
sp
h
sp
7 x wsu(max)
hsuh
su
K1
K2
K3
118;
327;
444;
76
12
1134
78
1184
1.
0.
10
Value
11.93
1152.992
180.7521
0.69
1489.13
11.93
Code Locations
076; 077
098; 099
119; 120; 121
211; 212
270; 271; 272
328; 329; 330
370; 371
445; 446; 447
688; 689
699; 700
668; 669
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Table H.1 (continued)
INPUTS TO THE PROGRAM
Note: As far as the code concerns (see notation, Chapter 3)
Klet = Km x Kiet
K = m xKmaKmak K rxKnak
K = Km x K
Ks = Km x KKsp  sp
Table H.2
SET POINTS LOCATIONS
Variable Value Program Location
EL(k) ref 4.3608 013;014;O15;016;017;018
Ep (k) ref 8.864 148;149;150;151;152
ep (k) ref(sprays) .13 164;165;166;167
Ec (o)(sprays) .032 178;179;180;181
Ep(Qh)max 8.96 231;232;233;234
Ep(Qh)min 88 241;242;243
Lret/l148  .4992 419;420;421;422;423
Note: Because of the calculator low memory capacity the back-up heaters
have been lumped in one group, starting its action at ECp(Qh)minand
stopping its action at ECp(Qh)max
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Table H.3
USERS MANUAL
Comments Key Sequence
1. Turn calculator and printer on
2. Input memory partition 3, 2nd OP 17
3. Load program (either by hand or
using magnetic cards)
4. Input initial data (Tables H.1, H.2)
5. Start program RST; R/S
6. Stop program R/S
7. Restart program GTO 478, R/S
Note: If the user wants to change a value during execution, he should
wait until next print sequence is done and stop it by pressing R/S. Then
he can change to the desired value and restart the program.
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Table H.4
Control System Simulation Code
17
' - - - -
- i i-a
- - - - - -- - - - L i
-E-:-7t
II
- . . -- :
--- : . .
-L-
. . - . . -- . . . - - r .
V*. 1 .
. t. . 1.01-J
-:F
.- .- t" -Z
- i-
.-D
- I
Li L
t I
----
.- ,
ZI.
._2
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Table H.4 (continued)
-7-
.r7 -. 7-
- -, .-
-- --. .
- -
-- - r---t
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Table H.4 (continued)
J
--4
i -T
-
J
-
L L-.. -
- -
- -
- E-1--
-- 
.
-74r r. -
7- -
r- -
- .. - c
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Table H.4 (continued)
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Table H.4 (continued)
-7-- -
---n--.-9
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APPENDIX I
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE N.S. SAVANNAH PRESSURIZER
VESSEL
The pressurizer (Fig. J-1) is a vertical, cylindrical vessel with
hemispherical heads at both ends.
The base material is Type SA-212, Grade B carbon steel and clad with
.109" thick SA-240, Grade S Stainless Steel.
The upper head is a 4'-6" I.D. hemispherical head and contains a 15"
opening for the manway, two 2" penetrations for safety valve connections,
a 1" penetration for the pressure transmitted connection and a 1"
penetration for the vent connection. Welded to the outside of this upper
head also are three 2' thick lifting lugs, material U.S.C.G. 51.04, Grade
D carbon steel.
The cylindrical section is a Z 1.D. vessel with 3-5/8" thick
SA-212 Grade B carbon steel walls and a .109" thick SA-240 Grade S
stainless steel cladding. Welded internally also -m-e four platform
support lugs, material SA-240, Grade S. There are elded interally
three stabilizer support bars, material SA-240, Grade for supporting
the surge chamber.
There are two 1-1/2" penetrations in this section for the temperature
sensing wells, two 1" penetrations for water level indicator connections
and a 2" penetration for the spray nozzle.
The lower head is also a 4'6" I.D. hemispherical head, material Type
SA-212, Grade B, carbon steel, 2-7/8" thick SA-240, Grade 5, stainless
steel cladding. This lower head contains 160 penetratons, 1.295" I.D. on
Tn
m c
n
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3" triangular pitch. There is also a 6-3/4" 1.0. penetration in the
lower head for the 4" insurge-outsurge nozzle.
INTERNALS
The vessel internals consist of the in-spray piping, in-spray nozzle,
upper surge chamber, lower surge chamber, in-surge, out-surge baffle
plate stand pipe assembly and 160 heater wells containing the electric
heaters.
IN-SURGE, OUT-SURGE
This nozzle serves the dual function of both and in-surge and
out-surge connection and is fitted with a thermal sleeve, with slots cut
in the sleeJe for drainage. In addition a baffle plate ;s welded to the
end pf the surge nozzle insicte the vessel. Primary water enters and
leaves this nozzle vertically and the flow is directed by means of the
control surge chamber.
STAND PIPE ASSEMBLY
The function of this assumption is to aid in measuring the
pressurizer water level. T~is assembly provides the constant reference
level from which changes in pressurizer water level are measured and
recorded. This as~embly consists of lit Sche1ule 40 SA-312 pipe connected
to the trasmit,er nozzle in the upper head, terminating with an open end
above the reservoir cup. This reservoir cup is connected by means of two
3/8" schedule 80 SA-212 pipes to the two level indicator connections in
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the cylindrical section. The cup is supported by the spider, consisting
of four 3/4" schedule 40, SA-312 pipes.
IN-SPRAY
Primary water also enters the spray nozzle located in the upper shell
section and flows through the stainless steel 1-1/4" Schedule 160 spray
piping to the spray distribution nozzle located in the center of the
upper part of the vessel. This spray distribution nozzle has a spray
angle of 45* designed so that the spray will not impinge on the vessel
walls at normal water level or operating conditions. The spray
distribution nozzle is screwed to the spray line.
The spray distribution nozzle is of the cone, hollow type with pipe
threads and locking clip welded to the nozzle and pipe to prevent
rotation. The spray distribution nozzle directs the water in such a
manner as to condense the steam in the upper portion of the vessel. The
spray nozzle is fitted with a thermal sleeve designed to protect the
vessel from temperature fluctuations of the incoming fluid. The spray
internal piping is welded to the spray nozzle.
SURGE CHAMBER
The surge chamber is essentially a cone-shaped baffle made up of an
upper and lower section with an internal volume of 26 cubic feet. The
surge chamber is supported at the top by three stabilizer bars. These
stabilizer bars are made of stainless steel, SA-24-, Grade 5, welded to
the inside of the vessel shell and bolted to the upper section of the
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surge chamber. The upper part of the upper section is cylindrical, 36"
0.D., material SA-240, Grade S, 1-1/4" thick plate. There are three 3/8"
x 5/8" slotted holes, 1200 apart for bolting to the stabilizer bars and
twelve 1" diameter drilled holes. The lower part of this upper section
is conical with a 14-1/32" I.D. at the bottom. The lower section is
cylindrical and is bolted to the upper section with four stainless steel
nuts and bolts. The lower section terminates on and is supported by
means of four support angles, located 90" apart, material SA-240 Grade S
which are welded to the bottom head.
PLATFORM SUPPORTS
Welded to the cylindrical section of the vessel are four platform
supports for maintenance, repair and inspection. These supports are
located 90' apart and are made of SA-240 Grade S, 2-1/2" x 1" x 3".
ELECTRIC HEATERS
The cartridge type, electric heating elements are designed for
vertical insertion into the walls provided in the pressurizer lower head
wall . The electric heaters are provided with electrical terminals for
connection to a power source that equals the heating rating.
The tubular pressurizer heaters will operate at 110 volts and are
connected four in series across a 440 volt supply. Each heater is rated
at 40 watts per square inch of heated sheath surface and have an outside
diameter of 0.553" with an effective heating length of 20 inches. The
heaters are enclosed by heater wells which extend vertically into the
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lower part of the vessel by means of stainless steel transition sleeves.
The heaters are held within the heater walls by means of mechanical
pressure seals which also serve as back-up well closures in the event of
heater well failure. They are mounted on a 3" triangular pitch in order
to provide for attachment of heater terminal box assemblies to the vessel.
The heater wells totally enclose the replaceable electric heaters.
The internal end of the heater wells are sealed by means of a welded plug
and externally by means of a mechanical pressure seal welded to the end.
The heater wells have an I.D. of 0.570" and are designed for 2015
psia external pressure and 900*F. The transition sleeve for the heater
well is welded to the heater well externally and to the vessel internally.
Heater well mechanical seals consisting of a nut and ferrule are
provided for each heater. They provide a high pressure seal between the
heater and the heater well on the external end of the well. The seal
retains the heater in position and prevents leakage in the event of well
failure from 637"F and 2015 psia.
NOZZLES
The pressurizer vessel is fitted with a total of ten nozzles.
The following nozzles are located in the upper hemispherical head:
o One 15" I.D. manway nozzle forging, carbon steel, U.S.C.G.
51.46, F-105-II.
o One 1" vent nozzle, carbon steel nozzles, U.S.C.G. 51.34,
P-106-B, SA-213, TP-302, stainless steel cladding.
o Two 2" safety valve carbon steel nozzles, U.S.C.G. 51.34,
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P-106-B, SA-213, TP-302, stainless steel cladding. One nozzle
feeds a line containing a safety relief valve. The second
nozzle feeds a line containing a safety diaphragm operated valve
which is pressure activated.
o One 1" pressure transmitter nozzle, carbon steel, U.S.C.G.
51.34, P-106-B, SA-213, TP-304 with stainless steel cladding.
The following nozzles are located in the cylindrical section:
o Two 1" water level indicator nozzles, carbon steel, U.S.C.G.
51.34, P-106-B, SA-213, TP-304 with stainless steel cladding.
o One 2" in-spray carbon steel nozzle, U.S.C.G. 51.34, P-106-B,
SA-213, TP-304 with stainless steel thermal sleeve and stainless
steel cladding.
o Two 1-1/2" stainless steel temperature sensing wells. Both are
located in the cylindrical section. Each well is 1-1/2" O.D. x
10.34" in length with 6" extending into the vessel and a 9"
screwed nipple on the external end. One well is located in the
steam space and one in the water space on the aft end of the
vessel approximately 15* starboard of the fore-aft centerline so
as to clear the level indicating device and remain water covered
after a 10 cubic foot outsurge and under design conditions of
pitch and roll.
On the center of the lower hemispherical head is located the 4"
in-surge and out-surge carbon steel nozzle, U.S.C.G. 51.34, P-106-B,
SA-213, TP-304, with stainless steel thermal sleeve and stainless steel
cladding.
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MANWAY AND SUPPORTS
The 15" I.D. manway located in the upper elliptical head, serves as
the only access to the pressurizer. The manway is sealed by a welded
diaphragm and bolted cover plat, 29" O.D. by 5-1/4" thick with sixteen
2-3/8" diameter holes equally spaced to receive the 2-1/4" dia. x 11-5/8"
long studs. Two lifting lugs are provided on the manway cover. The
manway can also be sealed by means of a flexitallic gasket on a temporary
basis if no welding facilities are available.
The pressurizer will be vertically mounted on a cylindrical support
ring and skirt attached to the bottom hemispherical head. Access holes
are provided in this support skirt for removing the replacable electric
heaters.
INSULATION
The pressurizer is fitted with a support ring for insulation. This
ring is located on the pressurizer support skirt. There will be a 4"
thickness of insulation on the entire vessel including the lower head
inside the supporting skirt.
